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ABSTRACT 
This research determines the quality of Australian public companies’ disclosure 
of greenhouse gas emission information in annual reports and stand-alone sustainability 
reports for the years 2007 and 2009.  Factors that have influenced these disclosures are 
also examined along with changes in disclosure between 2007 and 2009.  Some 1,776 
companies are studied for 2007 and 1,853 for 2009.  These companies represent the 
population of ASX-listed companies in those years. 
An index is used to measure the quality of those disclosures by reference to their 
being soft, unverifiable statements, or hard disclosures, where supporting evidence is 
possible.  Influential factors considered for the incidence of these disclosures come from 
information asymmetry, agency, political cost and proprietary cost theories.  Examining 
the disclosures from points of time on either side of the enforcement of the NGER Act 
2007 (Cth) establishes how these voluntary disclosures have progressed over this time. 
Ascertaining the content, motivations and progression of voluntary disclosures 
of greenhouse gas emission information reveals corporate commitment to the climate 
change agenda.  It also reveals corporate attitude to society’s climate change concerns.  
Establishing the population of ASX-listed companies’ 2007 and 2009 voluntary 
greenhouse gas emission disclosure practices permits a firm benchmark from which 
future cross-sectional and temporal comparisons may be made. 
Results determine that while the quality of voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
disclosures improves for some companies over the duration of the study, this cannot be 
generalised to the population.  Results also suggest that greenhouse gas emission 
disclosures are motivated by companies that are seeking new debt finance, are more 
highly leveraged, participate in less competitive product-markets, are large, are 
currently underperforming financially but are held in good esteem in the stock market, 
have older assets and hold additional listing status on securities exchanges outside of 
Australia.  Companies in the GICS sector - materials are likely to disclose more than 
those in other GICS sectors. 
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Chapter 1 Problem Identification 
1.1 Introduction to the Problem 
This research determines the nature of Australian public companies’ disclosure 
of greenhouse gas emission information in annual reports and stand-alone sustainability 
reports for the years 2007 and 2009, and factors that have influenced such disclosures, 
and identifies the progress of those disclosures.  Some researchers believe that climate 
change is among the great issues of our time (for example, Elkington, 2006) and that, 
globally, it is a major concern for governments, communities, businesses and 
individuals.  Climate change is influenced by naturally-occurring physical, chemical and 
biological processes and the activities of human inhabitants (Bureau of Meteorology, 
2008).  Anthropogenic (i.e., human) activities have increased concentrations of gases 
such as carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and others (i.e., 
greenhouse gases (GHG)) within the atmosphere, a phenomenon which has been termed 
the “greenhouse effect” by scientists.   
International cooperation to constrain GHG emissions led to the establishment of 
The Kyoto Protocol, which came into force in February 2005 and has 182 signatories as 
of May 2008 (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2008).  
Under this protocol, signatory countries are committed to achieving binding targets of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2012 (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 1998).  Australia became a party to the Kyoto Protocol in 
December 2007 (Department of Climate Change, 2007).   
Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol followed the enactment of the 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER).  The National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) provides a single national reporting 
framework with multiple objectives.  The objectives are the collection and 
dissemination of information relating to greenhouse gas emissions, energy production 
and energy consumption to underpin a “cap-and-trade” scheme (otherwise known as an 
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emissions trading scheme or ETS) intended to reduce carbon emissions.  Australia’s 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism, part of the Government’s Clean Energy Plan, released on 
10 July 2011 (Australian Government, 2012b) announced the legislated introduction of  
Australia’s emissions trading scheme.  Commencing on 1 July 2012,  carbon prices are 
fixed by the government until 30 June 2015 (Australian Securities Exchange, 2012).  
After that date, the mechanism allows for a fully flexible cap-and-trade scheme 
(Australian Government, 2012a).   
Possession of this data allows the Australian government to meet its 
international reporting obligations, formulate government policies at the State, Territory 
and Commonwealth levels, and inform the Australian public.  An important intention of 
the NGER legislation is to streamline corporations’ reporting obligations and to avoid 
the duplication of similar reporting requirements in the States and Territories ("National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007," 2007, s3).  This legislation requires 
corporations with operational control over facilities to report to the Australian Federal 
Government all of their Scope 1 and Scope 2
1
 GHG emissions, reductions, removals 
and offsets, and all their energy consumption and production from 1 July 2008 if either 
a corporate threshold or a facility level threshold is reached for specified levels.  At the 
corporate group level the threshold is 125 kilotonnes of CO2-equilavent (CO2-e), or 500 
terajoules of energy production, or 500 terajoules of energy consumption.  The facility 
level thresholds are 25 kilotonnes of CO2-e, or 100 terajoules of energy production, or 
100 terajoules of energy consumption (Australian Government Department of Climate 
Change, 2008).     
The concepts of operational control and facilities are key components of the Act.  
Operational control
2
 exists if corporations (including their subsidiaries, joint ventures or 
partnerships) have the authority to introduce and implement operating, health and 
                                                 
1
 Scope 1 emissions are releases of GHG as a result of an activity or series of activities that 
constitute the facility; Scope 2 emissions are releases of GHG that result from one or more activities that 
generate electricity, heating, cooling or steam that is consumed by the facility but that do not form part of 
the facility (National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations 2008, s.223); a third type of 
emissions, Scope 3, is not covered under the Act and is generated in the wider economy because of a 
facility’s activities but are produced by another facility (Australian Government Department of Climate 
Change, 2008). 
2
 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, s. 11. 
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safety, or environmental policies for their facilities.  A facility is defined under the Act
3
 
as an activity or series of activities that involve the production of greenhouse gas 
emissions, the production of energy or the consumption of energy that form a single 
undertaking or enterprise.    
Operational control or the declaration of the existence of a facility may also be 
determined by the administrator of the NGER Scheme.  This administrator was 
originally the Greenhouse and Energy Data Officer; however the Clean Energy 
Regulator, a government body, assumed that role on 1
st
 April 2012 (Australian 
Government, 2012d).  The administrator’s functions encompass the management of the 
National Greenhouse and Energy Register including the registration and deregistration 
of reporting corporations, monitoring compliance and enforcing the legislation, 
arranging external auditing, and the provision of communications and resources to assist 
with compliance (Australian Government Department of Climate Change, 2008).   
Reporting is to be made via a government web portal (OSCAR
4
) by 31 October, 
2009.  Publication of the obtained data is available from 28 February in 2010, on the 
Department of Climate Change website.  Under the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007, lower annual thresholds for reporting corporate GHG levels are 
progressively phased in, finalising at 50 kilotonnes of CO2-e, or 200 terajoules of 
energy production, or 200 terajoules of energy consumption by the 2010-11 financial 
year
5
.  This captures a greater number of corporations than the initial 700 medium and 
large companies expected to mandatorily report by 31 October 2009 (Australian 
Government Department of Climate Change, 2009).  The threshold level for facility 
CO2-e emissions remains at 25 kilotonnes. 
There are few mandatory corporate reporting requirements for sustainability or 
environmental issues in Australia at present under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or 
applicable to the Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASX) listing.  The key mandatory 
annual report disclosure of environmental matters for Australian companies is under the 
                                                 
3
 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, s. 9. 
4
 Online System for Comprehensive Activity Reporting, 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/oscar/index.html 
5
 National Greenhouse Energy and Reporting Act 2007, s13(iii). 
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Corporations Act 2001
6, which requires directors to report the entity’s performance in 
relation to any particular and significant environmental regulation under which they 
operate.  This requirement commenced on 1 July 1998 (Frost & English, 2002; Hanson 
& White, 2003) and is associated with an increase in the number of companies reporting 
about their level of environmental performance, although there is considerable variation 
in the content reported (Frost, 2007).  Since 1 January, 2005, companies operating in the 
extractive industries must comply with AASB 6 for measuring, recognising, and 
disclosure of exploration and evaluation assets.  Superannuation and certain managed 
investment funds must set out information detailing their consideration, or otherwise, of 
labour standards, environmental, social or ethical issues when making investment 
decisions to demonstrate their ethical investment credentials in their product disclosure 
statements
7
.  
It has been observed that Australian firms have voluntarily made environmental 
disclosures as early as the 1950s (Guthrie & Parker, 1989), and have disclosed details of 
their operational performance in relation to the environment within their annual reports  
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Kent & Chan, 2009).  GHG disclosures are a specific form of 
environmental reporting given that they address issues that have been identified as 
influencing climate change.  Although the NGER Act was enacted on 29 September 
2007 (Australian Government Department of Climate Change, 2009), there is evidence 
of Australian firms reporting information about their greenhouse gas emissions in their 
2007 annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports. 
1.2 General Problem 
Determining a manager’s incentive to disclose or withhold information when it 
is not mandated is an important accounting problem (Verrecchia, 1990).  Imperfect 
information, termed information asymmetry, is a characteristic of the capital market, and 
exists because managers are frequently better informed than investors.  Voluntary 
disclosures are attempts to remove this asymmetry (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006) and 
                                                 
6
s299(1)(f) “The directors' report for a financial year must if the entity's operations are subject to 
any particular and significant environmental regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or 
Territory--give details of the entity's performance in relation to environmental regulation.” 
7
Corporations Act 2001, s1013D, effective from 11 March 2002. 
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signalling theory suggests that managers attempt to reduce uncertainty resulting from 
information differences by making disclosures (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  This 
theory suggests that companies that believe they are better than others signal this 
through their voluntary disclosures, seeking to attract investment and to enhance their 
reputation (Campbell, Shrives & Bohmbach-Saager, 2001).   
The belief that no news is bad news is a rational assumption in capital markets 
(Lundholm & Van Winkle, 2006) and underpins the phenomenon of adverse selection 
(see Akerlof, 1970, for an example).  The adverse selection phenomenon induces firms 
to fully disclose information that outside investors know they possess, otherwise 
liquidity levels for firm shares are reduced (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000), and 
undervaluation of the company results.  In the absence of disclosure, the market 
assumes that this information is unfavourable to the company; otherwise it would have 
been reported.  The firm, therefore, has an incentive to fully disclose both good and bad 
information and avoid a negative response from the markets (Grossman, 1981; 
Milgrom, 1981).  The failure of firms to make full disclosure implies that frictions exist 
that influence management’s disclosure decisions (Verrecchia, 1983). These frictions 
relate to the costs of making discretionary disclosure.   
Parties external to the firm are aware of the existence of private information, but 
not its content (Verrecchia, 1983), and a corporate manager decides to release private 
information based on the information’s potential effect on the market (Verrecchia, 
1983).  Knowledge of this information influences decisions made by actors within the 
capital, labour and corporate control markets (Foster, 1986), and those in the consumer 
market, regulatory bodies, and the general public (Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995).   
Several forms of disclosure costs exist, including those that affect a firm’s 
position in product markets (Nagar, 1999) and those that impose political costs that 
reduce profits (Wagenhofer, 1990).  Product market disclosure costs are endogenous 
costs (Dye, 2001), identified as those that give rise to competitive concerns including 
the threat of new entrants to the market, if the disclosing firm is one that earns high 
profits (Berger & Hann, 2007; Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Darrough & Stoughton, 
1990; Dye, 2001; Gigler, 1994; Hayes & Lundholm, 1996; Verrecchia, 1990; 
 5 
 
Wagenhofer, 1990).  Political costs associated with disclosure arise from regulation, 
union demands or adverse media reports (Wagenhofer, 1990).   
1.3 Voluntary Disclosures 
Statutes, professional regulations and stock exchange listing requirements 
mandate certain corporate disclosures (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  Voluntary 
disclosures are unregulated, and represent the excess over the minimum of required 
disclosures (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  Voluntary disclosures, therefore, are made with 
free choice, or at the discretion of the reporting entity and, consequently, vary in terms 
of subject matter, amount of information provided, and degree of detail.   
1.4 Benefits of Voluntary Disclosures 
Possible benefits of voluntary disclosures include improving the marketability of 
shares, and thus positively influencing the firm’s market valuation, and easing financing 
considerations, and thus reducing firms’ cost of debt (Cerf, 1961).  Additional 
information reduces uncertainty about the quality of the firm as a means of investment 
and corporate voluntary disclosures provide reassurance about a firm’s ability to pay 
dividends and to meet debt obligations.  Thus, enhanced disclosure influences 
reductions in a firm’s cost of capital (Bushee & Leuz, 2005; Clarkson, Li, Richardson & 
Vasvari, 2008; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Huang & Zhang, 2008).  The provision of 
additional information lowers information asymmetries between the firm’s management 
and investors (Hayes & Lundholm, 1996) and financiers (Clarkson et al., 2008).  
Increased disclosure influences analysts, credit rating outlets, media outlets, and other 
third party information providers (Arya & Mittendorf, 2005; Banghoj & Plenborg, 
2008).  It also lowers their information gathering and reporting costs, and enhances 
external monitoring (Huang & Zhang, 2008).  Additional disclosure reduces agency 
problems (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Whittred, Zimmer, 
Taylor & Wells, 2004), and political costs (Jantadej & Kent, 1999).  Litigation risk has 
also been attributed to influencing the decision to make voluntary disclosures (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001).  For example, firms have been found to volunteer information seeking to 
pre-empt potential lawsuits in the presence of large negative earnings surprises (Field, 
Lowry & Shu, 2005; Skinner, 1994). 
 6 
 
Further disclosure also reduces the incentive to acquire private information and 
reduces the information acquisition costs of individual investors (Diamond, 1985; 
Verrecchia, 1982), improving the liquidity of the shares (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991).  
Miller (2002) found that investors respond positively to increased discretionary 
disclosure.  Less directly-observable, but nevertheless potentially influential to a firm’s 
cash flows, are the reputational effects stemming from additional disclosure (Campbell 
et al., 2001; Einhorn & Ziv, 2008).     
Internal benefits derived from the making of voluntary environmental 
disclosures include potential improvements in organisational practices and the 
management of environmental impacts.   These opportunities arise through the process 
of gathering environmental information to enable reporting.  Other beneficial prospects 
are the potential to gain additional general and investment community support as a 
consequence of good environmental performance (Deegan & Rankin, 1999).    
1.5 Costs of Voluntary Disclosures 
Direct and indirect costs are involved in making voluntary disclosures (Niskanen 
& Nieminen, 2001).  Direct costs are those pertaining to the preparation and 
dissemination of the information (Field et al., 2005; Lev, 1992) and include data 
collection, processing, production and auditing costs (Gray, Radebaugh & Roberts, 
1990).  Other costs are litigation, political, competitive disadvantage costs and 
constraints on managerial behaviour (Foster, 1986).  Indirect costs result from the 
revelation of proprietary information to competitors (Dye, 1986) or to other market 
participants (Darrough, 1993), the loss of bargaining power to unions or suppliers 
(Foster, 1986, p. 38), or the implicit agreement to provide future voluntary disclosures 
to the capital market (Einhorn & Ziv, 2008).  Financial executives from the United 
Kingdom and United States agree that the indirect cost of competitive disadvantage is 
the most important cost constraint of making voluntary disclosures (Gray et al., 1990). 
 
Proprietary Costs 
A manager’s endowment of private information contains proprietary information 
and non-proprietary information (Dye, 1986) and is acquired through management 
 7 
 
planning and controlling activities.   Unlike proprietary information, disclosed non-
proprietary information has little influence on the present value of a firm’s cash flows.  
Its classification (as non-proprietary information) is dependent on the other information 
privately held by the firm’s manager (Dye, 1986) as, in combination, disclosure could 
improve the ability of competitors to make inferences about a firm’s cost structure or 
future plans, and reduce cash flows to the firm.  The reduction of cash flows to the firm 
results in proprietary costs (Dye, 1986).   
The existence of proprietary costs produces management-tension regarding the 
decision to voluntarily disclose private information.  The manager’s conundrum is that 
while the disclosed information could be useful in more accurate firm-valuation in 
financial markets (Bhojraj, Blacconiere & D'Souza, 2004), it could also alert other 
parties to the firm’s business strategy, technical innovations and other firm-specifics 
(Elliott & Jacobson, 1994).   Disclosing private information could lead to favourable 
financial market results, in that the firm’s cost of capital reduces or the liquidity of its 
shares increases, but those disclosures could bring about significant competitive 
disadvantages in the product market (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994).    Managers must trade 
off the benefits from additional disclosure against the costs of revealing potentially 
harmful information (Aerts, Cormier & Magnan, 2008; Cormier & Magnan, 2007; 
Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven, 2005; Darrough, 1993; Depoers, 2000; Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Wagenhofer, 1990) and either do not otherwise disclose (Cho & Patten, 
2007), or a partial disclosure occurs (Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1983).        
1.6 Targets of Voluntary Disclosures 
Voluntary disclosures are targeted towards multiple audiences (Einhorn, 2007).  
Aside from capital markets and financing considerations, managers’ communication of 
voluntary information is directed to a broader group of stakeholders.  Additional 
audiences include competitors in the product market, consumers, suppliers, employees, 
labour unions, creditors, and regulatory authorities (Einhorn, 2007).   Mission 
statements, a form of voluntary disclosure, have been found to be directed to customers, 
shareholders, business partners, employees, community, and those concerned about the 
environment (Campbell et al., 2001). A survey of Australian sustainability reporting 
practices found eight target audiences:  employees, shareholders, customers, local 
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community, institutional investors, suppliers, analysts and other (Australian 
Government Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2005).  
1.7 Social Responsibility 
The consideration of these relevant audiences (Suchman, 1995) is often an 
attempt to promote the firm’s stance or performance in areas denoting social 
responsibility. In general terms, corporate social responsibility is concerned with a 
firm’s behaviour and its economic, social and environmental performance.  Corporate 
social responsibility reporting is a relatively recent, continually evolving and generally 
unregulated concept (Deegan, 2006, p. 381).   Given the diverse audiences, interest in 
one aspect of social responsibility, i.e., a firm’s specific environmental performance, is 
unlikely to abate in the near future.  Public disclosures of GHG emission data in annual 
reports, the major corporate social and environmental communication medium (Brown 
& Deegan, 1998; O'Donovan, 2002), and stand-alone sustainability reports are likely to 
help satisfy some of the current information requirements of those audiences.   
1.8 Objectives of This Research 
This research examines the economic implications of voluntary reporting of 
GHG emission information by Australian publicly-listed companies as early as 2007.  It 
relies on corporate disclosures made in annual reports and stand-alone sustainability or 
environmental reports.  It investigates management decisions to disclose that 
information within the context of positive accounting theory.  The pursuit of positive 
accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) is to explain and predict management’s 
motives for their financial reporting choices.  Within this framework, research on a 
firm’s decision to make voluntary disclosures is undertaken within a capital markets 
setting (Birt, Bilson, Smith & Whaley, 2006). 
This research has three objectives.  The first is to determine the nature of GHG 
emissions data reported by Australian publicly-listed companies in their annual reports 
or stand-alone sustainability
8
 reports for the years 2007 and 2009.  A 2005 Australian 
government inquiry did not endorse legislative intervention concerning corporate social 
                                                 
8
 For the remainder of this thesis, reference to “sustainability reports” includes environmental 
reports. 
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responsibility and its accompanied reporting (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, 2006).  The inquiry committee concluded that 
mandatory corporate responsibility reporting would lead to a meaningless compliance 
tick-a-box culture, defeating the purpose behind corporate responsibility concepts 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 2006).    The 
unregulated nature of voluntary disclosures suggests their content varies across firms 
and across time.  Establishing the content of voluntary disclosures of GHG emission 
information reveals corporate commitment to the corporate responsibility agenda.   
The second objective is to determine why these discretionary disclosures have 
been made when firms meeting NGER Act reporting thresholds are only required to 
report via a government portal commencing in 2009.  Firms operate within an 
environment of numerous stakeholder and constituent groups, for example, capital 
markets, labour markets, suppliers, product markets, competitors, potential entrants, 
employees, communities, and corporate control.  Therefore, the provision of additional 
disclosure often has simultaneous and contradictory effects (Lev, 1992).    
The third objective is to determine disclosures before and after implementation 
of the NGER legislation by comparing GHG emissions data reported voluntarily in 
2007 to those disclosed in 2009.  As societal attitudes and expectations concerning 
environmental issues change, and governmental environmental regulations become 
more prolific, it is necessary for businesses to re-examine their environmental 
performance and practices and to make adjustments accordingly.  It is beneficial to 
determine whether the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) 
stimulates additional annual report and sustainability report disclosures, and to reveal 
companies’ disclosures in these media before and after the Act.    
1.9 Research questions 
The thesis provides answers to the following research questions: 
What is the nature of greenhouse gas disclosures in annual reports and stand-
alone sustainability reports of Australian companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for 2007 and 2009? 
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Why do these companies voluntarily supply greenhouse gas information in these 
reports? 
How did the disclosures change from 2007, two years’ prior to the requirement 
for any disclosure, to 2009, when it became mandatory for corporations meeting 
emission thresholds to report to the government body responsible for clean energy and 
carbon emissions reduction?  
1.10 Contribution of the Research 
The introduction of the NGER legislation emphasises the importance the 
Australian Government places on the issue of GHG reporting.  Australian corporations’ 
GHG disclosure information in annual reports and sustainability reports is currently 
unknown as most research has focused on environmental voluntary disclosures in 
general. The contribution of this research is that it examines a specific type of 
environmental disclosure, GHG emissions, and focuses on the period prior to and 
immediately following the new NGER legislation.  This establishes the pre-legislative 
characteristics of GHG reporting and its post-legislative development.   It includes a 
sample of all companies listed on the ASX in 2007 and 2009.  Therefore, this research 
covers small, medium and large companies.   
Previous Australian studies have been completed before the NGER legislation, 
while others focus on the Top 300 companies.   Simnett and Nugent (2007) found that 
less than 10 per cent of Australian listed companies made GHG disclosures in their 
annual reports in 2005 and recommended that external verification of disclosures lends 
credibility to the information.  Wahyuni, Rankin and Windsor (2009) took a legitimacy 
viewpoint in their analysis of 2007 voluntary disclosures of ASX300 firms in annual 
reports, stand-alone environment or sustainability reports, and corporate websites, 
connecting them to the existence of  the firms’ environmental management systems.    
Perera and Jubb (2011) provide the first investigation concerning the NGER Act.  
They studied the voluntary environmental disclosures made by NGER Act-affected 
companies’ annual reports and sustainability reports.  The sample studied constituted 
approximately 4 per cent of listed companies.   The disclosures targeted in these reports 
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were the number of references to the NGER Act or GHG volumes in the financial years 
ending 30 June 2007 and 2009. 
Overseas, evidence of companies’ emissions performance and disclosures is also 
limited.  Gamble et al. (1996) studied international trends in environmental disclosure 
practices, which included emissions targets and performance, during the period 1989 to 
1991.  Cerin (2002) found that fewer than 10 per cent of OM Stockholm-listed 
companies provided documented environmental reports on the internet and that CO2 
emission data was lacking in 60 per cent of companies that did provide these reports.  
Clarkson et al. (2008) examined the relationship between environmental performance, 
including performance indicators of GHG emissions, and environmental disclosure for 
firms in high polluting industries in the United States.  Boasson (2009) compared two 
oil companies’ approaches to climate change and reported their management of CO2 
emissions and reductions in gas flaring and venting.  The Canadian Voluntary Climate 
Challenge and Registry served as the basis for Brouhle and Harrington’s (2009) 
research into how Canadian firms addressed GHG emissions, mitigation targets, and 
performance.  
Given the growing interest in reducing individuals’ and organisations’ 
environmental footprints and the concept of environmental sustainability, the 
significance of this research lies in its establishment of the characteristics of greenhouse 
gas emission data reported by Australian publicly-listed companies at a time period 
when it is not mandated.  This knowledge forms a benchmark against which cross-
functional and temporal comparisons can be made, and is useful for stakeholders at all 
levels of society in their decision-making.   
Understanding the characteristics of greenhouse gas information being reported 
is of use to standard-setters and policy-makers, especially given the global context in 
which companies list their securities.  These bodies are able to determine the adequacy 
of the information currently provided and mandate improvements or extensions in the 
form and content of reports to serve their general objectives.  Investors, suppliers, 
creditors, and lobby groups have a deeper insight into the ecological credentials of these 
companies, a knowledge which is likely to influence their future dealings with those 
firms, given the institutional changes emerging within society.   
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Academics and the professional community also desire to know the 
characteristics of the information voluntarily released within the annual report and 
stand-alone sustainability report, i.e., what type of GHG information is reported, how 
much information is reported, whether the reported information is qualitative or 
quantitative, whether the information is retrospective or future-oriented, and whether 
performance is measured against targets. This information enables a better 
understanding of corporate voluntary reporting behaviour.  Similarly, knowledge of how 
that information changes over time is beneficial in extending that understanding.  
Establishing reasons for the early disclosure practices allows interested parties to 
anticipate corporate reactions to future legislative mandates and permits conjectures 
about their consequent behaviour.   
1.11 Limitations of the Research 
As this research is limited to Australian-listed public companies, differences in 
business, regulatory and capital markets environments detracts from the generalisability 
of the results to corporations in other parts of the world.  This study investigates GHG 
disclosures in annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports only.  The variety of 
alternative reporting media used by companies is increasing (Adams, Hill & Roberts, 
1998), and disclosures in other media, e.g., a company’s webpage, a corporate brochure, 
a conference call, or a press release
9
, may contain different information.    Appendix A 
provides more comprehensive details of the various types of media studied in recent 
research. 
This research seeks to explain the nature and motivations of voluntary reporting 
of greenhouse gas emissions and relies on agency and information asymmetry theories.  
Because other theories, such as legitimacy, stakeholder, contingency, and transaction 
cost economics are beyond the scope of this study, the ultimate explanations for 
corporate motivations and behaviour in reporting their greenhouse gas emissions at this 
point in time and in these particular media may not have been fully exposed. 
                                                 
9
 This not an exhaustive list of all sources of corporate voluntary disclosures. 
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1.12 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows.  This chapter describes the problem being 
researched and prior related studies.  It provides a summary of the significance of its 
contribution to theory, research, practice and education.  A review of relevant literature, 
from which theories are developed and hypotheses are produced, is presented in Chapter 
Two.  Chapter Three describes the methods and techniques used to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter.    Chapter Four presents descriptive statistics.  
Chapter Five depicts the results and provides an analysis of the data.  The findings of 
the research are summarised in Chapter Six and the limitations and implications 
concerning this research are also discussed therein. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundation and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents key research carried out in the field of voluntary 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission disclosures by business corporations.  In providing a 
summary of research significant in this field, it ultimately draws on existing theories 
from capital market and agency perspectives.  From these perspectives, it sets the 
theoretical framework and develops testable hypotheses about voluntary GHG emission 
disclosures.     
The focal point of voluntary accounting disclosure literature
10
 is on management 
disclosure decisions, which are associated with capital market, contracting, and political 
cost considerations (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  The importance of managers’ disclosures 
relates to the prevention of inefficient resource allocations that result from information 
and incentive problems within a capital market economy (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
While research on voluntary environmental disclosures is well-established, voluntary 
greenhouse gas emission disclosures is under-researched.   
Signatories to the Kyoto Protocol accept obligations to reduce GHG emissions 
via market-based mechanisms (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 1998) and mandatory national emission reduction targets apply under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Australia became a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 but is yet 
to implement emission limiting mechanisms.  As a result, corporate proactivity to 
reduce GHG emissions currently varies considerably. Nevertheless, the National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER Act) has brought corporate 
attention to their GHG emission performance, with some listed companies voluntarily 
disclosing GHG information.  Business corporations’ GHG emission performance is of 
interest to government policy-makers, industry, investors and the general public. 
                                                 
10
 Various literature seeking to determine motivational factors for, and the significance of, the 
practice of making voluntary disclosures has preceded this research.  This literature has included 
accounting, finance and economics disciplines (Verrecchia, 2001), although there is yet to be one 
unifying theoretical framework to explain these disclosures.   
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The chapter continues in the following manner.  Section  2.2 discusses key 
research in the area of voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emission information.  
Section  2.3 leads into the development of hypotheses and precedes a discussion on the 
implications of voluntary disclosures on capital markets, presented in Section  2.4.  This 
is expanded further in Section  2.5 where the information problems inherent in capital 
markets and the acquisition of capital funding are explained.  A discourse on the 
principal/agent problem and voluntary disclosure comes next in Section  2.6.  The 
chapter continues to Sections  2.7 and  2.8 where proprietary costs and political costs 
surrounding the reporting of voluntary GHG disclosures are considered.  Other factors 
are discussed in Section  2.9 where control variables are introduced.  A chapter summary 
is presented in Section  2.10. 
2.2 Voluntary Greenhouse Emission Disclosures 
Voluntary disclosure is a persistent and important feature of corporate reporting 
(Cotter, Lokman & Najah, 2011).  Voluntary disclosures can offer a superior means of 
communicating a company’s economic, environmental, and social opportunities and 
performances rather than simply responding to requests for information from 
stakeholders (Global Reporting Initiative, 2002).  Increased environmental disclosure in 
Australia has been linked to an increase in society’s concern for environmental issues 
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996).  Worldwide, businesses are increasingly considering their 
corporate environmental performance as environmental issues grow in prominence in 
society.  
The body of work concerning the voluntary reporting of greenhouse gas 
emission information is in its early stages and, currently, research is limited.  A study of 
the first reporters under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) 
found no link between Australian corporate large GHG-emitters and voluntary 
disclosures in their annual and sustainability reports (Perera & Jubb, 2011).  Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009) sought to identify the factors relating to the 2005 corporate GHG 
website disclosures of 101 corporations from USA, Canada, Europe and Australia. The 
credibility of ASX 300 companies’ voluntary GHG disclosures in annual reports and 
stand-alone sustainability reports for 2007 were analysed from an institutional 
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governance theoretical perspective by Rankin, Windsor and Wayhuni (2011). 
Matsumura, Prakashand Vera-Muñoz (2010) undertook to determine the relationship 
between carbon emission performance, firm market value and cost of capital.  Freedman 
and Jaggi (2005) compared pollution and GHG disclosures made during 2000 to 2002 
by the world’s largest public corporations11 from Kyoto Protocol-adopting and non-
Kyoto Protocol-adopting countries.  They found superior disclosures by corporations 
from adopting countries.  Similar findings were made in a more recent study of 510 
international corporations
12
 (Freedman & Jaggi, 2011).  Research on voluntary GHG 
emissions reporting is expected to increase as governments around the world ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, introduce regulatory mechanisms to reduce GHGs and/or when 
emissions trading schemes become part of the business environment.   
Several voluntary reporting initiatives have been established to collect and 
disseminate organisational performance concerning climate change activities.   Their 
aims are to document and report, globally, accurate information about corporate 
environmental and social behaviour to make positive changes and to enhance the 
information set available to investors.  These initiatives aim to satisfy institutional 
investors’ demands for corporate carbon performance reporting and to allow investors 
to evaluate their future investment prospects (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2009).  The 
Carbon Disclosure Project has 551 financial institutional signatories with assets of over 
US$71 trillion at 1 February, 2011 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011) indicating the 
significance placed on this type of information for investment decision-making.  
A study of voluntary reports
13
 of GHG emission disclosures found that 
knowledge of this type of climate change information has a valuation effect for 
investors in S&P 500 and large Canadian companies (Griffin et al., 2010).   
                                                 
11
 Freedman and Jaggi (2005) studied the annual reports, environmental reports, and websites of 
120 of the world’s largest public companies in the chemical, oil and gas, energy, and motor vehicle and 
casualty insurance industries. 
12
 The sample of corporations for this later study comprised 148 firms from the European Union, 
106 firms from Japan, 28 firms from Canada, 16 firms from India, and 212 United States corporations 
(Freedman & Jaggi, 2011). 
13
 Griffin, Lont and Sun (2010) sourced their disclosures from Carbon Disclosure Project reports 
for the years 2006 to 2009. 
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2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Systems-oriented theories such as legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional 
provide accepted alternate perceptions of behaviour and have been the focus of various 
researchers (Deegan, 2006).  These are recognised increasingly as being valid concepts 
with which to explain corporate voluntary disclosure decisions.  Reporting beyond 
financial performance on matters of the firm’s social and environmental prominence is 
directly linked to the concept and goal of sustainable development, a phenomenon 
becoming widely embraced by organisations around the world (Deegan, 2005; Robins, 
2006) as being fundamental to their future survival.  Sustainable development is 
concerned with not compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs 
while meeting the needs of the present (United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987).  While the numbers of companies voluntarily 
producing sustainability reports have increased significantly since the early 1990s, the 
quality of the reports, being both unregulated and largely unverified, is questionable 
(Milne & Gray, 2008).  However, third-party verification or commentary on 
sustainability information is increasing as firms seek to improve the quality and 
credibility of the reported information (KPMG, 2008).  Ullmann (1985) is a critic of the 
piecemeal approach to social responsibility research, declaring the findings to be 
inconsistent and ambiguous.  This research provides an alternative theoretical 
perspective. 
The following sections discuss motivating factors likely to influence managers’ 
decisions to voluntarily communicate greenhouse gas emission information in annual 
reports and stand-alone sustainability reports. These factors consider the information 
problem inherent in capital markets and agency relationships, and implications for 
voluntary GHG information in relation to proprietary costs and political costs.  Testable 
hypotheses are developed from these discussions.   
2.4 Capital Markets  
Two obstacles impeding the efficient allocation of resources in capital markets 
relate to problems with information and incentives (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Firms seek 
financial resources from investors or lenders to fund business investments.  Firm 
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management has a motive to misstate the value of potential business opportunities 
because they possess superior information, leaving investors and lenders with an 
information problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Subsequent to gaining financial 
resources, conflicts of interest occur because managers have an incentive to make self-
opportunistic decisions, resulting in an agency problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
In the next section the information problem is discussed.  A discussion of the 
agency problem follows in Section  2.6. 
2.5 Information Problem 
Signalling literature centres on the consequences of asymmetric costs of 
information (Jensen & Smith Jr., 2002).  Although signalling theory originated in the 
labour market, it is generally applicable in any market where information asymmetry 
exists (Morris, 1987).  In a capital markets setting, information asymmetry, the 
information problem, surrounds various parties who have differential knowledge of 
firm-specific information.  Corporate managers possess information about the value of 
the corporation that is superior to that of outside investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), and imbalances frequently exist in 
the possession of private information about the firm’s value between investors (Brown 
& Hillegeist, 2007) or between different agents (Chae, 2005).  Public revelation of 
corporate private information can reduce information asymmetries between managers 
and investors, and among investors (Botosan, 2000).  Disclosing corporate information 
can alleviate problems associated with differing managerial/owner incentives, 
competitive standing, new funding requirements, and relationships with regulatory 
bodies (Alvarez, Sanchez & Dominguez, 2008). 
Signalling is a means of indirectly conveying information to the capital markets 
(Ang & Cheng, 2011).  By publicly communicating corporate private information, 
managers are signalling the superior quality of the corporation over others that do not 
communicate private information (Akerlof, 1970).  Corporate disclosure reduces 
information asymmetries by permitting the company to disseminate value-relevant 
information and, therefore, to potentially influence the perceptions of various interested 
stakeholders (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008) about the future financial prospects of the firm 
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(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006).  Stakeholders interested in corporate disclosure are 
generally external parties such as stock analysts, capital markets and institutional 
investors (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006).    
Voluntarily disclosing GHG performance and management initiatives may be a 
means of distinguishing the firm from a competitor firm and a device that signals firm-
superiority in GHG mitigation.  Providing this private information could lead to a more 
efficient valuation of the company’s future prospects by the capital market and result in 
a higher share price (Alvarez et al., 2008). 
Investors make their stock pricing decisions based on past and estimated future 
returns.  They use all available information to estimate the extent to which the returns of 
future investments are likely to exceed the cost of capital (Botosan, 2000; Clarkson, 
Guedes & Thompson, 1996).  Lack of sufficient information results in uncertainty about 
their estimates and a perception of higher riskiness and, unless the risk can be 
diversified away, investors demand a higher cost of capital in compensation (Botosan, 
1997, 2000).   Investors who possess information about a firm’s GHG performance and 
management may be able to infer possible unrecorded assets and liabilities, and future 
economic performance, and therefore future returns, and thus lessen perceptions of risk. 
Managers have advance knowledge in their managerial capacity about profits, 
future sales contracts, research and development prospects, expansion or divestiture 
plans, decisions concerning acquisition or disposal of key assets, hiring plans for key 
personnel and other business and operational strategies.  These factors are associated 
with firm value.  Information asymmetry (Banghoj & Plenborg, 2008; Lev, 1992) is the 
lack of knowledge of this information in the stock market and therefore is a source of 
firm misvaluations or mispricing (Birt et al., 2006; Lev, 1992).  Information gaps also 
impede the efficient allocation of resources and can result in higher transaction costs 
and lower liquidity (Birt et al., 2006; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991).   
Managers are motivated to provide information that signals the quality of their 
firms’ future prospects to investors and potential investors when share prices are 
undervalued, although to be effective, the signal must not be easily copied (Morris, 
1987).  Clarkson et al. (2008) proposed that environmentally proactive corporations 
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with superior environmental performance have incentives to inform their investors and 
stakeholders of their accomplishments because poor-environmentally performing firms 
simply cannot make the same declarations.  As a consequence, they suggest there is a 
potential for an increase in firm valuation by credible disclosures of environmental 
performance.  This is possible because informed investors infer that good environmental 
performers are likely to have lower environmental risks and liabilities than poorer 
environmental performers.  
Capital Funding 
Corporations obtain capital funding from equity investors and debt holders. 
Linkages between voluntary disclosure and capital markets benefits have been 
established by theoretical and empirical research (Botosan & Harris, 2000).  Prior 
empirical research has supported higher levels of disclosures being associated with 
lower costs of equity capital (Botosan, 1997, 2000; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 
2002), although this research is without consistent results (Abad, Bravo & Trombetta, 
2008; Fields, Lys & Vincent, 2001; Francis, Nanda & Olsson, 2008; Holm & 
Rikhardsson, 2006; Joos, 2000).  Sengupta (1998) found that disclosure can lower the 
cost of issuing debt, while the same result was not obtained by Collett and Hrasky 
(2005) when they investigated voluntary corporate governance disclosures.  Francis, 
Khurana and Periera (2005) found that, globally, cost of equity and debt capital were 
lower in the presence of expanded disclosures.   
2.5.1 Acquisition of Capital: Hypotheses 1 & 2 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) propose that minimising information asymmetry 
when issuing equity securities can increase their proceeds. Frankel, McNichols, and 
Wilson (1995) suggest that market forces provide some incentives for increased 
disclosure when access to external finance is intended.  In an international study of non-
United States companies, Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) found a positive link 
between voluntary disclosure levels of financial information and external financing 
requirements.   
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Additional information reduces uncertainty about the returns to the investor and 
improves the liquidity of the stock.  By reporting about their company’s GHG 
emissions, managers improve the information set available to capital market participants 
to make their investment and lending decisions.   
In this research, seeking new debt or additional share capital is assumed to 
influence a firm’s decision to adopt a GHG reporting regime and to voluntarily report 
thereon.  Hence the following hypotheses are tested: 
H1:  Companies provide higher quality GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance. 
H2:  Companies provide higher quality GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional equity finance. 
2.6 Agency Theory 
A characteristic of publicly-listed companies is the separation of ownership and 
control (Fama, 1980).  For various reasons, including personal wealth limitations and 
listing rules, no publicly traded corporation is totally owned by management (Ang, Cole 
& Lin, 2000).  As shareholders (principals) are distant from the firm’s management, 
managers (agents) are prone to making decisions that are incongruent with investors’ 
wishes because they reduce shareholder wealth.  Agency costs result from those 
incongruent managerial decisions.  These costs occur through managerial extravagance 
or incompetence, poor asset management, and inferior investment choices (Chen & 
Yur-Austin, 2007).  Ang et al. (2000) found that, in small businesses, agency costs 
relating to excessive perquisite consumption and lost revenue due to managerial 
shirking vary inversely with the manager’s equity stake.  Their research confirmed 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) conjecture that agency costs are higher for firms where 
managers have no equity claims and increase as non-manager shareholders increase. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that the agency relationship raises conflicts 
of interest problems because of utility-maximising propensities of owners or debt-
providers (principals) and managers (agents).  Consequently, agency costs of 
monitoring, bonding and residual costs are unavoidable.  Agency costs to the principals 
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include contracting costs, transaction costs, moral-hazard costs, and information costs 
(Jensen & Smith Jr., 2002).   On the agents’ side, agency costs are financial and non-
financial, with non-financial costs involving additional effort in searching for new 
profitable undertakings, understanding new technologies, or due to anxiety concerning 
the implementation of innovative undertakings (Wright, Mukherji & Kroll, 2001).  
Principals and agents contract to minimise agency costs, although it is impossible for all 
possible decision-situations to be addressed ex-ante (Nagar, 1999). 
According to agency theorists, it is assumed that agents possess hidden 
knowledge or information relative to their principals that may be used opportunistically 
(Saam, 2007).  Providing information to principals is a mechanism to reduce the 
consequential agency costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) of this differential knowledge. 
A precept underpinning agency theory is that the provision of more corporate 
information is a means of controlling managers’ actions and aligning managerial 
incentives to those of owners (Alvarez et al., 2008).  Making disclosures is a channel for 
managers to signal that their actions are made in the owners’ best interest (Broberg, 
Tagesson & Collin, 2009).  The intuition is that voluntary disclosures are measures 
taken by managers to reduce agency costs, thereby avoiding wealth transfers away from 
themselves.  
This current research suggests that managers make voluntary GHG disclosures 
to thwart possible adverse performance evaluations that result from unexpected 
corporate costs and capital outlays to meet future legislative requirements.  Costs that 
must be recognised (operating expenses and those that are unable to be capitalised) 
reduce profits and potential dividends, and expenditures affect cash flows.  The 
assumption underpinning the instance of voluntary disclosures of GHG information is 
that managers are exercising prudence.  Voluntary GHG disclosures in annual reports 
and stand-alone sustainability reports may be made to warn shareholders and loan 
providers that this type of expenditure is pending and that consequential cash and profit 
effects are expected.   
Several recent empirical capital market studies have pursued agency theory to 
explain corporate voluntary disclosure practice.  Berger and Hann (2007) found that 
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concern with agency costs motivates managers to conceal negative segment information 
in their application of changes to segment reporting rules under SFAS 131
14
. This study 
found that managers have incentives to withhold disaggregated information in 
circumstances of segmental underperformance.  They wish to avoid unresolved agency 
costs that ultimately lead to increased external monitoring.  Berger and Hann (2007) 
suggest that managerial reluctance to disclose information relating to segment 
performance was due to the diversification discount phenomenon. The diversification 
phenomenon is used to describe situations where multi-segment firms trade at a 
discount relative to non-diversified firms.   
The costs arising from agency problems are a function of firm-specific attributes 
(Dey, 2008).  Company features such as its size, complexity, ownership structure (Ang 
et al., 2000; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003), growth, operating risk, and 
free cash flows have been used in prior research as indicators of the existence of agency 
conflicts.   Other internal attributes studied in agency-related research are leverage 
(Deumes & Knechel, 2008), assets in place, type of auditor, and foreign listing status 
(Hossain, Perera & Rahman, 1995).  
2.6.1 Debt and Leverage:  Hypothesis 3 
Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) found that in the 34 countries they studied, 
firms that practice expanded disclosure experienced a lower cost of debt capital.  
Hossain et al. (1995) determined that high leverage firms are inclined to disclose more 
voluntary information to reduce the cost of debt.  Sengupta (1998) found that financial 
analysts’ high disclosure quality ratings lower a firm’s effective debt interest, and 
argued that detailed disclosures reduce lenders’ perceptions of default risk and therefore 
cost of debt.   
Financial leverage raises agency problems between providers of equity capital 
and debt capital when their risk outlooks differ (Deumes & Knechel, 2008).  As 
leverage increases, so does the potential for wealth transfers from debt-providers 
                                                 
14
SFAS 131, effective for financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 1997, is 
Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 1997).   
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(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Watts, 
1977) to residual claimants (Depoers, 2000; Watts, 1977), and debt-providers take 
action to price-protect themselves (Hossain et al., 1995).  Agency theory proposes that 
the extent of voluntary disclosures is positively associated with increased leverage 
(Hossain et al., 1995; Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, 1981).  The ability of managers 
to transfer resources away from debt-providers consequently requires more monitoring 
and disclosure (Francis et al., 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and thus higher agency 
costs (Jensen, 1986).  Monitoring costs are likely to be high for firms with high levels of 
debt (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and disclosing more 
information is a way of reducing those costs (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).   
The amount of leverage in a firm’s capital structure influences agency costs of 
management incentive systems (Kocchar, 1996).  Debt has a disciplining effect on 
managers’ extravagances through the requirement to service the interest and principal 
payments, which lowers free cash flow.  This restricts opportunistic managerial 
behaviour as managers seek to avoid scrutiny and interference by debt-holders in case 
of default (Kocchar, 1996), and leads to a better alignment with the perspective of 
equity providers.  Leverage was found to explain voluntary annual report disclosures of 
New Zealand companies (Hossain et al., 1995).  In contrast, Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987) found no relationship between leverage and extent of disclosure in Mexican 
Stock-Exchange-listed firms.  It has been established that protection of debt roll-over 
facilities motivates debt-heavy companies to provide more information (Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999).  
Investor uncertainty compels companies to disclose more information (Ahmed 
& Courtis, 1999).  Provision of more information decreases uncertainty (risk) and as a 
consequence, agency costs (Prencipe, 2004) attributable to debt-holders protecting 
against default risk by demanding higher yields (i.e., exercising price-protection) 
(Hossain et al., 1995).  The NGER Act 2007 (Cth) is the precursor of future legislation 
to control environment-destroying consequences of business.  The subsequent limiting 
measures, however, have not been determined by the Australian government.  Thus, 
while organisations’ GHG reporting requirements are clear under the NGER legislation, 
managers are unable to select optimum operating and investing strategies to mitigate 
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their future greenhouse gas emissions.  Because debt financers stand to lose their 
principal and interest should the business fail, they require reassurance of the riskiness 
of their investment.  Firms are likely to provide more information to apprise lenders of 
their actions in relation to environmental issues.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H3:  Companies with higher debt levels provide higher quality voluntary 
GHG emission disclosures. 
2.6.2 Ownership Structure:  Hypothesis 4 
Agency problems are exacerbated for firms with diffuse outside ownership 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Conflicting interests and management opportunism are 
more likely to occur in firms with dispersed ownership and low management ownership 
(Adrem, 1999).  These factors affect agency problems because of the need for increased 
external monitoring (Eng & Mak, 2003).  The level of monitoring and, consequently, 
disclosure is a function of managerial ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
blockholder ownership (Kaplan & Minton, 1994).   
The readiness and capacity of large shareholders to actively monitor the 
corporation to protect firm value lowers agency problems (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) 
by mitigating conflicts of interests between management and owners (Chen & Yur-
Austin, 2007).  When outside ownership is more highly concentrated, managers disclose 
less voluntary information in their external reports.  Broberg et al. (2009) found that 
dispersed share ownership has a positive relationship on the amount of information 
disclosed and that firms with high management ownership supply less information.   A 
similar result was found by Prencipe (2004).  Higher ownership levels by external 
shareholders increases management performance monitoring as these investors seek to 
maximise the value of their shareholding (Henry, 2010).   
Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) suggest that value-decreasing actions by managers 
are reduced with concentrated ownership, due to large shareholders’ ability to influence 
managerial decisions.  They found that agency problems can be constrained by large 
shareholders through a reduction in managerial extravagance, better asset utilisation and 
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easing problems with underinvestment.  This influence stems from blockholders’ 
capacity to control the corporate board composition and selection of top management.  
Similarly, institutional investors are seen as effective monitors that reduce agency costs 
(Henry, 2010). 
This implies that the need for management to provide additional information is 
not as important for companies with high concentrated ownership.  Less separation of 
ownership and control exists when ownership is highly concentrated and blockholders 
can readily obtain corporate information.  This reduces information asymmetry and 
lowers the agency problem.  Hence the following hypothesis is tested: 
H4:  Firms with higher concentrated ownership disclose lower quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. 
2.7 Proprietary Costs and Competition: Hypothesis 5 
If adverse selection causes firms to disclose fully all private information except 
the worst possible news, then rational managers with no extreme bad news should be 
making complete disclosure.  The friction that prevents such full disclosure is 
influenced by the existence of proprietary costs.  Managers possess private information 
that, if released, could damage the firm’s future earnings prospects.  Revelation of 
information that competitors could exploit could affect their competitive position in 
product markets (Darrough, 1993; Dye, 1986; Gigler, 1994; Verrecchia, 1983).  
Managers have incentives to withhold this information to protect their strategic interests 
from market competitors (Bhojraj et al., 2004).  
Mixed empirical evidence has been found regarding the relation between the 
level of disclosure and competition (Birt et al., 2006).  Verrecchia (1983) and 
Wagenhofer (1990) proposed that less information is provided by firms in more 
competitive industries, and firms in less competitive industries disclose more because of 
lower proprietary costs.  Conversely, there exists a greater incentive for a firm to 
disclose in highly competitive industries because it is less risky to their competitive 
position (Birt et al., 2006).  Darrough (1993) put forward that in some situations, firms 
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are better off sharing information with their competitors as they can coordinate their 
actions to their mutual advantage. 
Firms that disclose their GHG data risk revealing their operational strategy for 
GHG management.  These details could alert their competitors to the processes, 
technology or equipment currently possessed by the disclosing firm.  If these resources 
are superior, competitors could acquire similar ones and reduce the competitive 
advantage held by the disclosing firm.  Likewise, if these resources are deficient, 
competitors could inform the consumer market by making unfavourable comparisons in 
their marketing activities.   This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
2.8 Political Costs: Hypothesis 6 
Accounting systems have developed to include environmental performance 
perspectives.  This is a result of the business-response to global concern over climate 
change, global action to reduce GHG emissions (e.g., Kyoto Protocol), and to comply or 
to prepare to comply with mandatory GHG reduction schemes and emissions trading 
schemes.  These systems incorporate procedures that include life cycle analysis, 
environmental auditing, corporate environmental reporting, and scrutiny of suppliers’ 
environmental practices.  The inclusion of these practices follows a trend towards 
incorporating environmental quality into total quality management systems as firms 
acknowledge a competitive advantage for being environmentally responsible 
(Elkington, 1994).  
Researchers have variously classified a firm’s operations as pertaining to 
environmentally-sensitive industries, although noting that not all sectors are equally 
environmentally sensitive.  A summary of environmentally-sensitive industries 
classifications follows in Table  2-1. 
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Table ‎2-1 Environmentally-sensitive Industry Classifications 
Industry sector Researchers 
Chemicals/ drugs / 
pharmaceutical 
 
Aerts and Cormier (2009);   Cho and Patten (2007); Cormier and 
Magnan (2007); Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni (1996); Holland and Foo 
(2003); Murray et al.(2006); Niskala and Pretes (1995); Toms (2002) 
Construction Holland and Foo (2003); Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
Consumer goods Cormier and Magnan (2007) 
Food and beverage/ 
household 
Cormier and Magnan (2007); Niskala and Pretes (1995); Toms (2002); 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
Forestry Esrock and Leighty (1998); Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni (1996); Niskala 
and Pretes (1995) 
Infrastructure Aerts and Cormier (2009); Burritt (2002); Cho and Patten  (2007) 
Iron and steel Ingram and Frazier (1980) 
Manufacturing Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
Metals Cho and Patten  (2007); Cormier and Magnan (2007); Fekrat, Inclan and 
Petroni (1996); Niskala and Pretes (1995); Toms (2002) 
Minerals processing Toms (2002) 
Motor Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni (1996) 
Natural resources/ mining/ 
gold 
Aerts and Cormier (2009); Bertels and Peloza (2008); Burritt (2002); 
Cho and Patten  (2007); Cormier and Magnan (2007);  Deegan and 
Gordon (1996); Holland and Foo (2003) 
Nuclear Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) 
Oil and gas/ oil and gas 
exploration 
Aerts and Cormier (2009); Bertels and Peloza (2008); Burritt (2002); 
Cho and Patten  (2007); Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999); Cormier and 
Magnan (2007); Deegan and Gordon (1996); Esrock and Leighty 
(1998); Holland and Foo (2003); Murray et al. (2006); Niskala and 
Pretes (1995) 
Paper/ pulp/ paper packaging/ 
forest products 
Aerts and Cormier (2009); Burritt (2002); Cho and Patten  (2007); 
Cormier and Magnan (2007); Deegan and Gordon (1996); Hanson and 
White (2003); Ingram and Frazier (1980); Niskala and Pretes (1995); 
Toms (2002);  Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
Petroleum refining/ petrol 
producers/ petrochemical 
Cho and Patten (2007); Deegan and Gordon (1996); Fekrat, Inclan and 
Petroni (1996); Ingram and Frazier (1980); Mobus (2005) 
Pipelines Aerts and Cormier (2009); Bertels and Peloza (2008); Burritt (2002); 
Cho and Patten  (2007) 
Plastics / rubber 
manufacturing 
Deegan and Gordon (1996); Toms (2002) 
Transport/ tourism Deegan and Gordon (1996); Wilmshurst and Frost (2000); Niskala and 
Pretes (1995) 
Utilities/ power generation/ 
gas distributors/ energy 
Aerts and Cormier (2009); Bertels and Peloza (2008); Burritt (2002); 
Cho and Patten  (2007); Deegan and Gordon (1996); Holland and Foo 
(2003); Ingram and Frazier (1980); Niskala and Pretes (1995); Toms 
(2002) 
  
A relationship to industry membership has been found to influence 
environmental disclosures (Adams et al., 1998).  Reid and Toffel (2009) found that 
public disclosures of a company’s climate change strategies and GHG emissions were 
influenced by shareholder activism on a related issue made towards the company itself, 
or made towards other firms in their industry.  
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While the above industries are presented as being “environmentally sensitive”, 
this study is concerned with the issue of disclosures of greenhouse gases, a specific 
environmental problem linked to climate change.  Industries likely to be immediately 
affected by climate change laws are those involved in electricity generation, coal or 
other mining activities, natural gas retailing, industrial processing, fossil fuel intensive 
industries and waste disposal (Australian Government, 2012c).  These industries align 
with the following broad GICS sector classifications
15
:  energy (electricity generation 
industries and coal or other mining activities); utilities (natural gas retailing industries); 
materials (industrial processing industries) and industrials (industrial processing 
industries, waste disposal industries). 
The undesired attention of governments and other external parties, for example 
unions, suppliers and environmental activists, may be diverted by the firm taking 
various actions, including voluntarily disclosing their GHG performance.  The attention 
stemming from political visibility causes costs that transfer wealth away from the 
company.   
Deegan and Gordon (1996) found a positive association between increasing 
social pressure and concern from lobby groups, and increased environmental disclosures 
in their review of Australian corporate environmental reporting behaviour from 1980 to 
1991.  It is proposed that a firm’s membership in a climate change-sensitive GICS 
sector attracts increased attention and generates higher stakeholder expectations.  Firms 
respond to these expectations by implementing GHG management programs and 
reporting their GHG performance.  From this, the following hypothesis results: 
H6:  Companies in climate change-sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission information than those in other GICS sectors.  
2.9 Control Variables 
It is likely that other company characteristics influence the voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emission information.  The true relationship between the independent variables 
                                                 
15
   Since August 2008, the Global Industry Classification Standard consists of ten sectors 
aggregated from 24 industry groups, 68 industry sectors and 154 sub-industry sectors (Standard & Poors, 
2008). 
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and voluntary GHG disclosure are concealed if these other characteristics are ignored.  
Accordingly, five categories of control variables are included for testing the model.   
These are financial performance, audit quality, age of fixed assets, foreign listing status 
and size.     
2.9.1 Financial Performance 
A corporation’s financial performance is likely to influence whether or not 
voluntary greenhouse disclosures are made.  Financial performance can be measured 
from an accounting or a market perspective.  Each type of measure has its shortcomings.  
Accounting measures are indicative of the firm’s historical performance and are open to 
management manipulation (Christie & Zimmerman, 1994; Holthausen, 1990).  Market 
measures represent investors’ perceptions of the firm’s future earnings ability (Kent & 
Chan, 2009). 
In keeping with numerous prior research (for example, Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux 
& Magnan, 2009; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2009; Magness, 2006; Matsumura et 
al., 2010; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Van der Laan, Van Ees & Van, 
2007) this study uses return on assets (ROA) as the accounting measure of financial 
performance.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) note that companies want to reveal their good 
news to the financial markets, and so disclose more when they expect better earnings 
forecasts.  Including ROA in this study is consistent with more recent research on 
voluntary environmental disclosures (for example, Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Chapple, 
Clarkson & Gold, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008; Moroney, Windsor & Aw, 2011; Rankin 
et al., 2011).   This study assumes a positive relationship between financial 
performance, as measured by return on assets, and voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
disclosures. 
Tobin’s Q is also used widely to represent financial performance.  Tobin’s Q is a 
financial market-based measure of the future performance potential of an investment 
(Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj & Konsynski, 1999).  It represents the market’s opinion of a 
firm’s cash flows per dollar invested in assets and should be higher if greater cash flows 
are expected or if cash flows are considered less risky  (King & Lenox, 2001).  Thus, 
Tobin’s Q indicates the profitability of investment opportunities, or growth 
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opportunities (Min & Prather, 2001)  anticipated by the market, based on investors’ 
information-set specific to the firm.  It has featured in voluntary environmental 
disclosure studies (for example, Chapple et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008; Moroney et 
al., 2011; Stanny & Ely, 2008), and agency theory studies (for example, Ertugrul & 
Hegde, 2008; Harvey, Lins & Roper, 2004; Henry, 2010; Min & Prather, 2001).  In this 
thesis, it is proposed that firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, has a positive 
influence on the provision of greenhouse gas emission information. 
2.9.2 Audit Quality 
Accounting literature has long held the view that information asymmetry and 
agency problems influence the demand for audit quality (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1983, 1986).  Audit quality was found to influence the voluntary 
disclosure of forward-looking information of Australian companies in 2000 (O'Sullivan, 
Percy & Stewart, 2008).  Gray and Ratzinger (2010) conducted focus group studies of 
chief financial officers (financial statement preparers), bankers and analysts (financial 
statement users) and financial statement auditors.  Participants believed that Big 4 
auditors possess a depth of resources not held by smaller firms.  The general belief was 
that a Big 4 audit provides superior audit quality for large, complex and/or multinational 
firms.  Gray and Ratzinger (2010) linked this perception to Simunic’s (1980) argument 
that Big 4 auditors are perceived to be more credible than others.    
Big 4 firms have been found to be associated with higher quality financial 
reporting  (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004).  Participants in the Gray and 
Ratzinger  (2010) study believe that a Big 4 audit provides value to the client firm in the 
form of reduced loan interest rates, higher stock prices, and easier issuance of IPOs.  
Barton  (2005) suggests that firms that are more prominent in the capital markets engage 
highly reputable auditors to enhance their financial reporting credibility.   
In prior research Big 4 auditors (or their predecessors, Big 5, Big 6 or Big 8 
depending on the timing of the research) are used as an indication of high audit quality 
(see, for example Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 2004; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Yatim, 
Kent & Clarkson, 2006).    The audit quality provided by larger audit firms is increased 
because they value their reputation and, to financial statement users, auditor size is a 
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surrogate measure for audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981).  Deumes and Knechel  (2008) 
suggest that a high quality external auditor’s independent review of unaudited parts of 
the annual report may increase the perceived credibility of voluntary reporting.  This 
thesis takes the same view and assumes a positive relationship between a Big 4 auditor 
and the making of voluntary greenhouse emissions disclosures.   
2.9.3 Age of Fixed Assets 
A corporation’s asset structure influences the extent of external monitoring 
required and in consequence, its agency costs (Huang & Zhang, 2008; Leftwich et al., 
1981).  Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) proposed that agency costs are lower for firms 
with large proportions of fixed assets in place.   Their research followed Myers (1977) 
who found an inverse relationship between voluntary financial disclosure and a firm’s 
proportion of assets in place.  While Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) also proposed that 
managers in control of already acquired assets would disclose less, they did not find a 
significant relationship in the Mexican context of their study.  For New Zealand studies, 
Bradbury’s (1992) results were similarly unsuccessful, as were those of Hossain, Perera 
and Rahman (1995).  Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman’s (1981) agency theory test of 
assets in place and the frequency of voluntary corporate reporting among United States 
firms also did not establish the expected inverse relationship.  However, Indian banking 
corporations that provide more voluntary information, and thus have lower agency 
costs, have been found to have more assets in place (for example, Hossain & Reaz, 
2007).  Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004) found that leverage is instrumental in alleviating 
agency problems in emerging-market-firms with a high proportion of assets in place.  
Thus the proposition that the extent of voluntary disclosure is inversely related to a 
firm’s proportion of assets in place is unresolved. 
In this research it is considered that it is the age of fixed assets, rather than the 
proportion of fixed assets held, that influences GHG disclosures.  Fixed asset age has 
featured in models representing several theoretical perspectives.  It has been included in 
legitimacy theory studies (for example, Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 2004), stakeholder 
theory studies (for example, McGuire et al., 1988), value relevance studies (for 
example, Moneva & Cuellar, 2009) and political cost studies (Uchida & Ferraro, 2007).  
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Fixed asset age has been found to be a determinant of the level of environmental 
disclosure by German firms (Cormier & Magnan, 2007; Cormier et al., 2005) and 
Canadian firms (Cormier & Magnan, 2007).  It has been included as a control variable 
in other studies (see, for example, Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2004; Cormier 
& Magnan, 2003), and as a measure of the environmental management of the company 
(Cormier et al., 2005; Russo & Fouts, 1997).   
Older assets are an indication of more-polluting technology (Cormier & 
Magnan, 1999) and of difficulties for the company in meeting environmental 
regulations (Cormier et al., 2004).  In contrast, newer assets are assumed to be more 
environmentally friendly and more focussed on pollution prevention  (Chambers, 2011).  
The age of plant is related to environmental performance (Jaggi & Freedman, 1992) and 
thus increases exposure to political costs.  This has led Cormier and Magnan (2007) to 
suggest that in the absence of further information, investors may use fixed asset age to 
assume the company’s environmental performance.  Investors are likely to believe that 
old assets are associated with lower environmental performance.  This study assumes 
that additional disclosures are necessary to counteract these beliefs, and a positive 
relationship is predicted between voluntary greenhouse gas emission disclosures and the 
age of fixed assets.  
2.9.4 Foreign Listing Status 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that listing on a foreign exchange could 
motivate more communication to investors.  A company’s foreign listing status has been 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure in New Zealand companies (Hossain et 
al., 1995) and in the content of voluntary disclosures in Swedish companies (Broberg et 
al., 2009).  Similarly, Meek and Gray (1989) found that multinational European 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange disclosed more than required by  
London Stock Exchange rules.  An international listing association was found to 
influence the voluntary strategic information disclosures of United States and United 
Kingdom multinational corporations (Gray, Meek & Roberts, 1995).  
Companies may make voluntary GHG disclosures when they are listed on a 
stock exchange in a jurisdiction where carbon mitigation mechanisms are in force or 
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where climate change issues are a significant part of the business environment.   
Accordingly, a foreign listing variable is included as a control variable and measured as 
a binary variable.   
2.9.5 Size 
An additional test of political costs is provided by the size of companies.  Prior 
research suggests that corporate voluntary disclosure of environmental information 
increases with firm size.  In this thesis, size is included as a firm characteristic that 
influences the ability and propensity to make voluntary GHG disclosures.  It is costly to 
accumulate and report detailed information and smaller firms may not consider that the 
expense is worthwhile (Cerf, 1961).  In contrast, however, larger firms and those with 
diversified geographic regions or products require a higher level of internal reporting as 
a control mechanism and have already borne the costs of information collection  (Cerf, 
1961).      
Larger firms are concerned with liquidity and its consequences on cost of 
capital, as illiquidity causes stocks to be priced lower (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991).  
Larger firms place importance on attracting large holdings from institutional investors 
and their subsequent large trades, a factor influencing the price of the security.  
Accordingly, larger firms are the biggest recipients of benefits of reducing information 
asymmetry and disclose more information (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
The magnitude of political costs is highly dependent on firm size (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978).  Large firms are more visible and are thus subject to political 
pressures (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and public scrutiny.  Álvarez, Sánchez and 
Domínguez  (2008) found that more-visible Spanish firms volunteered a larger volume 
of unregulated corporate social responsibility information on their websites, and suggest 
that this is to reduce political costs.  Various studies have found a significant 
relationship between the size of a company and its level of voluntary environmental 
reporting  (for example, Adams et al., 1998; Cormier & Gordon, 2001; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993) and voluntary social reporting in general (for example, Belkaoui & 
Karpik, 1989; Patten, 1991; Trotman & Bradley, 1981).  Thus a positive relationship is 
expected and size is included as a control variable.  
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2.10 Summary 
Some overlap occurs amongst three of the main theories (information 
asymmetry, agency, and political cost theories) underpinning this research into why 
firms voluntarily disclose their GHG performance.  The most basic reason is that the 
corporation perceives that benefits exist from disclosing this information.     
Corporations should benefit from disclosing better information about their GHG 
emission performance in three key areas.  Firstly, reducing information asymmetry 
allows stock market participants to better evaluate the future earnings potential of the 
company and, thus, influence the market’s assessment of firm value, and promote the 
liquidity of the stock.  Secondly, lessening the need for costly management monitoring 
by equity and debt providers should facilitate the acquisition of capital funding.  
Thirdly, reporting non-mandatory GHG performance information to a wide audience is 
indicative of greater transparency and accountability and should reduce political cost 
pressures in these times of carbon emission sensitivity.   
This chapter detailed the conceptual and theoretical framework from which this 
research is based.  Voluntary disclosure and its impact on capital market participants 
were discussed from an information asymmetry perspective.  Following, agency and 
proprietary costs theories were presented as further crucial theoretical frameworks for 
this thesis.  Lastly, political cost theory was raised.  Six hypotheses were presented for 
analysis and control variables were introduced.  The hypotheses describe the factors that 
influence a company’s decision to make voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  In the 
next chapter the research method for testing those hypotheses is reported.     
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Chapter 3 Research Design 
This section documents the data studied, the methodology adopted, and the 
variables of interest in this investigation into the voluntary GHG disclosures of 
Australian listed-companies in 2007 and 2009.  
3.1 Sample Selection 
The National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER Act 
2007) requires large emitters to report their greenhouse gas emissions and energy use to 
the Australian Government, commencing from 2008.  The objectives of this research are 
to determine the status of corporate voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
disclosures in 2007 and 2009, their motivating factors, and their progression from 2007 
to 2009.  This research investigates the entire population of ASX listed companies for 
2007, the year immediately prior to the commencement of the new reporting regime 
instituted under the legislation, and 2009, the year immediately following its 
commencement.   
The sample includes 1,776 companies with a balance date falling in 2007 and 
1,853 companies with a balance date in 2009.  Companies whose annual reports and 
stand-alone sustainability reports specify information about greenhouse gas emissions, 
carbon emissions, and/or CO2 emissions or with specific statements about the NGER 
Act 2007 (Cth) are targeted and their disclosures scrutinised.     
3.2 Disclosure Medium 
Climate change challenges are global and their economic consequences have 
caused great and wide-ranging market failure (Stern, 2006).  Major and perhaps 
irreversible economic and social disruptions are predicted unless effective global actions 
are taken immediately (Stern, 2006).  Climate change is an issue appearing in political 
and business agendas worldwide (PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia, 2011; Santam, 
2009; Starbuck & Singer, 2011) as parties deliberate on actions to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions and consequential risks.  
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Internal and external stakeholders demand information about the organisation’s 
ability to manage key risks beyond those of a financial nature (Ballou, Heitger & 
Landes, 2006).  Increasing social pressure on their management of societal, moral and 
environmental aspects of their activities has made firms accountable to a wider audience 
than solely shareholders (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006).  Corporations seek to assure 
stakeholders that they are acting responsibly in relation to environmental laws and 
regulations and communicate their performance in various reporting media including 
annual reports, newsletters, bulletins, media releases, stand-alone environmental reports 
and internet homepages (Holland & Boon Foo, 2003).   
Enhanced communication is a means of managing relationships among 
interested parties, and voluntary disclosures represent management’s strategic posture 
towards social demands (Bowman & Haire, 1975; Kent & Chan, 2009; Ullmann, 1985). 
Stakeholder engagement is important to corporations, yet is complicated by the diversity 
of company stakeholders and the changing nature of issues relating to the organisation 
and its operating environment (Adams & Frost, 2006).  A further complication stems 
from the varied interests of stakeholder groups (Ballou et al., 2006).  Corporate 
greenhouse gas performance is of interest to NGOs, investors, and other stakeholders 
(World Business Council for Sustainable Development & Institute, 2004).   
Companies use a variety of formats when communicating environmental issues.  
They use questionnaire surveys, face-to-face meetings with persons of influence, 
briefings, conferences, hard copy reports, brochures and newsletters, and electronic 
media, although with varying frequency (Adams & Frost, 2006).  Other communication 
media include news releases, speeches, “hot-links” to other web sites (Esrock & 
Leighty, 1998), conference calls (Burritt, 2002), and mass advertising (Zeghal & 
Ahmed, 1990).  This study is based on disclosures of GHG information provided in 
annual reports and sustainability reports.   
3.3 Annual Report 
The annual report is generally regarded as one of the most important sources of 
corporate information (Botosan, 1997).  It is the main company disclosure vehicle 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991) to outsiders and shareholders (Guthrie & Parker, 1989) and 
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for stakeholder communication (Adams & Frost, 2006).  Annual reports are considered 
as the principal source of voluntary information (Ingram & Frazier, 1980) on issues 
concerning employees, customers, society, and the environment (Owen, 2008).  They 
are the chief medium for Australian corporate environmental performance disclosures 
(Brown & Deegan, 1998) and are used strategically to signal desirable environmental 
behaviour (Aerts & Cormier, 2009).  The annual report’s breadth of coverage and 
availability makes it an influential source to the public (Hooks, Coy & Davey, 2002) 
and a vehicle for discharging public accountability (Boyne & Law, 1991).   
Australian corporations now have alternative means of distributing their annual 
report.  They may provide it in a hard copy or may make an electronic copy available on 
a website, or distribute it in an electronic format ("Corporations Act 2001 No. 50," 2001 
s. 314).  Notwithstanding the growing popularity of the internet as a means of 
dissemination of corporate information, there is evidence that the annual report’s 
importance to corporate communications has not declined, although the quantity of 
information provided has decreased for some companies (Adams & Frost, 2006).   A 
widely available, public communication device, the annual report provides a permanent 
record (Cormier et al., 2004) in contrast to internet web content which, being a dynamic 
resource, can be changed or removed instantaneously and without notice. 
3.4 Sustainability Report 
Sustainability reporting has become mainstream (Isenmann, Bey & Welter, 
2007; KPMG & Group of 100, 2008) and is gaining in importance (Raar, 2006).  It is 
another type of communication used by corporations to convey their environmental 
performance to interested stakeholders.  These are voluntary corporate performance 
reports, often included as a separate section in the annual report, or as a separate report.  
Like annual reports, companies produce stand-alone sustainability reports in hard or 
electronic copies, and sometimes the page numbering of the sustainability report 
provides evidence of it being a direct extract from the corporate annual report.   
According to Isenmann, Bey and Welter (2007), sustainability reporting appears 
to have become a daily component in a company’s business operations.  The intention 
of a sustainability report is to present an integrated view of the company’s performance 
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as a whole (Adams & Frost, 2006), and to complement annual report disclosures of 
social and environmental information (Gibson & O'Donovan, 2007).  It is seen as a 
useful source for appraising management’s attitude to risk and the communications of 
governance (CPA Australia Ltd, 2009).  These are attributes that may not be fully 
captured in financial reporting (CPA Australia Ltd, 2009).  This study includes the 
sustainability reports of Australian publicly-listed companies, identified and sourced 
from their websites following an internet search. 
3.5 Disclosure Medium Summarised 
To summarise, the medium for researching voluntary GHG emission disclosures 
consists of ASX-listed companies’ 2007 and 2009 annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports.  The annual reports are obtained from Aspect Huntley 
FinAnalysis
16
 electronic database or companies’ websites.  Sustainability reports 
(sometimes called Corporate Social Responsibility Reports or other similar 
nomenclature) in document format are acquired from the corporation’s website.  
Webpage disclosures are not accessed for reasons stated at the end of Section  3.3. 
3.6 Disclosure Metrics 
The importance of an issue to the reporting entity has been assumed to 
determine the volume of disclosure, according to Krippendorff (2004).  Campbell et al. 
(2001) believe that only the most important matters are disclosed in annual reports 
because of space restrictions.  However, this viewpoint might not hold in today’s digital 
reporting age.  The amount of disclosure in the written medium can be analysed in 
various ways, but it is observed that some research, for example corporate social 
responsibility, has tended to prefer the use of words, sentences and pages as units of 
analysis.   
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) selected the average pages of disclosures in 
their study of United Kingdom firms over a thirteen year period.  They found that the 
volume of pages of voluntary disclosure rose fourfold in that time.  Guthrie and Parker 
                                                 
16
AspectHuntley FinAnalysis is owned by Morningstar, Inc  (Huntleys' Investment Information 
Pty Limited, 2011). 
 40 
 
(1989) made use of the page measurements (excluding photographs and graphics) of 
CSR disclosure made by BHP over a century.  They measured the absolute number of 
quarter-pages, rather than the relative amount of space devoted to CSR as opposed to all 
other information types.   
The number of lines of disclosure formed the basis of analysis in Bowman and 
Haire’s (1975) study.  They counted and compared the proportion of lines of narrative 
devoted to social responsibility in the annual reports of a sample of fourteen 
“outstandingly responsible”17 (Bowman & Haire, 1975, p. 51) firms and a similar 
control group that had not been so identified. 
Sentences were the unit of analysis used by Kent and Chan (2009) when they 
operationalized Ullmann’s (1985) stakeholder theory to explain the quantity and quality 
of voluntary environmental disclosures of large Australian public companies.  The 
sentence has been established as an acceptable unit of analysis in various research, for 
example Ingram and Frazier  (1980), because it is easily identified and is subject to less 
inter-judge variation than phrases, clauses, or themes.    
3.7 Disclosure Quality 
According to Singhvi and Desai (1971, p. 131), quality of disclosure has the 
three attributes of “completeness, accuracy and reliability”.  Disclosure quality, an 
“elusive” concept at the empirical level (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011, p. 4), has been 
defined and measured in various ways including the actual amount of disclosure.  In his 
2005 paper, Gray (2005) argued that it is essential to challenge corporate reports for 
their absence of quality.  Wiseman (1982) determined that the length of environmental 
disclosures in the annual reports of United States’ companies in three industries (steel, 
oil, and pulp and paper) was not indicative of quality of disclosure.  Therefore, while the 
level of disclosure may provide some indication of the importance of information, some 
researchers (for example Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2009) are of the opinion 
that the attributes of disclosures are also worthy of research.   
                                                 
17
 As identified by a leading New York Times editor in 1973. 
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Other researchers, (for example, Beattie, McInnes & Fearnley, 2004; Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008) also, take the view that the quantity of disclosure alone is an 
inadequate measure of the quality of disclosure.  They examine disclosures under a 
multi-dimensional framework, including the various topics reported, the time 
orientation, financial versus non-financial aspects, and whether the disclosure is 
quantitative or qualitative.   
Quality of disclosures of environmental information has been represented by 
various means.  Brammer and Pavelin (2008) used five indicators of quality: the 
disclosure of environmental policies, the description of environmental initiatives, 
reporting on environmental improvements, setting of environmental targets, and the 
presence of an environmental audit or assessment.  Their disclosures were sourced from 
a research agency and resulted from an analysis of the content of annual reports, 
accounts, and separate environmental reports, and used indicators of best practice 
determined by standard-setting bodies
18
.   
The quality, rather than the quantity, of the disclosures concerning greenhouse 
gas emissions information is studied in this thesis.  The measurement of quality of GHG 
emissions information is by way of the existence of a statement made in the annual 
report or stand-alone sustainability report that conforms to the subject matter of an 
indexed list of items. 
3.8 Disclosure Indices 
Researcher-constructed disclosure indices, measuring the attributes of reported 
information, were pioneered in 1961 by Cerf (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  The original 
researcher-constructed disclosure index was used to evaluate the quality of annual 
report disclosures by identifying the inclusion of items of information that were deemed 
as important to the investment decision.  Cerf’s (1961) study was a consequence of 
concern among members of the National Federation of Financial Analysts Societies, and 
others, over the deficiencies of corporate annual reporting in relation to the investment 
                                                 
18
 The standard-setting bodies identified by these authors were:  the Global Reporting Initiative, 
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, and Business in the Environment (Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2008). 
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decision. The content of Cerf’s (1961) index reflected the suggested reporting 
improvements identified by the Corporate Information Committee of the National 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies in various studies.  Items were weighted 
differently to denote their relative importance as determined by various subcommittees 
of the Committee on Corporate Information.  A per centage score was obtained by 
dividing the number of points awarded for included items by the number of possible 
points for the company.  The validity of this index was achieved by having the 
importance of each item externally determined, although Cerf (1961) acknowledged that 
there would be differing opinions on the inclusion or exclusion of index items or 
weighting assignments.  This index was updated and improved in a later study in which 
it was demonstrated that inadequate corporate disclosure in annual reports is likely to 
impact on the investment decision and result in wide fluctuations in a security’s market 
price (Singhvi & Desai, 1971). 
While the formation of disclosure indices is subjective, they have been found to 
be a valuable research tool (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  Subsequently, various 
disclosure indices have been used (see Beattie et al., 2004, for a summary of their 
characteristics).   
Small and medium companies’ annual report information of a financial and non-
financial nature was indexed by Buzby (1974) to identify possible deficiencies in the 
required accounting disclosures in the early 1970s.  The index was constructed from the 
perspective of professional financial analysts seeking to evaluate the investment-
worthiness of common equities of small and medium companies.  Some 38 items of 
information were included in the index.  The items were weighted by a factor of 
importance that had been determined following a survey of members of The Financial 
Analysts Federation.  Surveying financial analysts for their importance ratings provided 
validation for the choice of index items (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011).  Buzby (1974) 
concluded that deficiencies existed in the extent of annual report disclosure by small 
and medium size companies and that many items of information important to financial 
analysts were inadequately disclosed.  More recently, Campbell et al. (2001) created an 
index to measure the comprehensiveness of the content of mission statements reported 
in the annual reports of FTSE 100 companies during 1998.  Kent and Ung (2003) used a 
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rating scale to evaluate disclosure quality of forecast earnings performance in their 
study. 
Environmental disclosures in annual reports were specifically targeted in 
Wiseman’s (1982) study.  She developed a four-category, eighteen-item index with 
which she compared the environmental disclosures of 26 of the largest companies in 
three United States industries
19
 to their actual environmental performance ratings 
measured by the external body, the Council on Economic Priorities.  The categories of 
her index were: economic factors, litigation, pollution abatement, and other 
environmentally related information.  A three-point scoring system was applied, with 
scoring based on the presence or absence of a piece of information and the degree of 
specificity of the disclosure.  Unlike Cerf (1961) and Buzby (1974), Wiseman (1982) 
did not obtain outside verification of the index items or their weightings.  Wiseman 
(1982) observed a noticeable lack of specificity in disclosed environmental information.  
She found that the voluntary environmental disclosures were incomplete and did not 
reflect the firm’s environmental performance.  The Wiseman (1982) index has since 
featured in numerous research, in modified and unmodified forms (see, for example, the 
works of Choi, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Fekrat et al., 1996; Hughes, Anderson 
& Golden, 2001; Jantadej & Kent, 1999; Walden & Schwartz, 1997). 
Aerts and Cormier (2009) measured the extent and quality of environmental 
disclosures in annual reports using a coding instrument they called a grid. They scored 
items on a three-point scale according to the specificity of the statement and the nature 
of the terms used
20
.  They grouped 39 items into six categories of expenditures and 
risks, compliance with laws and regulations, pollution abatement, sustainable 
development, land remediation and contamination and environmental management.  
This same grid also formed the basis of a study into the relationship among corporate 
environmental disclosure, financial markets and public pressure of international 
corporations by Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2008), and underpinned even earlier 
                                                 
19
 The industries were: steel, oil, and pulp and paper. 
20
 A score of 3 was given if the item was described in monetary or quantitative terms; 2 if the 
item was described specifically; 1 if only a general discussion was provided (Aerts & Cormier, 2009, p. 
24).  
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studies (see Cormier et al., 2004; Cormier & Magnan, 2007; Cormier et al., 2005).  It 
appears that this grid and rating scale had its origins with Cormier, Gordon and Magnan 
(2004). 
  In this study the measurement of disclosure quality is made using an index 
slightly modified from the one used by Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari (2008).  A 
feature of their index is that each disclosure item is mapped to the Global Reporting 
Initiative guidelines.  The Global Reporting Initiative provides a comprehensive 
sustainability reporting framework that is used voluntarily by organisations worldwide 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2012).  The principles underlying the Global Reporting 
Initiative Reporting guidelines are aimed at ensuring the quality of reported information 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2011).   KPMG (2011) recently measured quality of 
corporate responsibility communications with reference to whether or not corporations 
used Global Reporting Initiative standards in their responsibility reporting.  They stated 
that the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines “best serve the needs of stakeholder” and 
provide “credibility” (KPMG, 2011, p. 5).   According to KPMG (2011), eighty per cent 
of the top 250 companies belonging on the Fortune Global 500 list in 2010 and 69 per 
cent of the uppermost 100 companies in terms of revenues from each of thirty-four 
countries
21
 follow the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, 
considered as the de facto standard around the world.  
Clarkson et al. (2008) grouped their index items into seven categories: 
governance structure and management systems, credibility, environmental performance 
indicators, environmental spending, claims about vision and strategy, environmental 
profile and environmental initiatives.  The maximum score possible for Clarkson et al.’s 
(2008) index was 95.   
Disclosure items for six out of the seven categories were of a binary nature (with 
one indicative of the presence of the disclosure item, and zero otherwise).  A six-point 
scoring scale was applied for the environmental performance indicators category.  The 
                                                 
21
 These countries comprise: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (KPMG, 2011). 
 45 
 
focus of this category was the presence of specific environmental performance data 
covering ten areas.  A point was allocated if performance data was presented, if it was 
presented relative to peers/rivals or industry, if performance trend over previous periods 
was provided, if performance against targets was given, if performance data was 
presented in both absolute and normalised forms, and if it was disaggregated (Clarkson 
et al., 2008).   
Additionally, the Clarkson et al. (2008) index of environmental performance 
disclosures, of which GHG information is included, classes categories of items as either 
high quality hard disclosures, or lower quality soft disclosures.   Disclosures regarded as 
hard are objective measures of environmental performance.  The hard disclosures 
include items relating to governance structure and management systems, credibility, 
environmental performance indicators, and environmental spending.   Soft disclosures 
lack credibility and substantiation (Clarkson et al., 2008).  These disclosures consist of 
claims about vision and strategy, environmental profile and environmental initiatives.  
Clarkson et al.’s (2008) index was validated by collaborating with an expert in 
environmental reporting. 
3.9 GHG Disclosure Index 
The minor modifications made for this study are to the Clarkson et al. (2008) 
item descriptors to reflect an Australian context and to exclude references to web 
disclosures.  The main modification is to the items included in the environmental 
performance indicators category.  Only environmental performance indicator data on 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy use and/or energy efficiency are collected.  These 
are the key reporting elements of the NGER Act 2007 (Cth).  GHGs and energy are two 
of the ten items in the Clarkson et al. (2008) environmental performance indicators 
category.  However, in this modified Clarkson et al. (2008) index the environmental 
performance indicator category relates to only GHG and/or energy performance data, 
and is labelled GHG Performance Indicators.   
All index items are scored uniformly.  This study’s index involves seven 
categories and consists of a maximum score of 41.  
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In further keeping with the Clarkson et al.’s (2008) index design, the higher-
level hard or soft classifications are maintained for the seven categories of disclosures.  
The index of disclosures is presented in Table  3-1.    
A total score of 25 is possible for the hard disclosure items.  This class of 
disclosures is split into four categories.  Statements that fit into these categories are 
objective, able to be verified, and point to the company’s organisation of its operations 
in regard to its GHG emission performance and management, and its commitment to the 
management of GHG emissions.  These are statements of fact and are unable to be 
easily mimicked or to be flippantly made.   
The first group concerns governance structure and management systems 
(disclosure category A1).  Statements within this category indicate that environmental 
protection is an important issue to the company and is considered in short- and long-
term planning and control decisions.  This consideration extends to how the company is 
structured, the involvement of suppliers, customers and other stakeholders in their 
interactions with the firm, the implementation of an international standard of 
environmental management, and how its managers are rewarded.  The six items in this 
group follow; each is worth a score of one.  Item A1 refers to the existence of a 
department for pollution control and/or management positions for environmental 
management.  Item A1.2 covers the existence of an environmental and/or a public 
issues committee on the board.  Item A1.3 relates to the existence of terms and 
conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental practices.  
Item A1.4 is for statements made about stakeholder involvement in setting corporate 
environmental policies.  Item A1.5 is a statement about the implementation of ISO 
14001
22
 at the plant and/or firm level.  Item A1.6 refers to statements that executive 
compensation is linked to environmental performance.          
Disclosure category A2 comprises ten items that attest to the company’s 
credibility of disclosures and claims.  Statements in this category refer to the 
achievement of external standards of environmental performance.  Item A2.1 refers to 
                                                 
22
 ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems.  The founders of International Organization 
for Standardization have shortened its name to ISO to avoid having different acronyms in different 
languages (International Organization for Standardization, 2012). 
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the adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines.  Item A2.2 is scored when 
independent verification/assurance about environmental information is disclosed in the 
annual report or sustainability report.  Item A2.3 is a statement indicating that periodic 
independent verifications/audits are performed on environmental performance and/or 
systems.  Item A2.4 is a declaration about having certification of environmental 
programs by independent agencies.   Item A2.5 refers to the company attaining product 
certification with respect to its environmental impact.  Item A2.6 relates to the company 
achieving external performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index.  Item 
A2.7 is a statement of stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process.  
Item A2.8 is about participation in voluntary environmental initiatives that are 
endorsed by government.  Item A2.9 is for statements about the company’s 
participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental 
practices.  Similarly, item A2.10 is concerned with statements attesting to participation 
in other environmental organisations/associations to improve environmental practices. 
The section concerning GHG performance indicators (disclosure category A3) is 
where companies provide actual quantitative data about their GHG and energy 
performance and targets.  Six types of data qualify for this category.  Item A3.1 is 
scored when performance data is presented.  Item A3.2 is where performance data is 
presented relative to peers/rivals or industry.  Item A3.3 receives a score when 
performance data is presented relative to previous periods (trend analysis).  Item A3.4 
refers to performance data being presented relative to targets.  Item A3.5 is where the 
company presents performance data in absolute and normalised form.  Item A3.6 is for 
statements providing performance data at a disaggregate level (i.e., plant, business 
unit, geographic segment). 
The final set of statements comprising the hard category is about a firm’s 
environmental spending (disclosure category A4).  Three items make up this set.  Item 
A4.1 is when the company gives a summary of dollar savings arising from 
environmental initiatives to the company.  Item A4.2 is the provision of the amount 
spent on technologies, research and development and/or innovations to enhance 
environmental performance and/or efficiency.  Item A4.3 is used when the amount spent 
on fines related to environmental issues is provided. 
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Soft disclosure items generally lack hard proof or their subject matter can be   
easily altered depending on the firm’s prospects and corresponding outlook, and/or 
positioning strategy.  There are three soft disclosure categories.  These comprise 
statements about the company’s vision and strategy claims, environmental profile and 
environmental initiatives. 
Vision and strategy claims (disclosure category A5) has six items.  These are 
assertions in which environmental management and performance is espoused without 
providing objective proof.  Item A5.1 is where a CEO statement on environmental 
performance in a letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders is reported.   Item A5.2 is 
concerned with a statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, 
environmental codes of conduct.  Item A5.3 refers to the reporting of a statement about 
formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance.  Item A5.4 
is when a statement is made that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations 
of its environmental performance.  Item A5.5 is when there is a statement of 
measureable goals in terms of future environmental performance.  Item A5.6 is scored 
when there is a statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new 
technologies. 
A company’s environmental profile (disclosure category A6) has four items and 
covers statements about the firm’s influences on the environment.  Item A6.1 refers to a 
statement about the firm’s obligations regarding climate change regulation.  Item A6.2 
applies when an overview of the environmental impact of the industry is given.  Item 
A6.3 covers statements providing an overview of how the business operations and/or 
products and services impact the environment.  Item A6.4 is for statements giving an 
overview of corporate environmental performance relative to industry peers. 
The environmental initiatives category (disclosure category A7) is the last 
category and deals with the firm’s resourcefulness and proactivity towards 
environmental improvements.  Six items are included.  Item A7.1 is awarded a score 
when a substantive description of employee training in environmental management and 
operations is provided.  Item A7.2 is for statements concerning the existence of 
response plans in case of environmental accidents.  Item A7.3 is for statements about 
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the existence of internal environmental awards.  Item A7.4 applies when the company 
makes a statement about internal environmental audits.  Item A7.5 covers statements 
about internal certification of environmental programs.   Item A7.6 is for reports 
detailing community involvement and/or donations related to the environment. 
Table  3-1 follows on page 50. 
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Table ‎3-1 GHG Emissions Disclosure Index 
Hard Disclosure Items 
A1 Governance structure and management systems (max score is 5) 
1 Existence of a department for pollution control and/or management positions for environmental 
management (0-1) 
2 Existence of an environmental and/or public issues committee on the board (0-1) 
3 Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding 
environmental practices (0-1) 
4 Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies (0-1) 
5 Implementation of ISO 14001 at the plant and/or firm level (0-1) 
6 Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance (0-1) 
A2 Credibility (max score is 10) 
1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a CERES report (0-1) 
2 Independent verification/assurance about environmental information disclosed in the annual report 
or sustainability report (0-1) 
3 Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental performance and/or systems (0-1) 
4 Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies (0-1) 
5 Product certification with respect to environmental impact (0-1) 
6 External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index (0-1) 
7 Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process (0-1) 
8 Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA or Government Department 
(0-1) 
9 Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (0-1) 
10 Participation in other environmental organisations/associations to improve environmental practices 
(0-1) 
A3 GHG Performance Indicators (max score is 6) 
1 Performance data is presented (0-1) 
2 Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals or industry (0-1) 
3 Performance data is presented relative to previous periods (trend analysis) (0-1) 
4 Performance data is presented relative to targets (0-1) 
5 Performance data is presented in absolute and normalized form (0-1) 
6 Performance date is presented at disaggregate level (i.e., plant, business unit geographic segment) 
(0-1) 
A4 Environmental spending (max score is 3) 
1 Summary of dollar savings arising from environmental initiatives to the company (0-1) 
2 Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or innovations to enhance environmental performance 
and/or efficiency (0-1) 
3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues (0-1) 
Soft Disclosure Items 
A5 Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6) 
1 CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to shareholders and/or stakeholder (0-1) 
2 A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, environmental codes of 
conduct (0-1) 
3 A statement about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance (0-
1) 
4 A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental 
performance (0-1) 
5 A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance (if not awarded 
under A3)  (0-1) 
6 A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (0-1) 
A6 Environmental profile (max score is 4) 
1 A statement about the firm’s obligations regarding climate change regulations (0-1) 
2 An overview of environmental impact of the industry (0-1) 
3 An overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact the environment 
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(0-1) 
4 An overview about specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (0-1) 
A7 Environmental initiatives (max score is 6) 
1 A substantive description of employee training in environmental management and operations (0-1) 
2 Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents (0-1) 
3 Internal environmental awards (0-1) 
4 Internal environmental audits (0-1) 
5 Internal certification of environmental programs (0-1) 
6 Community involvement and/or donations related to environment (if not awarded under A1.4 or 
A2.7) (0-1) 
 
3.10 Content Analysis 
The annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports for the entire 
population of ASX publicly-listed companies for the years 2007 and 2009 are 
examined.  To minimise possible evaluation bias, a two-step process of content analysis 
is used.  In the first instance, a research assistant
23
 collected disclosures from the annual 
reports of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in the years 2007 and 
2009.  During 2007, there are 1,940 corporations listed and 1,927 corporations during 
2009
24
.  An electronic search for the words:  environment, carbon, sustain, emission, 
regulation, committee and their derivatives, is used to identify companies that made 
GHG disclosures, or referred specifically to the NGER Act 2007 (Cth), and to identify 
corporate approaches to key environmental aspects regarding their operations.  These 
search words were selected because they appear to reflect an efficient and parsimonious 
process of capturing a broad set of company references to the information required to be 
reported under the NGER Act 2007 (Cth).   
Errors in locating relevant text are virtually eliminated (Krippendorff, 2004) 
because computer-aided text analysis tools operate by searching for character strings.  
They are thus reliable to the extent that the exact search words are identified.   
                                                 
23
 The author was the grateful recipient of a grant from AFAANZ in 2008 which provided partial 
funding for research assistance. 
24
 According to the Australian Securities Exchange (Australian Securities Exchange, 2008, 
2010), there were 2,209 listed entities at 31 December, 2007, and 2,181 at the same date in 2009.   
However, included in these figures are trusts with quoted equities, entities that trade as stapled securities, 
and entities with debt securities only.  These were beyond the scope of this study.  Additionally, new 
listings and delistings occur during each year, and their annual reports are not necessarily available in 
those circumstances. 
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Relevant text segments were copied and pasted into two Excel files, one each for 
2007 and 2009.  A separate worksheet was devoted to each company.  Next, the work 
was checked by the author for reproducibility.  Reproducibility is concerned with the 
ability that a process can be replicated by different analysts and is a medium-strength 
indicator of reliability (Krippendorff, 2004).  For PDF files that were not electronically-
readable, careful reading was carried out and relevant disclosures were noted, along 
with the annual report page number.  A similar procedure was performed on company 
sustainability reports.  Some 218 companies make GHG disclosures in 2007 and 390 in 
2009
25
.  Coding of the disclosures was the next step of the analysis process. 
In this research the coding procedure takes the unitised data and classifies it 
according to its fit with predefined recording units.  These predefined recording units 
are the 41 items comprising the index, providing that the company’s disclosures include 
GHG or energy information.  Therefore, the second step involved the researcher, as 
principle investigator, reading each company’s collected disclosures for each year to 
determine if they featured greenhouse gases
26
 or energy
27
.  If greenhouse gas or energy 
disclosures were identified, the entire compilation of disclosures collected as above for 
that company was coded according to whether or not they corresponded with an index 
item.  The corresponding index item received a score of one for a disclosure matching 
the item, or a zero where a match was absent.  An item was scored only once regardless 
of the frequency with which disclosures matched a given item.  By following this 
process a disclosure index score was attributed to each company for 2007 and 2009.      
A necessary condition in content analysis is to assess the reliability of the 
coding.  This demonstrates that the obtained results do not represent the idiosyncratic 
results of one coders’s subjective judgment (Tinsley & Weiss, 1975).   Details of 
reliability testing follow in Section  3.11. 
                                                 
25
 A list of all disclosing companies and their disclosure medium is included at  Appendix B.   
26
 “Greenhouse gases” include 24 gases specified in the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Regulations ("National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations," 2008). 
27
 Listed companies that did not make reference to CO2, carbon, greenhouse gas, or energy in 
their reports were not included in the indexing process. 
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3.11 Tests of Reliability 
The three forms of reliability applicable to content analysis are stability, 
reproducibility and accuracy (Krippendorff, 2004).  Stability, the weakest form, refers 
to the same content being coded the same way more than once by the same coder 
(Weber, 1990), and is also known as intraobserver consistency (Krippendorff, 2004).  
Accuracy, while the highest form of reliability, is concerned with the extent by which 
classified text confirms to a standard (Krippendorff, 2004) or norm (Weber, 1990).  The 
use of accuracy is seldom used in reliability assessment (Weber, 1990) and is limited to 
coder training and when objective standards are readily available (Krippendorff, 2004).  
Thus the most frequently reported measure is reproducibility (Weber, 1990), and it 
serves to validate the coding scheme
28
 and is an imperative for human-coding content 
(Neuendorf, 2002).   
Reproducibility refers to intercoder (Neuendorf, 2002; Weber, 1990) inter-rater 
(Beattie et al., 2004), or inter-observer (Krippendorff, 2004) reliability.  It signifies the 
extent to which independent judges make the same coding decisions (Lombard, Snyder-
Duch & Bracken, 2002).  It  measures the consistency of shared understandings (Weber, 
1990) and is of central importance to the trust placed in content analysis (Singletary, 
1993).  Without intercoder reliability the data and their interpretations can never be 
considered valid (Lombard et al., 2002).  At least two independent coders are necessary 
for reproducibility (Krippendorff, 2004).  A numerical index of the extent of agreement 
between or among the coders is calculated from their categorisations of units (Lombard 
et al., 2002).   
Reliability is concerned with the confidence that the agreement level for the data 
produced by independent observers is not due to chance.  Recall that a 41-item index 
was used in this research and that text segments were the units of analysis.  Perfect 
reliability is difficult to achieve when complex coding tasks require elaborate cognitive 
process (Krippendorff, 2004).      
                                                 
28
 The coding instructions for this study are located at  Appendix C. 
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No set standard exists for the number of units to be used in reliability 
assessment, but generally a subsample between 50 and 300 is acceptable (Neuendorf, 
2002).  Reproducibility of the coding process was established for this study by having a 
subsample (n=266)
29
 of the units of analysis (each company’s text segments) 
independently coded by a second coder
30
.  The coder training procedure involved the 
second coder indexing the disclosures of ten companies after verbal instruction and 
using the coding instructions.  This resulted in the identification and rectification of 
inter-coder differences of understanding.   Subsequent independent coding of the full 
subsample yielded a data reliability matrix comprising 10,906
31
 pairs of observations. 
Measuring coding agreement was done using Krippendorff’s alpha 
(Krippendorff, 2004).  Other frequently used measures of coefficients of agreement are 
Scott’s pi (Scott, 1955) and Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960).   
Krippendorff’s alpha can be used with any number of coders, any sized sample, 
and for different measurement levels.  It evaluates each variable individually, allows for 
missing categories or scale points and accounts for chance agreements  (Krippendorff, 
2004; Lombard et al., 2002).   
Levels for acceptability of reproducibility vary according to different researchers 
but it appears that a minimum coefficient of 70% is a basic requirement.  Coefficients of  
80% or higher are said to be acceptable in most situations, and greater than 90% are 
acceptable to all (Neuendorf, 2002).   Krippendorff’s agreement coefficient α, used to 
                                                 
29
 The selection of a subsample was achieved by using Excel’s Data Analysis Sampling 
technique, which incorporates a “with replacement” rule to provide a simple random sample.  In order for 
each unit of the population to have an equal chance of being chosen, it is replaced in the “draw” after 
selection and is available to be reselected.  To account for duplications, some 330 randomly selected units 
were generated, aiming to achieve an acceptable sample size after disregarding repeated units.  Running 
this technique resulted in 64 duplications which were ignored to produce the 266 discrete units for 
reliability assessment.   The subsample is included at  Appendix D. 
30
 A research assistant was employed for this stage of the study.  This assistant was selected 
from a pool of research assistants used by various researchers at Bond University and had no particular 
knowledge of the subject matter being coded.  This fulfils a condition for generating reliability data: that 
any individual with specifiable qualifications, rather than an expert, could understand the coding 
instructions and carry out the coding process (Krippendorff, 2004).  
31
 266 randomly selected sets of disclosures applied to a 41-item index. 
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evaluate reliability in content analysis, was .84 (84 per cent) in this study.  This is an 
acceptable reliability distribution, and thus the index data as a whole is reliable 
(Krippendorff, 2004).    
3.12 Dependent Variables 
Two measures are used to reflect the quality of voluntary GHG emission 
disclosures.  These are the index score achieved by each GHG disclosing company and 
the ratio of hard disclosures to total disclosures.    
3.13 Independent Variables 
This study relies on the following explanatory factors for a company’s decision to 
voluntarily disclose their greenhouse gas emission management and performance:  
obtaining additional debt or equity funding, leverage, concentration of stock ownership, 
competitiveness of product market, and industry membership.  A number of control 
variables are also incorporated into the analysis, and these are discussed in Section  3.14. 
The suitability of these variables has been established in prior studies.  Data 
relating to all independent and control variables are obtained from archival sources, 
specifically, FinAnalysis, DatAnalysis and Capital IQ.  Where required data are not 
present in these databases, they are collected directly from the companies’ annual 
reports
32
.   
3.13.1 Additional debt or equity funding 
Support has been found for managers providing greater disclosure when they 
determine to raise capital (Choi, 1973; Frankel et al., 1995).    
It is pertinent to assume that the issuance of additional share capital or debt 
funding lags GHG disclosure. The measurement of a firm’s obtainment of additional 
external financing is the incidence of new debt financing or new share issues in the year 
after the GHG disclosure.  This information is disclosed in a company’s Statement of 
                                                 
32
 As an example, it was necessary to hand collect data from the notes to each company’s annual 
reports in order to calculate the age of fixed assets variables for 2007 and 2009.  This time-consuming 
effort (involving accessing almost 3,800 annual reports and calculating gross fixed assets and 
accumulated depreciation thereon) was required because of inaccuracies in available data bases. 
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Cash Flows
33
 and accordingly, the firms’ 2008 and 2010 financial statements provide 
this information.  Borrowings next year and equity issued next year are measured as the 
natural log of the proceeds from borrowings and proceeds from share issues undertaken 
in the next financial year, respectively.   
3.13.2 Leverage 
Disclosures are expected to increase as firm debt increases because of the 
monitoring demands of debt-holders (Leftwich et al., 1981).  Another reason is that 
higher quality disclosures have been found to have a favourable effect on the default 
risk premium charged by debt-providers (Sengupta, 1998).  Leverage is measured as the 
ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year.   
3.13.3 Ownership concentration 
Cormier & Magnan (1999) found an association between less environmental 
disclosure and concentrated ownership. It is expected that corporations with a high 
concentrated ownership have a lower need to provide greenhouse gas emission 
information.  This is because monitoring costs are lower (Demsetz, 1983) and dominant 
owners normally have access to the information they require (Broberg et al., 2009; 
Cormier et al., 2005).  Following prior research, for example Banghøj and Plenborg 
(2008), Deumes and Knechel (2008) Elijido-Ten (2007), Kent and Chan (2009) and 
Roberts  (1992), ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of ownership 
of the firm held by shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the total shareholding.  
Shareholding information was obtained from the Capital IQ database. 
3.13.4 Competitiveness of product market 
The degree of product competition is likely to have an effect on a manager’s 
decision to report GHG information.  It is expected that firms operating in a highly 
competitive environment are hesitant to disclose information that can be used to reduce 
their future cash flows from the consumer market.  Competition is measured in this 
                                                 
33
 AASB 107 requires the cash flow statement to report cash flows from a firm’s operating, 
investing and financing activities.  Proceeds from issuing shares or other equity instruments, and proceeds 
from issuing debentures, loans, notes, mortgages, and other borrowings relate to financing activities. 
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research using a proxy for a market structure indicator, the Herfindahl index.  This 
index has been used extensively in accounting research as a measure of industry 
concentration (see, for example, the research of Ajinkya, Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2005; 
Beattie et al., 2004; Berger & Hann, 2007; Birt et al., 2006; Christensen, 2011; Cuijpers 
& Buijink, 2005; Dhaliwal, Khurana & Pereira, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2009; Harris, 
1998; Heitzman, Wasley & Zimmerman, 2009).  
The Herfindhal Index is computed as the sum of squares of revenue of all 
companies in each of the Global Industry Classification (GICS)
34
 sub-industry sectors 
divided by the total revenue of that sector.  A score of one indicates a monopoly, and 
zero indicates a purely competitive market, with a higher score indicating increasing 
market power and a decrease in competition.  As in Birt et al. (2006), the product of the 
Herfindahl index is deducted from one for ease of interpretation, and thus the calculated 
Herfindahl index score rises as competition in the sub-industry sector increases. 
3.13.5 Industry membership 
The GICS sector in which an industry is classified is likely to influence a firm’s 
GHG disclosures.  Firms in sensitive sectors, from a climate change perspective, are 
expected to make disclosures, and to provide more detailed disclosure.  Perhaps this is a 
self-servicing action on their behalf (Francis, 2011).   
Accordingly, industry dummy variables that are based on Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) sectors classifications are included.  Consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, health care, industrials, information 
technology, materials, telecommunication services and utilities, representing the ten-
sector principal business activities framework for industry analysis (Standard & Poors, 
2008) are included.   
                                                 
34
 Since August 2008, the Global Industry Classification Standard consists of ten sectors 
aggregated from 24 industry groups, 68 industry sectors and 154 sub-industry sectors (Standard & Poors, 
2008).  
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3.14 Control variables 
It is likely that other factors influence the decision to report voluntarily on 
greenhouse gas emissions and thus five control variables are included in the statistical 
modelling.  These are financial performance, audit quality, age of fixed assets, foreign 
listing status and size. 
3.14.1 Financial performance 
Better-performing companies are likely to reveal their good news (Aerts & 
Cormier, 2009; Botosan, 2000; Hutton, Miller & Skinner, 2003) and thus financial 
performance has been linked positively to corporate disclosure (Cormier & Magnan, 
1999, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; McGuire et al., 1988).  Financial performance is 
gauged using an accounting perspective and a capital market perspective.  
The accounting measurement, return on assets (ROA) is widely used in 
accounting disclosure research as a control for firm performance (see, for example, the 
research of Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Alvarez et al., 2008; Birt et al., 2006; Cahan, 
Rahman & Perera, 2005; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2009; El-Gazzar, 
Fornaro & Jacob, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003; Francis et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2005; 
Haggard, Martin & Pereira, 2008; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Rankin et al., 2011).  ROA 
is calculated as income before abnormal items
35
 at the end of the year (either 2007 or 
2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 
2008).     
Tobin’s Q also features in accounting disclosure research (examples are the 
work of Cahan et al., 2005; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2009; Haggard et al., 
2008). The typical Tobin’s Q ratio is measured by the sum of market value of common 
equity plus the book value of total debt and preferred shares divided by book value of 
total assets
36
.  A value greater than 1 indicates that the capital market considers the 
                                                 
35
 Earnings before taxes before abnormal items are still provided by the Aspect Huntley database 
even though the disclosure of abnormal items has been discontinued under AASB 101.  Abnormal items 
are determined according to the discretion of the Aspect Huntley analyst allocated to the company 
(Aspect Huntley, 2012).   
36
 It is noted that this formula is in reality a variation of the “approximate q”, created by Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) using basic financial and accounting information.  They found their simplified 
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company’s assets to be greater than their book value.  Thus measured, Tobin’s Q 
encompasses investor expectations for company performance based on existing assets.  
In keeping with several recent studies of voluntary disclosures (for example, Chapple et 
al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008; Moroney et al., 2011), this research measures Tobin’s 
Q in the same way.   
3.14.2 Audit quality 
Recall that sixteen of the forty-one index items are categorised as soft in that 
they are non-verified assertions by the company about their vision and strategy, 
environmental profile and environmental initiatives.  Big 4 auditors are believed to 
provide higher quality and more credible audits.  Their independent review of unaudited 
sections of the annual report may increase the perceived general credibility of voluntary 
GHG emission disclosures.  Bar-Yosef & Livnat (1984) suggest that the selection of 
auditors is a signalling mechanism.  This study uses a dichotomous variable assigning a 
value of 1 if a company engages a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise. 
3.14.3 Age of fixed assets 
Older fixed assets are likely to be less efficient, more costly to operate, and less 
technically advanced than newer assets, and may be indicative of the company’s future 
earnings prospects.   Older assets are associated with lower environmental performance 
(Freedman & Jaggi, 1992) and are likely to be less efficient in managing GHG 
emissions than newer fixed assets.  These factors could influence a manager’s decision 
to report GHG disclosures.   
Measuring the accumulated depreciation of tangible assets divided by gross 
property plant and equipment gives an indication of the age of the tangible assets.  
Although there have been conflicting results in prior research and in different theoretical 
frameworks, a positive direction is expected for the age of fixed assets variable.    
                                                                                                                                               
calculation of Tobin’s Q to have a 96.6% degree of accuracy with more theoretically correct models.  The 
original Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets 
(Chung & Pruitt, 1994). 
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3.14.4 Foreign Listing 
Foreign listing is included as a control variable, given the global interest in GHG 
management and reduction.  A greater need for external capital can be indicated by 
multiple listing, and this may be an explanatory factor (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
Foreign listing is measured as a dichotomous variable where corporations only listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange are coded 0, and corporations listed on additional stock 
exchanges are coded 1.   
3.14.5 Size 
Large firms are more politically sensitive and have relatively larger wealth 
transfers imposed on them (political costs) than smaller firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986).  Increased disclosures are a means of mitigating potential political costs.  Large 
firms also are likely to have the resources to enable them to voluntarily disclose 
information (Meek et al., 1995).     
Operational measures of firm size are many, although there is some consistency 
within a particular theoretical research stream.  Five operational measures for firm size 
are number of employees, market capitalisation, sales, income, and assets (Bujaki & 
Richardson, 1997).   Various permutations of these measures are used for the different 
theoretical constructs.  Interestingly, no theoretical reason exists in disclosure studies 
for any particular measure of size (Hackston & Milne, 1996).  Therefore, this thesis 
emulates numerous disclosure studies (for example, Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Amir 
& Ziv, 1997; Birt et al., 2006; Bujaki & McConomy, 2002; El-Gazzar et al., 2008; 
Francis et al., 2005; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hossain et al., 1995; Kent & Ung, 2003; 
O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Perera & Jubb, 2011; Sengupta, 1998) in measuring size as the 
natural log of total assets.   
Using the number of employees is not preferred because, unlike the disclosure 
paper of Boesso and Kamalesh (2007), the focus of this study is not of the management 
of employee relationships as a major stakeholder group.  Market capitalisation is 
eliminated as a size measure as it is used in the calculation of the financial performance 
variable, Tobin’s Q.  Similarly, sales are a component of the competition variable, 
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Herfindahl Index, and an element in calculating income.  Income is used in the 
calculation of the financial performance variable Return on Assets, and although total 
assets are also a component of this variable, intuition suggests that logging the total 
assets is least likely to create multicollinearity issues.   
3.15 Econometric Modelling 
Four econometric models are tested in this research.  The first model uses the 
continuous variable, indexed disclosures, as the dependent variable and linear regression 
and Tobit regression techniques are applied.  The second model has as its dependent 
variable the voluntary GHG disclosure behaviour of the Australian-listed companies for 
2007 and 2009.  Companies are placed in one of two categories, those that do disclose 
and those that do not disclose GHG information.  Logistic regression is applied due to 
this variable’s categorical nature (1 if disclosures are made, 0 otherwise).  The final two 
models focus on the disclosing companies.  Analysis is firstly conducted with the 
dependent variable being the number of disclosures made (Model 3), and subsequently, 
with the dependent variable as the ratio of hard to total disclosures to measure the 
quality of the disclosures (Model 4).   
Robustness tests, although not forming part of the main statistical analysis, are 
performed and reported upon in a later section.   
3.15.1 Model 1 
Section  3.12 described how the content-quality of the 2007 and 2009 voluntary 
GHG disclosures made in annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports of 
Australian publicly-listed companies are indexed.  The preceding section 
operationalized the proxy measures for information asymmetry, agency theory, political 
costs, proprietary costs, and control variables.  From these, the following model is 
specified to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2.   
VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage + 
4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q + 
9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
 62 
 
Where: 
VD = the score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports. 
Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following 
year. 
Equity issued next year = the natural log of proceeds from issue of equity in the 
following year. 
Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Ownership Concentration = the percentage of ownership of the firm held by 
shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the total shareholding.  
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index.   
GICS sector = industry fixed effects;  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector 
- consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 
0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 
0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008).     
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock 
and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total assets.  
Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 
auditor, 0 otherwise. 
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Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment 
divided by gross property plant and equipment. 
Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas 
stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise. 
Size = the natural log of total assets. 
 Model 1 is statistically analysed using multiple regression and Tobit regression 
techniques. 
3.15.2 Model 2 
This model features a categorical variable for voluntary disclosure as its 
dependent variable.   
VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage + 
4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q + 
9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
Where: 
VD = a dichotomous variable for voluntary GHG disclosures for 2997 (2009); 1 if GHG 
disclosures were made, 0 otherwise. 
Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following 
year. 
Equity issued next year = the natural log of proceeds from issue of equity in the 
following year. 
Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Ownership Concentration = the percentage of ownership of the firm held by 
shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the total shareholding. 
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Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index.   
Industry = industry fixed effects;  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 
0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 
0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008).     
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock 
and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total assets.  
Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 
auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment 
divided by gross property plant and equipment. 
Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas 
stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise. 
Size = the natural log of total assets. 
3.15.3 Model 3 
The third model is concerned with disclosing companies and applies multiple 
regression to this subsample.  Model 3 is as follows: 
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VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage + 
4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q + 
9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
 
Where: 
VD = the indexed GHG disclosures based on annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports for 2007 (2009) for disclosing companies only.  
Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following 
year. 
Equity issued next year = the natural log of proceeds from issue of equity in the 
following year. 
Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Ownership Concentration = the percentage of ownership of the firm held by 
shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the total shareholding. 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index.   
Industry = industry fixed effects;  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 
0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 
0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise. 
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ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008).     
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock 
and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total assets.  
Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 
auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment 
divided by gross property plant and equipment. 
Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas 
stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise. 
Size = the natural log of total assets. 
3.15.4 Model 4 
The final model considers the quality of the disclosures made and takes as its 
dependent variable the ratio of hard to total disclosures.  Recall that hard disclosures are 
verifiable and are not easily replicated.  Model 4 follows: 
VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage + 
4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q + 
9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
Where: 
VD = the ratio of hard to total score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual 
reports and stand-alone sustainability reports, restricted to disclosing companies. 
Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following 
year. 
Equity issued next year = the natural log of proceeds from issue of equity in the 
following year. 
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Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Ownership Concentration = the percentage of ownership of the firm held by 
shareholders who own 5 per cent or more of the total shareholding. 
Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index.   
Industry = industry fixed effects;  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 
0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 
0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008).     
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock 
and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total assets.  
Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 
auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment 
divided by gross property plant and equipment. 
Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas 
stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise. 
Size = the natural log of total assets. 
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3.16 Summary 
This chapter described the sample, data studied, the methodology adopted, and 
the variables of interest in this investigation into the voluntary GHG disclosures of 
Australian listed-companies in 2007 and 2009.  Four models for analysis were presented 
with alternate dependent variables and thus requiring the application of diverse 
regression techniques.  Descriptive statistics are presented in the next chapter and 
results of analyses are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to identify the motivating factors for companies making 
voluntary greenhouse gas emission (GHG) disclosures in their annual reports and stand-
alone sustainability reports.  Chapter 2 developed hypotheses derived from information 
asymmetry, agency, political cost and proprietary costs theories.  It is proposed that 
taking measures to reduce information asymmetry by disclosing information about 
GHG performance allows capital market participants to better evaluate the future 
earnings potential of the company.  Additionally, it is proposed that political cost 
pressures arising from carbon emission sensitivity are reduced when greater corporate 
transparency and accountability exists.  In contrast, however, is the proprietary cost 
consideration that more disclosures may serve to the detriment of a company’s 
competitive position in the product market. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used to measure the dependent
37
, 
independent and control variables and describes the basic model for statistical testing. 
In this chapter the disclosure index and the descriptive statistics for the disclosed 
items are presented and discussed in Sections  4.2 to  4.5.  Section  4.6 summarises the 
disclosure index findings.  In Section  4.7 the results of reliability testing are reported.  
Descriptive statistics for the sample companies are presented in Section  4.8.     
4.2 Disclosure Index 
Two sources of disclosures are examined and these are those in the companies’ 
annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports.  In 2007, 227 companies report 
GHG information in their annual reports, and 27 in their stand-alone sustainability 
reports.  In 2009, GHG information is reported in 388 company annual reports and 43 
                                                 
37
 Companies’ disclosures were only collected when they made statements that referred to 
greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emissions, and/or CO2 emissions or with specific statements about the 
NGER Act 2007 (Cth).  This index measures the quality of GHG emission information by considering the 
company’s governance system, external verification of systems and initiatives, environmental spending, 
strategic objectives, environmental profile and initiatives, as well as actual GHG performance data. 
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stand-alone sustainability reports.  In total, 228 companies make GHG disclosures in 
either or both types of reports in 2007, and 390 in 2009
38
.   
The categories making up the disclosure index permit an inference of the quality 
of those disclosures.  Hard disclosures are statements made about GHG performance 
and management that are able to be substantiated through external verification.  Soft 
disclosures are claims that do not have this third party oversight.      
A maximum score of 25 is possible for statements that fit the hard disclosure 
category, and a maximum score of 16 is possible for statements matching the soft 
disclosure category.  Hard disclosures are discussed first in Section  4.3.  A discussion of 
soft disclosures follows in Section  4.4, and the aggregated disclosures are discussed in 
Section  4.5. 
4.3 Hard Disclosures 
Table  4-1 shows the index of hard voluntary greenhouse disclosures found in 
companies’ annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports for 2007 and 2009.  In 
this section, hard disclosures concerning greenhouse gas emission performance and 
management of ASX-listed companies for 2007 and 2009 obtained from annual reports 
are discussed first, and those made in sustainability reports are discussed second. 
The hard disclosure category comprises statements grouped into four sub-
categories:  A1 Governance structure and management systems; A2 Credibility; A3 
GHG performance indicators; and A4 Environmental spending.  These are presented in 
Table  4-1 in Panels A, B, C and D respectively.   
Annual Reports 
In 2007 (2009) the highest annual report score for companies making statements 
that correspond with the hard disclosure category is 12 (10), the lowest
39
 is 0 (0).  In 
2007, 81.11 per cent of companies making voluntary GHG disclosures in their annual 
                                                 
38
 In 2007, one company makes GHG disclosures only in their sustainability report.  Two 
companies make GHG disclosures in their sustainability reports only in 2009.   
39
 Note that the lowest score for each hard category for each year is zero for annual report 
disclosures.  It is therefore not reported separately again in this discussion. 
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reports make hard disclosures.  Some 54.87 per cent of companies make the same type 
of disclosures in 2009.  While the proportion of disclosing companies with verifiable 
disclosures is higher in 2007, in absolute terms the 2009 results represent 37 additional 
companies reporting verifiable information about their governance structure and 
management systems, external verification or certification of performance or programs, 
actual GHG performance data, and spending on environmental initiatives in their annual 
reports.     
Sustainability Reports 
The second source of disclosures analysed are companies’ stand-alone 
sustainability reports.  In 2007, there are 27 stand-alone sustainability reports that are 
found to include GHG disclosures.  This number is greater in 2009, with 43 companies 
found to report their GHG emission performance and management therein.  Results of 
indexation of hard disclosure items included in these sustainability reports, as presented 
in Table  4-1, follow. 
All companies report hard disclosure items in their sustainability reports for both 
years (2007, 100 per cent, 2009, 100 per cent).   In 2007, the maximum
40
 category score 
achieved for the hard disclosure category is 17, the minimum score is one.  In 2009, the 
highest score is 20, the lowest score is one.   
4.3.1 Governance structure and management systems 
Table  4-1, Panel A provides data on governance structure and management 
systems disclosures.  Annual report disclosures are discussed first and sustainability 
report disclosures follow.  The maximum score possible for this category is six. 
Annual Reports 
Some 57.14 per cent of disclosing companies provide statements in their annual 
reports about their governance structure and management systems (item A1) in 2007.  In 
2009, some 35.64 per cent of companies make disclosures within this category.  The 
highest (lowest) score found for this type of disclosure is four (zero) for both 2007 and 
                                                 
40
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 25. 
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2009.  Some 6.91 (3.08) per cent of disclosing companies report the existence of a 
department for pollution control and/or management positions for environmental 
management (item A1.1) in 2007 (2009).   More companies have an environmental 
and/or a public issues committee on the board in 2007 (2009) (item A1.2), with 24.42 
(15.90) per cent of disclosing companies providing this information in their annual 
reports.   The proportion of disclosing companies notifying the existence of terms and 
conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental practices 
(item A1.3) is 9.22 (6.92) per cent in 2007 (2009).  In 2007 (2009) some 30.41 (14.36) 
per cent of disclosing companies report stakeholder involvement in setting corporate 
environmental policies (item A1.4).  A total of 13.36 (8.21) per cent of disclosing 
companies report the implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (item 
A1.5) in 2007 (2009).  Only 4.61 (3.08) per cent of disclosing companies link executive 
compensation to environmental performance in 2007 (2009) in their annual reports 
(item A1.6).   
Sustainability Reports 
In 2007 (2009) some 70.37 (76.74) per cent of disclosing companies make 
statements concerning their governance structure and management systems (disclosure 
category A1) in their sustainability reports.  Here, the highest
41
 (lowest) category score 
is 5 (0) for both 2007 and 2009.  
For five items, 2009 disclosures are greater than those in 2007.  Item A1.1, 
existence of a department for pollution control and/or management positions for 
environmental management is reported by 18.52 per cent of disclosers in 2007 and 
20.93 per cent of disclosers in 2009.  Some 33.33 per cent of companies disclosing in 
2007 relate the existence of an environmental and/or a public issues committee on the 
board (item A1.2).  The proportion of disclosing companies making these disclosures in 
2009 is 44.19 per cent.  Statements about the existence of terms and conditions 
applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental practices (item A1.3) 
are made by 29.63 per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 and 39.53 per cent in 2009.  
Allowing stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies (item 
                                                 
41
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 6. 
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A1.4) is reported by 29.63 per cent of companies making disclosures in 2007, and 41.86 
per cent in 2009.  The implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (A1.5) 
is an assertion made by 33.33 per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 and 32.56 per 
cent of disclosing companies in 2009.  A statement about executive compensation being 
linked to environmental performance (item A1.6) is provided by 3.70 per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007. Some 4.65 per cent of disclosing companies make this 
statement in 2009 in their sustainability reports. 
4.3.2 Credibility 
Table  4-1, Panel B provides data on credibility disclosures.  The credibility 
(disclosure category A2) of companies’ disclosures is made up of ten items.  Annual 
report disclosures are discussed first, followed by sustainability report disclosures.  It is 
possible for a company to score 10 for disclosures that fit within this group. 
Annual Reports 
The maximum number of annual report statements found to fit within the 
credibility category is 5 (4) for 2007 (2009).  In 2007, some 59.45 per cent of disclosing 
companies report this information.  In comparison, in 2009, 34.36 per cent of companies 
make these types of disclosures.   
Some 3.69 (1.28) per cent of companies report the adoption of GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines (item A2.1) in 2007 (2009).  Only 0.92 (0.26) per 
cent of companies state they have independent verification/assurance about 
environmental information disclosed in the annual report or sustainability report (item 
A2.2).  The number of companies that report having periodic independent 
verifications/audits on their environmental performance and/or systems (item A2.3) 
amounts to 13.82 (10.00) per cent in 2007 (2009).  Even fewer companies make 
statements that they have certification of environmental programs by independent 
agencies (item A2.4), with 10.60 (4.10) per cent telling of this in 2007 (2009).   
Companies making disclosures about having product certification with respect to 
environmental impact (item A2.5) comprise 3.69 (3.59) of disclosing companies in 2007 
(2009).  A total of 22.58 (9.49) per cent of disclosing companies make annual report 
statements about achieving external environmental performance awards and/or being 
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included in a sustainability index (item A2.6) in 2007 (2009).  Reporting of stakeholder 
involvement in the environmental disclosure process (item A2.7) is made by 1.38 per 
cent of disclosing companies in 2007.  No companies are found making this type of 
disclosure in their annual report in 2009. Some 11.52 (4.10) per cent of disclosing 
companies report participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by 
government (item A2.8) in 2007 (2009).  Participation in industry specific 
associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (item A2.9) is reported by 
19.82 (6.92) per cent of companies in their 2007 (2009) annual reports.  The final item 
in this sub-category, participation in other environmental organisations/associations to 
improve environmental practices (item 2.10) is disclosed by 11.06 (9.74) per cent of 
companies in 2007 (2009) in their annual reports. 
Sustainability Reports 
Statements concerning the credibility disclosure category (A2) are made by 
92.59 (97.67) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009) in their sustainability 
reports.  The maximum
42
 (minimum) score achieved for this group of disclosures is 7(0) 
in 2007 and 8 (1) in 2009.  Some 48.15 per cent of disclosing companies indicate that 
they have adopted GRI sustainability reporting guidelines (item A2.1) in 2007.  In 2009, 
this proportion is 74.42 per cent.  Assertions of independent verification/assurance 
about environmental information disclosures (item A2.2) are made by 44.44 (37.21) per 
cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Some 29.63 (37.21) per cent of disclosing 
companies state that they have periodic independent verifications/audits on their 
environmental performance and/or systems (item A2.3) in 2007 (2009).  Obtaining 
certification of environmental programs by independent agencies (item A2.4) is done by 
7.41 (2.33) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  The per centage of 
companies that have their products certified with respect to their environmental impact 
(item A2.5) is 7.41 per cent in 2007 and in 2009 this rises to 27.91 per cent.  Of the 27 
(43) companies in 2007 (2009) whose sustainability reports are considered for this 
index, 66.67 (67.44) per cent state they have received external environmental 
performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index (item A2.6).  Some 3.70 
                                                 
42
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 10. 
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(25.58) per cent of these disclosing companies have stakeholder involvement in the 
environmental disclosure process (item A2.7) in 2007 (2009).   Participation in 
voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by governments (item A2.8) is asserted by 
33.33 (18.60) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Participation in industry 
specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (item A2.9) is stated 
by 33.33 (27.91) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Statements 
concerning participation in other environmental organisations/associations to improve 
environmental practices (item A2.10) are made by 55.56 (65.12) per cent of disclosers 
in their sustainability reports. 
4.3.3 GHG performance indicators 
The GHG performance indicators category (disclosure category A3) is 
concerned with factual data about GHG emissions or energy usage.  Indexing results are 
presented in Panel C, Table  4-1.  This category comprises six items and has a maximum 
score of six.  Annual report disclosures are presented first, and sustainability report 
disclosures follow. 
Annual Reports 
In both years companies reporting GHG information in their annual reports 
achieve a maximum score of five.  Some 25.81 (17.44) per cent of companies provide 
GHG performance indicators in 2007 (2009) in their annual reports.  The presentation of 
performance data (item A3.1) is made by 25.35 (16.41) per cent of companies in 2007 
(2009).  Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals (item A3.2) by 1.38 (0.26) 
per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  In 2007 some 8.29 per cent of 
disclosing companies provide GHG performance data relative to previous periods (item 
A3.3).  This category of information is presented by 7.44 per cent of disclosing 
companies in 2009.  The presentation of performance data relative to targets (item A3.4) 
is made by 4.15 (2.05) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Performance 
data in absolute and normalised form (item A3.5) is presented by 4.15 (2.31) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Disaggregation of performance data to the plant, 
business unit, or geographic segment (item A3.6) is reported by 4.15 (5.13) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009). 
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Sustainability Reports 
Sustainability report statements that fall within the third category of hard disclosure 
items, GHG performance indicators, have a maximum
43
 (minimum) score of 5 (0) in 
both years.  The respective per centages of participating disclosers are 88.89 and 86.05 
per centage for 2007 and 2009.  Some 88.89 (86.05) per cent of disclosing companies 
present performance data (item A3.1) in 2007 (2009).  The presentation of performance 
data relative to peers/rivals or industry (item A3.2) is carried out by 3.70 (0.00) per cent 
of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Providing performance data relative to previous periods 
(item A3.3) is done by 81.48 (76.74) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  
Presenting performance data relative to targets (item A3.4) is carried out by 33.33 
(30.23) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Performance data, presented in absolute 
and normalised form (item A3.5), is provided by 55.56 (55.81) per cent of disclosing 
companies in 2007 (2009).  Disaggregating performance data at the plant, business unit, 
or geographic segment (item A3.6) is reported in sustainability reports by 66.67 (72.09) 
per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009). 
4.3.4 Environmental spending 
The final hard disclosure category is concerned with environmental spending 
(disclosure category A4, Panel D, Table  4-1).  The reporting of dollar amounts saved by 
environment initiatives, or spent on technologies, research and development, or 
innovations that enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency, and paid as 
environmental fines is in evidence.  The maximum score possible is three.  Disclosures 
made in annual reports are discussed first; sustainability report disclosures are discussed 
afterwards. 
Annual Reports 
The maximum score of three is achieved by the 2007 disclosing companies 
making annual report disclosures.  In 2009, however, the maximum score achieved is 
two for GHG disclosing companies.  In 2007 (2009) some 11.52 (4.62) per cent of 
disclosing companies report information that fits into this category.  Some 5.07 (0.77) 
                                                 
43
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 6. 
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per cent of 2007 (2009) disclosing companies report the dollar amount of savings 
arising from environmental initiatives by their company (item A4.1).  The per centage 
of companies disclosing the amount spent on technologies, research and development 
and/or innovations to enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency (item A4.2) 
is 4.15 per cent in 2007 and 2.05 per cent in 2009.  In 2007, 5.07 per cent of disclosers 
reveal the amount spent on fines related to environmental issues (item A4.3).  There are 
only 2.05 per cent of disclosing companies making these types of disclosures in 2009 in 
their annual reports. 
Sustainability Reports 
Some 44.44 (51.16) per cent of disclosing companies report statements about 
their environmental spending in their sustainability reports.  The maximum
44
  
(minimum) score achieved in 2007 is 2 (0) and in 2009 the maximum (minimum) score 
is 3 (0).  A summary of dollar savings arising from environmental initiatives to the 
company (item A4.1) is provided by 7.41 (13.95) per cent of disclosing companies in 
2007 (2009).  The per centage of disclosers indicating the amount spent on 
technologies, research and development and/or innovations to enhance environmental 
performance and/or efficiency (item A4.2) is 33.33 per cent in 2007 and 16.28 per cent 
in 2009.  Some 14.81 (32.56) per cent of disclosers detail the amount spent on fines 
related to environmental issues (item A4.3) in 2007 (2009) in their sustainability 
reports. 
 
                                                 
44
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 3. 
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Table ‎4-1 Index of Quality of Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosures45 – Hard Disclosure Items 
  2007 2009 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Annual Reports Sustainability Reports 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=217) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=27) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=388) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=43) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
HARD DISCLOSURE ITEMS 81.11 12(0) 100.00 17(1) 54.87 10(0) 100.00 20(1) 
Panel A         
A1 
Governance structure and management systems (max 
score is 6) 
57.14 4(0) 70.37 5(0) 35.64 4(0) 76.74 5(0) 
A1.1 
Existence of a department for pollution control and/or 
management positions for environmental management  
6.91  18.52  3.08  20.93  
A1.2 
Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues 
committee on the board  
24.42  33.33  15.90  44.19  
A1.3 
Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers 
and/or customers regarding environmental practices  
9.22  29.63  6.92  39.53  
A1.4 
Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate 
environmental policies  
30.41  29.63  14.36  41.86  
A1.5 Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level  13.36  33.33  8.21  32.56  
A1.6 
Executive compensation is linked to environmental 
performance  
4.61  3.70  3.08  4.65  
Panel B         
A2 Credibility (max score is 10) 59.45 5(0) 92.59 7(0) 34.36 4(0) 97.67 8(1) 
A2.1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines  3.69  48.15  1.28  74.42  
                                                 
45
 Companies’ disclosures were only collected when they made statements that referred to greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emissions, and/or CO2 emissions 
or with specific statements about the NGER Act 2007 (Cth).  This index measures the quality of GHG emission information by considering the company’s governance 
system, external verification of systems and initiatives, environmental spending, strategic objectives, environmental profile and initiatives, as well as actual GHG 
performance data. 
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  2007 2009 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Annual Reports Sustainability Reports 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=217) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=27) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=388) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=43) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
A2.2 
Independent verification/assurance about environmental 
information disclosed in the annual report or sustainability 
report  
0.92  44.44  0.26  37.21  
A2.3 
Periodic independent verifications/audits on 
environmental performance and/or systems  
13.82  29.63  10.00  37.21  
A2.4 
Certification of environmental programs by independent 
agencies  
10.60  7.41  4.10  2.33  
A2.5 Product certification with respect to environmental impact  3.69  7.41  3.59  27.91  
A2.6 
External environmental performance awards and/or 
inclusion in a sustainability index  
22.58  66.67  9.49  67.44  
A2.7 
Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure 
process  
1.38  3.70  0.00  25.58  
A2.8 
Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives 
endorsed by government  
11.52  33.33  4.10  18.60  
A2.9 
Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to 
improve environmental practices  
19.82  33.33  6.92  27.91  
A2.10 
Participation in other environmental 
organisations/associations to improve environmental 
practices (if not awarded under 8 or 9 above)  
11.06  55.56  9.74  65.12  
Panel C         
A3 GHG performance indicators (max score is 6) 25.81 5(0) 88.89 5(0) 17.44 5(0) 86.05 5(0) 
A3.1 Performance data is presented 25.35  88.89  16.41  86.05  
A3.2 
Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals or 
industry 
1.38  3.70  0.26  0.00  
A3.3 
Performance data is presented relative to previous periods 
(trend analysis) 
8.29  81.48  7.44  76.74  
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  2007 2009 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Annual Reports Sustainability Reports 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=217) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=27) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=388) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=43) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
A3.4 Performance data is presented relative to targets 4.15  33.33  2.05  30.23  
A3.5 
Performance data is presented in absolute and normalised 
form 
4.15  55.56  2.31  55.81  
A3.6 
Performance data is presented at disaggregate level (i.e., 
plant, business unit, geographic segment) 
4.15  66.67  5.13  72.09  
Panel D         
A4 Environmental spending (max score is 3) 11.52 3(0) 44.44 2(0) 4.62 2(0) 51.16 3(0) 
A4.1 
Summary of dollar savings arising from environmental 
initiatives to the company 
5.07  7.41  0.77  13.95  
A4.2 
Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or innovations 
to enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency 
4.15  33.33  2.05  16.28  
A4.3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues 5.07  14.81  2.05  32.56  
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4.4 Soft Disclosures 
Three types of disclosures encompass the soft disclosure items.  Soft disclosures 
are claims made without supporting evidence from third party sources.  They are 
concerned with claims about corporate vision and strategy (disclosure category A5), 
corporate environmental profile (disclosure category A6) and environmental initiatives 
(disclosure category A7).  The total score possible is 16, being 6 for vision and strategy 
claims, 4 for environmental profile assertions and 6 for statements covering 
environmental initiatives.  Table  4-2, Panels A, B, and C present the findings.  
Discussions on annual report disclosures and presented first, followed by sustainability 
report disclosures, for each soft disclosure category. 
The highest (lowest
46
) score in the soft categories made in annual reports in 
2007 is 10 (0); in 2009 this score is 7 (0).  Some 96.77 per cent of companies make soft 
disclosures in 2007.  A similar proportion is observed in 2009 with 96.41 per cent of 
disclosing companies making statements about their vision and strategy, environmental 
profile and/or environmental initiatives. 
With regard to sustainability reports, soft disclosure items are made by 100 per 
cent of disclosing companies in 2007 and 97.67 per cent of disclosing companies in 
2009.  The highest (lowest) scores are 12 (1) in 2007 and 12 (0) in 2009.   
4.4.1 Vision and strategy claims 
Findings of vision and strategy claims are reported in disclosure category A5, 
Table  4-2, Panel A.  Some six items comprise this category, making a maximum 
(minimum) possible score of 6 (0).  Annual reports disclosures are discussed first. 
Annual Reports 
Vision and strategy claims are made by 92.63 (81.03) per cent of disclosing 
companies in annual reports.  These scores are achieved by disclosing companies in 
both years. 
                                                 
46
 The lowest soft disclosure score for the three categories is zero for both years.  Minimum 
scores are not referred to again in this discussion. 
 82 
 
The proportion of companies where the CEO’s statement to shareholders and/or 
stakeholders (item A5.1) includes environmental performance information is 11.98 per 
cent in 2007 and 11.79 per cent in 2009.  In 2007, 62.21 per cent of disclosing 
companies make a statement about their corporate environmental policy, values and 
principles, and environmental codes of conduct (item A5.2).  The same types of 
disclosures are made by 52.05 per cent of disclosing companies in 2009.  Statements 
about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance (item 
A5.3) are reported by 55.76 per cent of companies making GHG disclosures in 2007.  
Some 48.46 per cent of disclosing companies do so in 2009.  A statement that the firm 
undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental performance (item 
A5.4) is put forward by 35.94 (44.10) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  
The reporting of measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance (item 
A5.5) is made in 2007 (2009) by 13.36 (6.15) per cent of disclosing companies.  The 
final index item for this category, a statement about specific environmental innovations 
and/or new technologies (item A5.6) is reported by 47.47 (17.69) of annual report 
disclosers in 2007 (2009). 
Sustainability Reports 
The maximum (minimum) score achieved by sustainability report disclosing 
companies is 6 (1) in 2007 and 6 (0) in 2009.  In 2007, 100 per cent of disclosing 
companies make vision and strategy claims in this type of report.  In 2009, this figure is 
96.67 per cent.  
CEO statements on environmental performance in a letter to shareholders and/or 
stakeholders (item A5.1) are made by 55.56 (23.26) per cent of disclosing companies.  
Statements of corporate environmental policy, values and principles and environmental 
codes of conduct (item A5.2) are given by 92.59 (93.02) of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  
Some 62.96 (69.77) per cent of disclosers make statements about formal management 
systems regarding environmental risk and performance (item A5.3) in 2007 (2009).  
Some 29.63 (44.19) per cent of disclosing companies provide a statement that the firm 
undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental performance (item 
A5.4) in 2007 (2009).  The provision of a statement concerning measurable goals in 
terms of future environmental performance (item A5.5) is made by 48.15 (53.49) per 
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cent of disclosing companies.  Details of specific environmental innovations and/or new 
technologies (item A5.6) are given by 59.26 (72.09) per cent of disclosers in 2007 
(2009) in their sustainability reports. 
4.4.2 Environmental profile 
Disclosure category A6 covers the corporation’s environmental profile and 
consists of four items.  The maximum score possible is four.  Findings are presented in 
Table  4-2, Panel B.  Discussions on annual report disclosures are presented first, 
followed by discussions on sustainability report disclosures. 
Annual Reports 
The maximum score obtained by companies making environmental profile 
disclosures in annual reports in both years is two.  Some 25.35 per cent of disclosing 
companies make claims about their environmental profile in 2007.  This proportion is 
much higher in 2009, with 45.13 per cent of companies setting forth disclosures of this 
nature.  Some 1.38 (38.49) per cent of companies make statements about their 
obligations regarding climate change regulations (item A6.1) in 2007 (2009).  Providing 
an overview of the environmental impact of the industry (item A6.2) is carried out by 
some 4.15 (2.05) per cent of companies in 2007 (2009).  An overview of how the 
business operations and/or products and services impact the environment (item A6.3) is 
given by 21.66 (5.13) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Very little evidence is 
found of companies giving an overview of corporate environmental performance 
relative to industry peers (item A6.4).  Only 0.46 per cent of companies report this 
information in 2007 and no companies report this in 2009. 
Sustainability Reports 
The maximum
47
 (minimum) scores achieved by companies making 
environmental profiles in sustainability reports are 2 (0) in 2007 and 2 (0) in 2009.  A 
total of 44.44 per cent of disclosers make statements in this category in 2007.  In 2009 
this rises to 62.79 per cent.  Some 37.04 (51.16) per cent of disclosing companies make 
                                                 
47
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 4. 
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statements about the firm’s obligations regarding climate change regulations (item 
A6.1) in 2007 (2009).  An overview of environmental impact of the industry (item 
A6.2) is provided by 3.70 (2.33) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  A statement 
giving an overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact 
the environment (item A6.3) is provided by 14.81 (23.26) per cent of disclosing 
companies in 2007 (2009).  No companies provide an overview of corporate 
environmental performance relative to industry peers in 2007 or 2009 in their 
sustainability reports. 
4.4.3 Environmental initiatives 
The final category of soft disclosures is about corporate environmental 
initiatives (disclosure category A7).  Some six statement types make up this category 
and therefore the maximum score possible is six.  Table  4-2, Panel C, provides the 
findings.  Annual report disclosures lead the discussion for this category, followed by 
sustainability report disclosures. 
Annual Reports 
In both years, the maximum score for annual report disclosures relating to 
environmental initiatives is three.  There are 31.34 per cent of disclosing companies 
making statements about their environmental initiatives in 2007.  This proportion is 
17.95 per cent in 2009. 
Some 4.15 (3.08) per cent of companies provide a substantive description of 
employee training in environmental management and operations (item A7.1) in 2007 
(2009).  In 2007 no companies reveal the existence of response plans in case of 
environmental accidents (item A7.2), but 0.77 per cent do in 2009.  Internal 
environmental awards (item A7.3) are provided by 0.92 (0.26) per cent of disclosers in 
2007 (2009).  Some 15.67 (12.56) per cent of disclosing companies state that they carry 
out internal environmental audits (item A7.4) in 2007 (2009).  In 2007 (2009), some 
1.38 (0.26) per cent of disclosing companies indicate that their environmental programs 
are internally certified (item A7.5).  Community involvement and/or donations related 
to the environment (item A7.6) is reported by 13.82 (4.10) per cent of disclosing 
companies in 2007 (2009) in their annual reports. 
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Sustainability Reports 
Environmental initiative statements are made in sustainability reports by some 
66.67 (86.05) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  The maximum
48
 
(minimum) score obtained is 5 (0) for both years.  In 2007, some 14.81 per cent of 
companies provide a substantive description of employee training in environmental 
management and operations (item A7.1).  The comparable figure for 2009 is 34.88 per 
cent.  Information about the existence of response plans in case of environmental 
accidents (item A7.2) is provided by 14.81 per cent of disclosers in 2007 and 13.95 per 
cent of disclosers in 2009.  Internal environmental awards (A7.3) are a feature of some 
7.41 (11.63) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Some 33.33 (32.56) per 
cent of disclosers carry out internal environmental audits (item A7.4) in 2007 (2009).  In 
2007, 3.70 per cent of disclosing companies make a statement about internal 
certification of environmental programs (item A7.5).  No companies report this in their 
2009 sustainability reports.  Community involvement and/or donations related to the 
environment (item A7.6) is asserted by some 55.56 (67.44) per cent of sustainability 
report disclosers in 2007 (2009).  
 
                                                 
48
 Recall the maximum score possible for this category is 6. 
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Table ‎4-2 Index of Quality of Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosures
49
 – Soft Disclosure Items 
 
  2007 2009 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Annual Reports Sustainability Reports 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=217) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=27) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=388) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=43) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
SOFT DISCLOSURE ITEMS 96.77 10(0) 100.00 12(1) 96.41 7(0) 97.67 12(0) 
Panel A         
A5 Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6) 92.63 6(0) 100.00 6(1) 81.03 6(0) 97.67 6(0) 
A5.1 
CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to 
shareholders and/or stakeholders 
11.98  55.56  11.79  23.26  
A5.2 
A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and 
principles, environmental codes of conduct 
62.21  92.59  52.05  93.02  
A5.3 
A statement about formal management systems regarding 
environmental risk and performance 
55.76  62.96  48.46  69.77  
A5.4 
A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and 
evaluations of its environmental performance 
35.94  29.63  44.10  44.19  
A5.5 
A statement of measurable goals in terms of future 
environmental performance (if not awarded under A3) 
13.36  48.15  6.15  53.49  
A5.6 
A statement about specific environmental innovations 
and/or new technologies 
47.47  59.26  17.69  72.09  
Panel B         
A6 Environmental profile (max score is 4) 25.35 2(0) 44.44 2(0) 45.13 2(0) 62.79 2(0) 
                                                 
49
 Companies’ disclosures were only collected when they made statements that referred to greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emissions, and/or CO2 emissions 
or with specific statements about the NGER Act 2007 (Cth).  This index measures the quality of GHG emission information by considering the company’s governance 
system, external verification of systems and initiatives, environmental spending, strategic objectives, environmental profile and initiatives, as well as actual GHG 
performance data. 
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  2007 2009 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Annual Reports Sustainability Reports 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=217) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=27) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=388) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms 
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=43) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
Category 
Score 
A6.1 
A statement about the firm's obligations regarding climate 
change regulations 
1.38  37.04  38.49  51.16  
A6.2 An overview of environmental impact of the industry 4.15  3.70  2.05  2.33  
A6.3 
An overview of how the business operations and/or 
products and services impact the environment 
21.66  14.81  5.13  23.26  
A6.4 
An overview of corporate environmental performance 
relative to industry peers 
0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Panel C         
A7 Environmental initiatives (max score is 6) 31.34 3(0) 66.67 5(0) 17.95 3(0) 86.05 5(0) 
A7.1 
A substantive description of employee training in 
environmental management and operations 
4.15  14.81  3.08  34.88  
A7.2 
Existence of response plans in case of environmental 
accidents 
0.00  14.81  0.77  13.95  
A7.3 Internal environmental awards 0.92  7.41  0.26  11.63  
A7.4 Internal environmental audits 15.67  33.33  12.56  32.56  
A7.5 Internal certification of environmental programs 1.38  3.70  0.26  0.00  
A7.6 
Community involvement and/or donations related to 
environment (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) 
13.82  55.56  4.10  67.44  
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4.5 Aggregated Annual Reports and Sustainability Report Disclosures 
It is appropriate to combine the two sources of voluntary GHG emission 
performance and management disclosures to obtain a clear picture of corporate 
behaviour in this respect. Some 218 companies make voluntary GHG disclosures in 
2007 in either or both of these two reports.  In 2009 the number of companies is 390.   
Table  4-3 shows the aggregation of the annual report and stand-alone 
sustainability report indexation results for hard disclosure items.  Soft disclosure results 
are found in Table  4-4.  Hard disclosures are discussed first; a discussion on soft 
disclosures follows. 
4.5.1 Hard disclosures 
Hard disclosure items are provided by 81.65 (56.67) per cent of disclosers in 
2007 (2009).  The maximum hard category score is 19 in 2007 and 20 in 2009, showing 
that some disclosing companies are extending their reporting of verifiable information.  
In both years the minimum score is 0, meaning that at least one company in each year 
makes only soft GHG disclosures and provides no GHG performance and management 
information that is verifiable.  Overall, these results do indicate that more companies 
make disclosures that are capable of being authenticated and in that respect, the quality 
of disclosures improves from 2007 to 2009. 
4.5.2 Governance structure and management systems 
Some 59.17 (37.44) per cent of disclosing companies make disclosures in the 
governance structure and management systems category (disclosure category A1, Table 
 4-3, Panel A).  The maximum (minimum) score is 5 (0) in 2007 and 6 (0) in 2009.  This 
signifies that more companies consider it important to make these types of disclosures 
and that the quality of these disclosures improves in 2009.   
A statement concerning the existence of a department for pollution control 
and/or management positions for environmental management (item A1.1) is provided 
by 9.17 (5.38) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Reports of the 
existence of an environmental and/or a public issues committee on the board (item 
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A1.2) are made by 26.15 (17.18) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Providing notice 
of the existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers 
regarding environmental practices (item A1.3) is done by 12.84 (9.74) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Assertions that stakeholders are involved in the 
setting of corporate environmental policies (item A1.4) are made by 32.11 (17.95) per 
cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Some 16.06 (11.03) per cent of disclosing companies 
indicate they have implemented ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (item A1.5).  
Statements relating to the linking of executive compensation to environmental 
performance (item A1.6) are made by 5.05 (3.33) per cent of disclosers. 
4.5.3 Credibility 
Statements that assist readers in gauging the credibility of initiatives undertaken 
by corporations in their GHG performance and management are indexed at category A2, 
Table  4-3, Panel B.  The maximum score possible is 10.  In 2007, some 61.93 per cent 
of disclosing companies make these types of disclosures.  The maximum (minimum) 
score achieved is 8 (0).  Some 38.72 per cent of disclosing companies make these 
reports in 2009.  The maximum (minimum) score is 8 (0) in 2009 also.  Although the 
quality of credibility disclosures remains the same, in absolute terms, more companies 
make these types of disclosures in 2009. 
The percentage of disclosing companies indicating they have adopted GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines (item A2.1) is 9.17 per cent in 2007 and 8.21 per cent 
in 2009.  In absolute terms, some 20 companies have adopted GRI guidelines in 2007 
and 32 have done so in 2009, a 60 per cent increase.  Statements concerning the 
independent verification/assurance about environmental information disclosed in the 
annual report or sustainability report (item A2.2) are made by 5.50 (4.10) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Some 16.06 (13.59) per cent of disclosers 
indicate in 2007 (2009) that periodic independent verification/audits are performed on 
their environmental performance and/or systems (item A2.3).  Independent certification 
of environmental programs (item A2.4) is specified by 11.47 (4.10) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Statements concerning the certification of 
products with respect to environmental impact (item A2.5) are made by 4.59 (5.90) per 
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cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Some 25.69 (14.10) per cent of disclosers 
state they have achieved external environmental performance awards and/or the 
inclusion in a sustainability index (item A2.6) in 2007 (2009).  Reports of stakeholder 
involvement in the environmental disclosure process (item A2.7) are made by 1.83 
(2.82) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Some 15.14 (6.15) per cent of 
disclosing companies indicate they participate in voluntary environmental initiatives 
endorsed by government (item A2.8) in 2007 (2009).  Participation in industry specific 
associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (item A2.9) are stipulated by 
22.02 (9.23) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Some 16.06 (15.64) per cent of 
disclosers report that they participate in other environmental organisations/associations 
to improve environmental practices (item A2.10) in 2007 (2009). 
4.5.4 GHG performance indicators 
The quality of reporting of GHG performance indicators (disclosure category 
A3, Table  4-3, Panel C) remains constant for 2007 and 2009.  In both years the 
maximum (minimum) score is 5 (0).  Some 31.65 per cent of disclosing companies 
reveal GHG performance data in 2007.  This represents 69 companies.  In 2009, 24.10 
per cent (94 companies) make the same type of disclosures. 
GHG performance data is presented (item A3.1) by 31.19 (23.33) per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  GHG performance data, presented relative to 
peers/rivals or industry (item A3.2), is provided by 1.83 (0.26) per cent of disclosers in 
2007 (2009).   The presentation of GHG performance data relative to previous periods 
(item A3.3) comes from 15.60 (13.85) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  
Providing GHG performance data relative to targets (item A3.4) is made by 6.42 (4.10) 
per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Reporting GHG performance data in 
absolute and normalised form (item A3.5) is done by 10.55 (7.95) per cent of disclosers 
in 2007 (2009).  GHG performance data presented at disaggregate level (item A3.6) is 
made by 11.47 (11.54) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009). 
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4.5.5 Environmental spending 
The final hard disclosure category, environmental spending (A4, Table  4-3, 
Panel D), is where companies report the dollar amounts spent or saved on 
environmental matters.  The maximum score possible is three and this is achieved in 
both years.  The minimum score in both years is zero.  Some 14.68 per cent of 
disclosing companies report in this category in 2007; in 2009, the per centage is 9.23 
per cent.  The quality of disclosures for this category remains steady for the two years 
under examination, but four more companies report this type of information in 2009. 
A summary of dollar savings arising from environmental initiatives to the 
company (item A4.1) is given by 5.50 (2.31) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 
(2009).  Some 7.34 (3.85) per cent of disclosers make statements about the amount 
spent on technologies, research and development and/or innovations to enhance 
environmental performance and/or efficiency (item A4.2) in 2007 (2009).  The dollar 
amount spent on fines related to environmental issues (item A4.3) is stipulated by 5.96 
(4.87) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009). 
 
Table ‎4-3 Index of Hard Disclosures from Annual Reports and Sustainability 
Reports, Aggregated 
  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources Aggregated Sources 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage of 
firms 
 attaining the 
item (%)  
(n=218) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
 
Categor
y Score 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=390) 
Highest 
(lowest)  
Category 
Score 
HARD DISCLOSURE ITEMS 81.65 19(0) 56.67 20(0) 
Panel A 
    
A1 
Governance structure and management systems 
(max score is 6) 
59.17 5(0) 37.44 6(0) 
A1.1 
Existence of a Department for pollution control and/or 
management positions for environmental management 
9.17 
 
5.38 
 
A1.2 
Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues 
committee on the board 
26.15 
 
17.18 
 
A1.3 
Existence of terms and conditions applicable to 
suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental 
practices 
12.84 
 
9.74 
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  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources Aggregated Sources 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage of 
firms 
 attaining the 
item (%)  
(n=218) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
 
Categor
y Score 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=390) 
Highest 
(lowest)  
Category 
Score 
A1.4 
Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate 
environmental policies 
32.11 
 
17.95 
 
A1.5 
Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm 
level 
16.06 
 
11.03 
 
A1.6 
Executive compensation is linked to environmental 
performance 
5.05 
 
3.33 
 
Panel B 
    
A2 Credibility (max score is 10) 61.93 8(0) 38.72 8(0) 
A2.1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines 9.17 
 
8.21 
 
A2.2 
Independent verification/assurance about environmental 
information disclosed in the annual report or 
sustainability report 
5.50 
 
4.10 
 
A2.3 
Periodic independent verifications/audits on 
environmental performance and/or systems 
16.06 
 
13.59 
 
A2.4 
Certification of environmental programs by independent 
agencies 
11.47 
 
4.10 
 
A2.5 
Product Certification with respect to environmental 
impact 
4.59 
 
5.90 
 
A2.6 
External environmental performance awards and/or 
inclusion in a sustainability index 
25.69 
 
14.10 
 
A2.7 
Stakeholder involvement in the environmental 
disclosure process 
1.83 
 
2.82 
 
A2.8 
Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives 
endorsed by government 
15.14 
 
6.15 
 
A2.9 
Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives 
to improve environmental practices 
22.02 
 
9.23 
 
A2.10 
Participation in other environmental 
organisations/associations to improve environmental 
practices (if not awarded under 8 or 9 above) 
16.06 
 
15.64 
 
Panel C 
    
A3 GHG performance indicators (max score is 6) 31.65 5(0) 24.10 5(0) 
A3.1 Performance data is presented 31.19 
 
23.33 
 
A3.2 
Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals or 
industry 
1.83 
 
0.26 
 
A3.3 
Performance data is presented relative to previous 
periods (trend analysis) 
15.60 
 
13.85 
 
A3.4 Performance data is presented relative to targets 6.42 
 
4.10 
 
A3.5 
Performance data is presented in absolute and 
normalised form 
10.55 
 
7.95 
 
A3.6 
Performance data is presented at disaggregate level (i.e., 
plant, business unit, geographic segment) 
11.47 
 
11.54 
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  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources Aggregated Sources 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage of 
firms 
 attaining the 
item (%)  
(n=218) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
 
Categor
y Score 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=390) 
Highest 
(lowest)  
Category 
Score 
Panel D 
    
A4 Environmental spending (max score is 3) 14.68 3(0) 9.23 3(0) 
A4.1 
Summary of dollar savings arising from environmental 
initiatives to the company 
5.50 
 
2.31 
 
A4.2 
Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or innovations 
to enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency 
7.34 
 
3.85 
 
A4.3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues 5.96 
 
4.87 
 
 
4.5.6 Soft disclosures 
Findings concerning soft disclosures are presented in Table  4-4, Panels A, B and 
C. Statements that are termed soft disclosure items are made by 96.79 per cent of 
disclosing companies in 2007 and 96.41 per cent of disclosing companies in 2009.  The 
maximum score possible for soft disclosure items is 16.  Maximum scores for these 
types of disclosures are 12 for both years.  The minimum is 0 for both years.  It is 
concluded that the quality of soft disclosures remains the same for these two years.  
However, while disclosing companies are not increasing their level of soft disclosures, 
more companies make them in 2009.   
4.5.7 Vision and strategy claims 
Vision and strategy claims (disclosure category A5, Table  4-4, Panel A) are 
made by 92.66 (81.79) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  The maximum 
(minimum) score for this category is 6 (0).  This range is achieved by companies in both 
years, indicating no decline in this type of disclosure between 2007 and 2009.   CEO 
statements on environmental performance in a letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders 
(item A5.1) are made by 17.89 (13.85) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  
Reports about corporate environmental policy, values and principles, and environmental 
codes of conduct are provided by 65.60 (55.38) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  
Formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance (item A5.3) 
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are referred to by 57.80 (50.77) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  
Indications of internal periodic reviews and evaluations of environmental performance 
(item A5.4) are provided by 38.07 (45.38) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  
Measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance (item A5.5) are given 
by 16.06 (11.03) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  Statements about 
specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (item A5.6) are made by 
50.00 (23.85) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).   
4.5.8 Environmental profile 
Disclosure category A6 (Table  4-4, Panel B) deals with the corporation’s 
environmental profile statements.  A maximum score of four is achievable, but for both 
years the maximum, (minimum) score is 2 (0).  Some 28.90 (48.97) per cent of 
disclosing companies report information that belongs to this category.  Companies are 
not increasing their statements about their environmental profile, but the number of 
companies making these disclosures grows in 2009.  This is most noticeable in their 
statements about the firm’s obligations regarding climate change regulations (item 
A6.1).  In 2007, some 5.96 per cent of disclosing companies are observed making these 
statements.  This percentage rises to 43.08 per cent in 2009.  This increase results from 
many more companies making references to their obligations (or lack of obligation) 
under the NGER Act 2007 (Cth) or making references to their obligations under other 
climate change regulations in their 2009 reports.  This indicates that climate change is 
an issue under consideration by many Australian corporations and is important enough 
to be included in their generalised external reporting.  Some 4.59 (2.31) per cent of 
disclosing companies provide an overview of the environmental impact of the industry 
(item A6.2) in 2007 (2009).  The impact of business operations and/or products and 
services upon the environment (item A6.3) is reported by 22.48 (7.18) per cent of 
disclosers in 2007 (2009).  The provision of an overview of corporate environmental 
performance relative to industry peers (item A6.4) is only made by 0.46 per cent of 
companies in 2007 and by no companies in 2009.  This occurrence is suggestive of 
proprietary cost concerns influencing the disclosure decision. 
 95 
 
4.5.9 Environmental initiatives 
Reports of environmental initiatives (disclosure category A7, Table  4-4, Panel 
C) are made by 36.70 (23.85) per cent of disclosing companies in 2007 (2009).  The 
maximum score for this category is six.   In 2007 the scores range from 0 to 5.  A 
similar range occurs in 2009.  From this, it is construed that while the nature of items 
reported remains steady, more companies are expressing this kind of information in 
their annual reports or stand-alone sustainability reports.  Some 5.96 (6.67) per cent of 
disclosing companies give a substantive description of employee training in 
environmental management and operations (item A7.1) in 2007 (2009).  Statements 
concerning the existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents (item 
A7.2) are provided by 1.83 (2.31) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009).  Internal 
environmental awards (item A7.3) are given by 1.83 (1.54) of disclosing companies in 
2007 (2009).  Internal environmental audits (item A7.4) are carried out by 19.72 (14.62) 
per cent of disclosers.  Some 1.83 (0.26) per cent of disclosing companies have internal 
certification of environmental programs (item A7.5) in 2007 (2009).  Statements of 
community involvement and/or donations related to the environment (item A7.6) are 
made by 18.81 (10.26) per cent of disclosers in 2007 (2009). 
Table ‎4-4 Index of Soft Disclosures from Annual Reports and Sustainability 
Reports, Aggregated 
  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources Aggregated Sources 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
 attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=218) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
 Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=390) 
Highest 
(lowest)  
Category 
Score 
SOFT DISCLOSURE ITEMS 96.79 12(0) 96.41 12(0) 
Panel A 
    
A5 Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6) 92.66 6(0) 81.79 6(0) 
A5.1 
CEO statement on environmental performance in letter 
to shareholders and/or stakeholders 
17.89 
 
13.85 
 
A5.2 
A statement of corporate environmental policy, values 
and principles, environmental codes of conduct 
65.60 
 
55.38 
 
A5.3 
A statement about formal management systems 
regarding environmental risk and performance 
57.80 
 
50.77 
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  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources Aggregated Sources 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
 attaining 
the item 
(%)  
(n=218) 
Highest 
(lowest) 
 Category 
Score 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
(n=390) 
Highest 
(lowest)  
Category 
Score 
A5.4 
A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews 
and evaluations of its environmental performance 
38.07 
 
45.38 
 
A5.5 
A statement of measurable goals in terms of future 
environmental performance (if not awarded under A3) 
16.06 
 
11.03 
 
A5.6 
A statement about specific environmental innovations 
and/or new technologies 
50.00 
 
23.85 
 
Panel B 
    
A6 Environmental profile (max score is 4) 28.90 2(0) 48.97 2(0) 
A6.1 
A statement about the firm's obligations regarding 
climate change regulations 
5.96 
 
43.08 
 
A6.2 An overview of environmental impact of the industry 4.59 
 
2.31 
 
A6.3 
An overview of how the business operations and/or 
products and services impact the environment 
22.48 
 
7.18 
 
A6.4 
An overview of corporate environmental performance 
relative to industry peers 
0.46 
 
0.00 
 
Panel C 
    
A7 Environmental initiatives (max score is 6) 36.70 5(0) 23.85 5(0) 
A7.1 
A substantive description of employee training in 
environmental management and operations 
5.96 
 
6.67 
 
A7.2 
Existence of response plans in case of environmental 
accidents 
1.83 
 
2.31 
 
A7.3 Internal environmental awards 1.83 
 
1.54 
 
A7.4 Internal environmental audits 19.72 
 
14.62 
 
A7.5 Internal certification of environmental programs 1.83 
 
0.26 
 
A7.6 
Community involvement and/or donations related to 
environment (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) 
18.81 
 
10.26 
 
 
4.6 Summary of Disclosures 
In summary, more companies make voluntary GHG disclosures in 2009 when 
compared to 2007.  The quality of the disclosures, measured by reference to hard 
disclosure items is improving in that some companies are making more hard disclosures 
in 2009 than in 2007.  Soft disclosures remain steady.   
The sustainability report is a source of greater GHG emission disclosures in 
2007 for 37 of the index items.  Recall that 217 companies make voluntary GHG 
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emission disclosures in their 2007 annual reports and 27 in their stand-alone 
sustainability reports.  Some 26 of those sustainability reports pertain to companies that 
make GHG emission disclosures in their annual reports.  It is clear disclosing companies 
perceive that the sustainability report is a means of providing interested parties with 
superior information concerning corporate GHG emission performance and 
management. 
There are four exceptions to this inference.  Statements that executive 
compensation is linked to environmental performance (item A1.6) are reported in 4.61 
per cent of disclosing companies’ 2007 annual reports, but only in 3.70 per cent of 
sustainability reports for the same year.  Some 10.60 per cent of disclosing companies 
report information about certification of environmental programs by independent 
agencies (item A2.4) in their annual reports in 2007, but this percentage drops to 7.41 
per cent in their 2007 sustainability reports.   Disclosing companies give an overview of 
the environmental impact of the industry (item A6.2) in 4.15 per cent of annual report 
statements, compared with only 3.70 per cent in sustainability reports in 2007.  An 
overview of corporate environmental performance relative to industry peers (item A6.4) 
is provided by 0.46 per cent of disclosing companies in their annual reports in 2007 and 
by no companies in their sustainability report in that year. 
In 2009, comparisons between the two disclosure sources reveal a similar 
pattern.  Some 388 companies make annual report disclosures and 43 of these same 
companies report GHG information in their sustainability reports. More disclosures are 
made in the sustainability reports for all index items, excluding the following.   In 2009, 
the sustainability report is the source of statements about the certification of 
environmental programs by independent agencies (item A2.4) for only 2.33 per cent of 
disclosing companies, a decrease from the 4.10 per cent of disclosing companies 
making these statements in their annual report.  No company presents performance data 
relative to peers/rivals or industry (item A3.2) in their sustainability report in 2009 but 
0.26 per cent do in their annual reports.  Finally, statements concerning internal 
certification of environmental programs (item A7.5) are presented by 0.26 per cent of 
disclosing companies in their 2009 annual reports, but no company provides this 
information in their sustainability report for that year. 
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Taken together, these results permit the conclusion that the event of the NGER 
Act 2007 (Cth) has firstly prompted more companies to make voluntary GHG 
disclosures in their annual reports and/or stand-alone sustainability reports.  Secondly, 
the observation of increases in hard disclosure categories and not in soft disclosure 
categories allows the conclusion that since this legislation, some companies now report 
better quality information about their GHG emission performance and management in 
these two non-mandatory settings.   
To improve the informative of the research, a summary of all aggregated 
disclosures follows in Table  4-5.  This table provides additional information not 
previously tabulated, i.e., it provides the number of firms making disclosures that match 
the index items.  
Table ‎4-5 Summary of all Disclosures 
  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources 
(n = 218) 
Aggregated Sources 
(n = 390) 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
 attaining 
the item 
(%)  
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
HARD DISCLOSURE ITEMS 81.65 178 56.67 221 
A1 Governance structure and management systems  59.17 129 37.44 146 
A1.1 
Existence of a Department for pollution control and/or 
management positions for environmental management 
9.17 20 5.38 21 
A1.2 
Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues 
committee on the board 
26.15 57 17.18 67 
A1.3 
Existence of terms and conditions applicable to 
suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental 
practices 
12.84 28 9.74 38 
A1.4 
Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate 
environmental policies 
32.11 70 17.95 70 
A1.5 
Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm 
level 
16.06 35 11.03 43 
A1.6 
Executive compensation is linked to environmental 
performance 
5.05 11 3.33 13 
A2 Credibility  61.93 135 38.72 151 
A2.1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines 9.17 20 8.21 32 
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  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources 
(n = 218) 
Aggregated Sources 
(n = 390) 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
 attaining 
the item 
(%)  
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
A2.2 
Independent verification/assurance about 
environmental information disclosed in the annual 
report or sustainability report 
5.50 12 4.10 16 
A2.3 
Periodic independent verifications/audits on 
environmental performance and/or systems 
16.06 35 13.59 53 
A2.4 
Certification of environmental programs by 
independent agencies 
11.47 25 4.10 16 
A2.5 
Product Certification with respect to environmental 
impact 
4.59 10 5.90 23 
A2.6 
External environmental performance awards and/or 
inclusion in a sustainability index 
25.69 56 14.10 55 
A2.7 
Stakeholder involvement in the environmental 
disclosure process 
1.83 4 2.82 11 
A2.8 
Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives 
endorsed by government 
15.14 33 6.15 24 
A2.9 
Participation in industry specific 
associations/initiatives to improve environmental 
practices 
22.02 48 9.23 36 
A2.10 
Participation in other environmental 
organisations/associations to improve environmental 
practices (if not awarded under 8 or 9 above) 
16.06 35 15.64 61 
A3 GHG performance indicators 31.65 69 24.10 94 
A3.1 Performance data is presented 31.19 68 23.33 91 
A3.2 
Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals 
or industry 
1.83 4 0.26 1 
A3.3 
Performance data is presented relative to previous 
periods (trend analysis) 
15.60 34 13.85 54 
A3.4 Performance data is presented relative to targets 6.42 14 4.10 16 
A3.5 
Performance data is presented in absolute and 
normalised form 
10.55 23 7.95 31 
A3.6 
Performance data is presented at disaggregate level 
(i.e., plant, business unit, geographic segment) 
11.47 25 11.54 45 
A4 Environmental spending  14.68 32 9.23 36 
A4.1 
Summary of dollar savings arising from 
environmental initiatives to the company 
5.50 12 2.31 9 
A4.2 
Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or 
innovations to enhance environmental performance 
and/or efficiency 
7.34 16 3.85 15 
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  2007 2009 
    Aggregated Sources 
(n = 218) 
Aggregated Sources 
(n = 390) 
Disclosure Category 
Percentage 
of firms 
 attaining 
the item 
(%)  
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
Percentage 
of firms  
attaining 
the item 
(%) 
Number of 
disclosing 
companies 
A4.3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues 5.96 13 4.87 19 
SOFT DISCLOSURE ITEMS 96.79 211 96.41 376 
A5 Vision and strategy claims  92.66 202 81.79 319 
A5.1 
CEO statement on environmental performance in 
letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders 
17.89 39 13.85 54 
A5.2 
A statement of corporate environmental policy, values 
and principles, environmental codes of conduct 
65.60 143 55.38 216 
A5.3 
A statement about formal management systems 
regarding environmental risk and performance 
57.80 126 50.77 198 
A5.4 
A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews 
and evaluations of its environmental performance 
38.07 83 45.38 177 
A5.5 
A statement of measurable goals in terms of future 
environmental performance (if not awarded under A3) 
16.06 35 11.03 43 
A5.6 
A statement about specific environmental innovations 
and/or new technologies 
50.00 109 23.85 93 
A6 Environmental profile  28.90 63 48.97 191 
A6.1 
A statement about the firm's obligations regarding 
climate change regulations 
5.96 13 43.08 168 
A6.2 An overview of environmental impact of the industry 4.59 10 2.31 9 
A6.3 
An overview of how the business operations and/or 
products and services impact the environment 
22.48 49 7.18 28 
A6.4 
An overview of corporate environmental performance 
relative to industry peers 
0.46 1 0.00 0 
A7 Environmental initiatives  36.70 80 23.85 93 
A7.1 
A substantive description of employee training in 
environmental management and operations 
5.96 13 6.67 26 
A7.2 
Existence of response plans in case of environmental 
accidents 
1.83 4 2.31 9 
A7.3 Internal environmental awards 1.83 4 1.54 6 
A7.4 Internal environmental audits 19.72 43 14.62 57 
A7.5 Internal certification of environmental programs 1.83 4 0.26 1 
A7.6 
Community involvement and/or donations related to 
environment (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) 
18.81 41 10.26 40 
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4.7 Intercoder Reliability Tests 
A discussion the indexation process and of tests of reliability is provided in 
Section  3.11.  Krippendorff’s agreement coefficient alpha is used to evaluate intercoder 
reliability. An α of 84 is achieved, which is an acceptable level (Neuendorf, 2002) and 
thus the index data as a whole is reliable (Krippendorff, 2004).    
4.8 Descriptive Statistics 
This study is based on a census of ASX-listed companies during the years 2007 
and 2009 and is concerned with their motivations to voluntarily disclose greenhouse gas 
emission information in their annual reports and sustainability reports.  Data were 
available for 1,776 companies in 2007 and 1,853 in 2009
50
.  In these final samples, 
some 218 companies are found to have made greenhouse gas emission disclosures in 
2007 and 390 in 2009.  The following table summarises the four dependent variable 
measures used for hypotheses testing. 
Table ‎4-6 Summary of Dependent Variable Measures 
Model Dependent Variable Year Disc 
Non-
Disc 
Mean Med 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max N 
1 Total Disclosures 
2007   0.80 0.00 2.88 0 31 1776 
2009   1.07 0.00 3.25 0 32 1853 
2 Disclosure Behaviour 
2007 218 1558      1776 
2009 390 1463      1853 
3 Total Disclosures 
2007   6.54 5.00 5.49 1 31 218 
2009   5.10 3.00 5.44 1 32 390 
4 
Ratio of Hard to Total 
Disclosures 
2007   0.41 0.48 0.26 0 1 218 
2009   0.28 0.25 0.29 03 1 390 
 
 Table  4-7 and Table  4-8 respectively provide the descriptive data for the whole 
sample, the disclosing companies, and the non-disclosing companies for 2007 and 2009.   
                                                 
50
 According to the Australian Securities Exchange (Australian Securities Exchange, 2008, 
2010), there were 2,209 listed entities at 31 December, 2007, and 2,181 at the same date in 2009.     
Included in these figures are trusts with quoted equities, entities that trade as stapled securities, and 
entities with debt securities only.  These are beyond the scope of this study.  Additionally, new listings 
and delistings occur during each year, and their annual reports are not necessarily available in those 
circumstances. 
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The 2007 whole sample descriptive statistics for independent variables are 
discussed first.  Next, this discussion is expanded to disclosing companies and non-
disclosing companies for 2007.  Subsequently the 2009 whole sample descriptive 
statistics for independent variables are reviewed in Section  4.8.3.  A discussion of the 
disclosing and non-disclosing samples’ descriptive statistics for independent variables 
for 2009 follows at Section  4.8.4. 
4.8.1 Whole sample descriptive statistics, 2007   
In Table  4-7, the continuous variables are tabulated in Panel A.  Categorical 
variables are shown in Panel B.  Continuous variables are discussed first. 
The mean borrowings next year for the whole sample are 6.83.  The minimum for 
this variable is 0.00, the maximum is 24.24.  Equity issued next year has a mean of 
9.55; the range is 0.00 to 21.81.   The leverage variable has a mean value of 0.37 and a 
minimum (maximum) of 0.00 (13.56).  Ownership concentration has a mean of 22.43; 
the range is 0.00 to 100.00.  Competition has a mean of 0.72, and ranges from 0.00 to 
1.00.  ROA ranges from -77.19 to 23.52, and has a mean of -0.37.  The mean value for 
Tobin’s Q is 2.88, the minimum is 0.00 and the maximum is 144.55.  Age of fixed 
assets has a mean of 0.29; the minimum is 0.00 and maximum is 1.00.  The final 
continuous variable, size, has a minimum of 10.55, a maximum of 27.06, and a mean of 
17.58. 
Several categorical variables are used in this research, GICS sector, audit quality 
and foreign listing status.  GICS sector dummy variables are used as independent 
variables; audit quality and foreign listing status are control variables. 
Companies may belong to one out of ten GICS sectors. Some 570 companies are 
members of the GICS sector – materials.  These companies represent 32.09 per cent of 
the companies studied.  GICS sector – consumer discretionary has 167 companies (9.40 
per cent) in this study.  GICS sector – consumer staples is represented by 47 companies, 
or 2.65 per cent of the sample.  There are 207 companies (11.66 per cent) in the GICS 
sector – energy.  Some 278 of the companies studied belong to GICS sector – financials.  
This represents 15.65 per cent of the sample.  GICS sector – health care has 150 
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companies, or 8.45 per cent of the sample.  Some 112 (6.31 per cent) of companies are 
designated as part of the GICS sector – information technology.  GICS sector – 
telecommunication services has 30 companies or 1.69 per cent of the sample.  The final, 
and smallest, GICS sector membership is utilities.  There are 29 companies, or 1.63 per 
cent, belonging to this sector in 2007. 
Some 872 companies (49.10 per cent) have a Big 4 auditor.  Only 11.77 per cent 
(209) of companies are listed on another exchange outside of Australia.   
4.8.2 Disaggregated descriptive statistics, 2007 (disclosing and non-disclosing 
companies) 
Table  4-7 continues to be discussed in this section.  Separating the sample 
companies by their GHG disclosure behaviour allows a better understanding of their 
respective characteristics.  Recall that in 2007, 218 companies provide GHG disclosures 
in either or both annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports and the remaining 
1,558 companies do not.  The continuous variables are first discussed, then the 
categorical variables. 
The disclosing companies’ borrowings next year have a mean of 13.62 (minimum 
0.00, maximum 24.24).  In comparison, non-disclosers’ borrowing next year averages 
5.88 (minimum 0.00, maximum 23.16).  The mean value of equity issued next year by 
disclosing companies is 10.09 (minimum 0.00, maximum 21.81).  In the non-disclosing 
group, these values are mean, 9.48, minimum 0.00 and maximum 21.30.  Disclosing 
companies are, on average, more highly leveraged, with a mean of 0.51 (minimum 0.02, 
maximum 2.81).  In contrast, non-disclosing companies have a mean of 0.36 for 
leverage, and a range of 0.00 to 13.56.  Disclosers’ ownership concentration has a mean 
of 27.22 (minimum 0.00, maximum 97.53).  These same statistics in the disclosing 
group are mean of 21.76, minimum 0.00, maximum 100.00.  The competition measure 
is lower in the disclosing companies with a mean value of 0.67 (minimum 0.00, 
maximum 1.00).  In the disclosers, the range is the same, but the mean value is 0.72.  
Disclosers’ average ROA is 0.00 (minimum -2.10, maximum 0.85).  Non-disclosers 
have a mean ROA of -0.42 (minimum -77.19, maximum 23.52).  The mean value of 
Tobin’s Q in the disclosing sample is 2.61 (minimum 0.12, maximum 48.57).  Non-
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disclosers’ mean Tobin’s Q value is 2.92 (minimum 0.00, maximum 144.55).  The age 
of fixed assets is greater in disclosing companies.  Their mean value is 0.32 (minimum 
0.00, maximum 0.92).  Non-disclosers’ asset age is 0.29 on average (minimum 0.00, 
maximum 1.00).  Finally, disclosing companies are larger on average, with a mean size 
of 20.42 (minimum 12.93, maximum 27.06).  Non-disclosers’ mean size is 17.19 
(minimum 10.55, maximum 25.56).  
Some 55 disclosing companies belong to the GICS sector – materials.  This 
represents 25.23 per cent of the disclosing companies’ total.  Of the non-disclosing 
subset, there are 515 companies (representing 33.06 per cent of the total non-disclosers) 
that are in this sector.  GICS sector – consumer discretionary has some 21 companies 
making disclosures (9.63 per cent of the disclosing group).   Some 146 non-disclosing 
companies, or 9.37 per cent overall, are part of this sector.  GICS sector – consumer 
staples is populated by 11 (5.05 per cent) disclosing companies, while 36 (2.31 per cent) 
non-disclosers make up the rest of this sector.    There are 30 disclosing companies 
(13.76 per cent) in the GICS sector – energy and 177 (11.36 per cent) non-disclosing 
companies.  GICS sector – financials has 43 disclosing companies within its midst.  
This number represents 19.72 per cent of disclosers.  Non-disclosing companies in the 
GICS sector – financials number 235 (15.08 per cent of the total non-disclosing group).  
GICS sector – health care is split into 5 disclosing companies (2.29 per cent of the 
disclosing group) and 145 non-disclosing companies (9.31 per cent of the non-
disclosing group).  Statistics for the GICS sector – industrials are 37 companies do 
disclose (16.97 per cent of the disclosers overall) and 149 companies make no 
disclosures (9.56 per cent of the non-disclosing subset).  GICS sector – information 
technology comprises 5 disclosing companies (2.29 per cent of the total disclosing 
group) and 107 non-disclosers (6.87 per cent of the total non-disclosing companies).  
GICS sector – telecommunication services has 2 disclosing companies (representing 
0.92 per cent of disclosers) and 28 non-disclosing companies (1.80 per cent of the whole 
non-disclosing group).  The smallest GICS sector group, GICS sector – utilities has 9 
disclosing companies (4.13 per cent of the total disclosing group) and 20 non-disclosing 
companies (1.28 per cent of the non-disclosing group).   
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Some 181 disclosing companies (83.03 per cent) have a Big 4 auditor, while 691 
non-disclosing companies (44.35 per cent) also use their services.  Some 45 disclosing 
companies (20.64 per cent) are listed on a foreign stock exchange, and the comparable 
figure for non-disclosing companies is 164 (10.53 per cent of the total non-disclosing 
group). 
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Table ‎4-7 2007 Descriptive statistics for the independent & control variables   
  Panel A - Continuous Variables 
  2007 All Companies, n = 1776 2007 Disclosing Companies, n = 218 2007 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1558 
Variable n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Borrowings next year 1776 6.83 8.30 0.00 24.24 218 13.62 8.72 0.00 24.24 1558 5.88 7.78 0.00 23.16 
Equity issued next year 1776 9.55 7.45 0.00 21.81 218 10.09 8.15 0.00 21.81 1558 9.48 7.34 0.00 21.30 
Leverage 1776 0.37 0.59 0.00 13.56 218 0.51 0.28 0.02 2.81 1558 0.36 0.62 0.00 13.56 
Ownership concentration 1776 22.43 23.74 0.00 100.00 218 27.22 24.46 0.00 97.53 1558 21.76 23.56 0.00 100.00 
Competition 1776 0.72 0.22 0.00 1.00 218 0.67 0.24 0.00 1.00 1558 0.72 0.21 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1776 -0.37 3.25 -77.19 23.52 218 0.00 0.35 -2.10 0.85 1558 -0.42 3.46 -77.19 23.52 
Tobin’s Q 1776 2.88 5.17 0.00 144.55 218 2.61 4.56 0.12 48.57 1558 2.92 5.25 0.00 144.55 
Age of fixed assets 1776 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.00 218 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.92 1558 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Size 1776 17.58 2.34 10.55 27.06 218 20.42 2.68 12.93 27.06 1558 17.19 2.00 10.55 25.56 
  Panel B - Categorical Variables 
  2007 All Companies, n = 1776 2007 Disclosing Companies, n = 218 2007 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1558 
Variable Yes Percentage Yes Percentage Yes Percentage 
GICS Sector - Materials 570 32.09 55 25.23 515 33.06 
GICS Sector – Consumer Discretionary 167 9.40 21 9.63 146 9.37 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples 47 2.65 11 5.05 36 2.31 
GICS Sector – Energy 207 11.66 30 13.76 177 11.36 
GICS Sector – Financials 278 15.65 43 19.72 235 15.08 
GICS Sector – Health Care 150 8.45 5 2.29 145 9.31 
GICS Sector – Industrials 186 10.47 37 16.97 149 9.56 
GICS Sector – Information Technology 112 6.31 5 2.29 107 6.87 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication Services 30 1.69 2 0.92 28 1.80 
GICS Sector – Utilities 29 1.63 9 4.13 20 1.28 
Audit quality 872 49.10 181 83.03 691 44.35 
Foreign listing status 209 11.77 45 20.64 164 10.53 
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4.8.3 Whole sample descriptive statistics, 2009   
Table  4-8 sets out the 2009 continuous variables in Panel A.  These are discussed 
first.  Categorical variables for this year are shown in Panel B and are discussed latterly.  
There are 1,853 companies in total studied in this year, 390 of which have been 
identified as GHG disclosing companies, the remaining 1,463 are non-disclosers. 
In 2009, the average borrowings next year are 5.36 (minimum 0.00, maximum 
24.03).  Compared to 2007, 2009 companies are generally borrowing less on average.  
The mean borrowings next year for all companies is around 22 per cent lower in 2009. 
Equity issued next year, with a mean value of 9.52, ranges from 0.00 to 21.33.   
This trend is very similar to that of 2007.  Leverage has a mean of 0.64 and a range of 
0.00 to 109.78.  This represents an increase of around 73 per cent from 2007.  The 
average ownership concentration is 24.73 (minimum 0.00, maximum 100.00), and is 
around a 10 per cent upwards change from 2007.  Competition is 0.71 on average and 
ranges from 0.00 to 1.00.  This is similar to 2007’s statistics.  ROA generally improves 
in 2009 by around 32 per cent.  The average ROA is -0.25 (minimum -18.89, maximum 
2.76).  Tobin’s Q experiences a drop since 2007, and has a mean of 2.80 and a range of 
0.02 to 455.21.  Age of fixed assets marginally increases in 2009, and is 0.30 on average, 
with a range of 0.00 to 1.00.  Size remains steady in 2009.  The size variable has a mean 
of 17.37 (minimum 9.43, maximum 27.21).   
A study of the GICS sector categorical variables reveals a number of changes in 
membership since 2007.  While there are 77 more companies listed on the ASX in 2009 
in comparison to 2007, five GICS sectors (materials, energy, financials, industrials and 
utilities) see an increase in constituents and the opposite occurs in the other five GICS 
sectors (consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, information technology 
and telecommunication services).  The biggest change occurs in the GICS sectors – 
materials.  Here some 69 companies join since 2007, making 639 member companies, or 
34.48 per cent of all companies.  GICS sector - consumer discretionary drops 7 
members, resulting in 160 companies or 8.63 per cent of total companies participating in 
this sector during 2009.  GICS sector – consumer staples also undergoes a reduction in 
membership, with two companies leaving its ranks since 2007.  As a result, there are 45 
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(2.43 per cent) companies belonging to this sector in 2009. The GICS sector – energy 
increases its membership by a further 19 companies.  In 2009 there are 226 companies in 
this sector, representing 12.20 per cent of all companies for that year.  A very small 
increase occurs in the GICS sector – financials with four companies joining, making a 
total of 282 (15.22 per cent) for 2009.  GICS sector – health care loses one company 
since 2007; there are 149 (8.04 per cent) companies in 2009.  GICS sector – industrials 
gains seven additional companies, and has 193 or 10.42 per cent of the total companies 
in 2009.  Twelve companies depart from the GICS sector – information technology, 
leaving 100 companies in 2009 (5.40 per cent).  A loss of three companies from GICS 
sector – telecommunication services leaves 27 companies (1.46 per cent) in 2009.  GICS 
sector – utilities grows by three companies to 32 in 2009 representing 1.73 per cent of 
total companies. 
Big 4 auditors are engaged by 847 companies (45.71 per cent of all companies), a 
reduction of 25 in absolute terms in comparison to 2007.  An additional 13 companies 
have foreign listing status in 2009, making this total 222 (11.98 per cent). 
4.8.4 Disaggregated descriptive statistics, 2009 (disclosing and non-disclosing 
companies) 
Discussion of Table  4-8 continues.  The 2009 sample companies are split into 
disclosing and non-disclosing segments and their respective descriptive results are 
discussed here.  There are 390 companies that make GHG disclosures in either or both 
annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports and 1,463 companies that do not.  
The continuous variables are first discussed, then the categorical variables. 
In 2009 the average borrowings next year for disclosing companies is 8.29 
(minimum 0.00, maximum 24.03).  Non-disclosers’ mean borrowings next year is 4.58 
(minimum 0.00, maximum 21.85).  The biggest reduction in average borrowings occurs 
in the disclosing companies.  Their average borrowings next year for 2009 are 40 per 
cent lower than in 2007.   Non-disclosers’ average borrowings next year follow the 
general trend and are down by around 22 per cent.  
Both disclosers and non-disclosers’ equity issued next year are similar in 2009 to 
their 2007 results.  Disclosing companies’ mean equity issued next year is 10.54 
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(minimum 0.00, maximum 21.33).  Non-disclosing companies’ average equity issued 
next year is 9.25 (minimum 0.00, maximum 20.48). 
In contrast to 2007 results, non-disclosing companies have higher leverage than 
disclosing companies in 2009.  The leverage variable for disclosures is determined to 
have a mean of 0.39 (minimum 0.00, maximum 1.24), a drop of around 75 per cent from 
their 2007 mean.  Non-disclosers almost double their mean leverage value in 2009.  
Their mean leverage of 0.70 (minimum 0.00, maximum 109.78) is a 94 per cent increase 
over 2007. 
Ownership concentration for disclosing companies remains steady in 2009.  The 
mean value is 27.23 (minimum 0.00, maximum 100.00).  Non-disclosing companies’ 
ownership concentration rises by around 10 per cent in 2009 to a mean of 24.06 
(minimum 0.00, maximum 100.00).   
Both disclosing and non-disclosing companies have similar results with the 
competition variable in 2009.  Both segments have a mean of 0.71 (minimum 0.00, 
maximum 1.00).  However, disclosing companies’ average competition is an almost 6 
per cent increase from that in 2007.  Non-disclosers’ average competition dropped 
marginally from 2007.   
Disclosing companies’ ROA generally deteriorates in 2009 when compared to 
2007.  The 2009 mean ROA for disclosers is -0.14 (minimum -18.89, maximum 1.10).  It 
is 0.00 (minimum -2.10, maximum 0.85) in 2007.  Non-disclosing companies are on 
average worse performers by this measure, although they do improve from 2007 results.  
Non-disclosers’ mean ROA is -0.28 (minimum -18.63, maximum 2.76) in 2009.  In 
2007, a mean of -0.42 (minimum -77.19, maximum 23.52) is achieved. 
The market-based performance measure, Tobin’s Q undergoes a decline of 31 per 
cent in disclosing companies in 2009 when measured against 2007.  Disclosing 
companies’ Tobin’s Q has a mean of 1.80 (minimum 0.05, maximum 40.06).  Non-
disclosers experience a 5 per cent increase over 2007.  Their Tobin’s Q mean is 3.07 
(minimum 0.02, maximum 455.21).      
Disclosing companies have newer assets in 2009 than they do in 2007, and they 
have newer assets in 2009 than non-disclosers have in that year.  The mean age of fixed 
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assets for disclosing companies in 2009 is 0.28 (minimum 0.00, maximum 1.00).  It is 
0.32 (minimum 0.00, maximum 0.92) in 2007.  Non-disclosing companies’ average age 
of fixed assets grows in 2009 to 0.30 (minimum 0.00, maximum 1.00) from 0.29 
(minimum 0.00, maximum 1.00) in 2007. 
Both disclosers and non-disclosers are slightly smaller in 2009 than they are in 
2007.  Disclosing companies’ mean size is 19.15 (minimum 12.44, maximum 27.21).  In 
2007 it is 20.42 (minimum 12.93, maximum 27.06).  Non-disclosers’ have a mean size 
of 16.90 (minimum 9.43, maximum 24.25) in this latest year.  They have a mean of 
17.19 (minimum 10.55, maximum 25.56) in 2007. 
Membership in all ten GICS sectors increases in 2009 for disclosing companies.  
An opposite result occurs for non-disclosing companies.  GICS sector – materials grows 
by 69 new constituents in 2009, all of which are disclosing companies.  Some 124 (31.79 
per cent) companies making GHG disclosures in 2009 belong to this sector.  Non-
disclosing companies belonging to this sector number the same as in 2007, 515, which in 
2009, is 35.20 per cent of non-disclosing companies.  Six disclosing companies join the 
GICS sector – consumer discretionary in 2009, making a total of 27 (6.92 per cent) out 
of the 390 disclosing companies.  In contrast, 13 companies that do not disclose leave 
this sector after 2007.  By 2009 there remain 133 non-disclosers, or 9.09 per cent of the 
total of non-disclosing companies.  GICS sector – consumer staples also experiences 6 
new members from the disclosing group of companies, making the total disclosing 
companies for this sector 17 in 2009.  This represents 4.36 per cent of disclosing 
companies.  Some 8 non-disclosing companies leave this sector post-2007, and there 
remain 28 non-disclosing companies or 1.91 per cent of the total of non-disclosing 
companies in 2009.  Disclosing companies join the GICS sector – energy at a rate of 34 
companies by 2009, while some 15 non-disclosing companies quit it.  Thus in 2009, 
there are 64 disclosing companies (16.41 per cent of total disclosers) and 162 non-
disclosing companies (11.07 per cent of total non-disclosers) in the GICS sector – 
energy.  Eight disclosing companies enter the GICS sector – financials after 2007, 
bringing the total disclosing companies in this sector to 51 (13.08 per cent of total 
disclosers).  This sector experiences a loss of four non-disclosing companies over the 
two years, leaving 231 non-disclosers at 2009, or 15.79 per cent of the total non-
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disclosers.  GICS sector – health care gains three additional disclosing companies by 
2009, finishing with 8 disclosers (2.05 per cent of the disclosing segment).  This gain, 
however, is offset by a loss of four of the non-disclosing companies during that time.  By 
2009 there are 141 non-disclosing companies in the GICS sector – health care, or 9.64 
per cent of the total companies that do not disclose.  GICS sector – industrials has an 
extra 27 disclosing companies within its constituents in comparison to 2007.  In 2009, 
there are 64 disclosing companies or 16.41 per cent of total disclosers.  In contrast, there 
is a deficit of 20 non-disclosing companies when comparing the two years.  Some 129 
companies that do not report about their GHG performance and management remain in 
the GICS sector – industrials (8.82 per cent of non-disclosing companies) in 2009.  GICS 
sector – information technology, while suffering an overall reduction during the two 
years, had the greatest percentage influx of new disclosing companies than any other 
sector.  Some 8 new disclosing companies, an increase of 160 per cent, come to this 
sector in 2009.  At this time, there are 13 disclosing companies (3.33 per cent of the total 
disclosers).  In comparison, 87 (5.95 per cent) non-disclosing companies remain in 2009, 
a drop of 20 companies from those observed in 2007.  There are now 4 disclosing 
companies in the GICS sector telecommunication services (1.03 per cent of the total 
disclosers), an increase of 100 per cent from 2007.   Some 23 non-disclosers (1.57 per 
cent) make up the balance in this sector, which is a decline of 5 from the last observation 
point.  GICS sector – utilities expands its disclosing companies’ membership by 9 
companies, but loses 3 non-disclosing companies in the duration.  Now there are 18 
disclosing companies (4.62 per cent of total disclosers) and 14 non-disclosers (0.96 of 
total non-disclosing companies). 
While Big 4 auditors lose some 25 corporate clients in the intervening two years, 
more of their clients begin to disclose GHG information.  By 2009, some 232 companies 
are classified as disclosers, an increase of 51 since 2007, and representing 59.49 per cent 
of total disclosing companies.  The exit (or change in disclosure behaviour) of 76 
companies considered to be non-disclosers from the Big 4 auditors’ client lists leaves 
615 non-disclosers or 42.04 per cent of the total non-disclosing companies at 2009. 
Some 13 more companies list on another exchange outside of Australia by 2009.  
This number comprises an increase of 20 disclosing companies and a decrease of 7 non-
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disclosing companies.  At 2009, there are 65 disclosing companies (16.67 per cent of 
total disclosers) and 157 non-disclosing companies (10.73 per cent of the total non-
disclosers) that hold a foreign listing status. 
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Table ‎4-8 2009 Descriptive statistics for the independent & control variables  
 
Panel A - Continuous Variables 
2009 All Companies, n = 1853 2009 Disclosing Companies, n = 390 2009 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1463 
Variable n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max 
Borrowings next year 1853 5.36 7.64 0.00 24.03 390 8.29 9.03 0.00 24.03 1463 4.58 7.03 0.00 21.85 
Equity issued next year 1853 9.52 7.54 0.00 21.33 390 10.54 7.82 0.00 21.33 1463 9.25 7.44 0.00 20.48 
Leverage 1853 0.64 3.77 0.00 109.78 390 0.39 0.28 0.00 1.24 1463 0.70 4.23 0.00 109.78 
Ownership concentration 1853 24.73 24.39 0.00 100.00 390 27.23 23.82 0.00 100.00 1463 24.06 24.51 0.00 100.00 
Competition 1853 0.71 0.22 0.00 1.00 390 0.71 0.20 0.00 1.00 1463 0.71 0.22 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1853 -0.25 0.95 -18.89 2.76 390 -0.14 1.02 -18.89 1.10 1463 -0.28 0.93 -18.63 2.76 
Tobin’s Q 1853 2.80 14.22 0.02 455.21 390 1.80 3.14 0.05 40.06 1463 3.07 15.92 0.02 455.21 
Age of fixed assets 1853 0.30 0.29 0.00 1.00 389 0.28 0.23 0.00 1.00 1463 0.30 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Size 1853 17.37 2.45 9.43 27.21 390 19.15 2.92 12.44 27.21 1463 16.90 2.07 9.43 24.25 
 Panel B – Categorical  Variables 
 2009 All Companies, n = 1853 2009 Disclosing Companies, n = 390 2009 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1463 
Variable Yes Percentage Yes Percentage Yes Percentage 
GICS Sector - Materials 639 34.48 124 31.79 515 35.20 
GICS Sector – Consumer Discretionary 160 8.63 27 6.92 133 9.09 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples 45 2.43 17 4.36 28 1.91 
GICS Sector – Energy 226 12.20 64 16.41 162 11.07 
GICS Sector – Financials 282 15.22 51 13.08 231 15.79 
GICS Sector – Health Care 149 8.04 8 2.05 141 9.64 
GICS Sector – Industrials 193 10.42 64 16.41 129 8.82 
GICS Sector – Information Technology 100 5.40 13 3.33 87 5.95 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication Services 27 1.46 4 1.03 23 1.57 
GICS Sector – Utilities 32 1.73 18 4.62 14 0.96 
Audit quality 847 45.71 232 59.49 615 42.04 
Foreign listing status 222 11.98 65 16.67 157 10.73 
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4.8.5 Descriptive statistics after winsoration   
If consideration is given to the discussion of descriptive statistics in the previous 
four sections, it is apparent that the range of some continuous variables is extensive.  
Table  4-7 and Table  4-8 include the standard deviations of each continuous variable.  
Extreme measurements, or outliers, make a substantial contribution to these standard 
deviations.  Violations of the assumption of normality distributions for all continuous 
variables are revealed for both years in the conduct of descriptive analysis.  Normality 
violations are common in larger samples and should not be problematic (Pallant, 2011).   
This research aims to examine the GHG disclosing behaviour of the entire 
population of ASX-listed public companies in 2007 and 2009, and therefore the 
retention of that population is a key objective.  Given that non-normality is an inevitable 
feature in this population, the impact of outliers is lessened by winsorising the more 
extreme cases using Tukey’s Hinges.  Tukey’s Hinges calculate outlier boundaries 
based on the spread of values across the 25 to 75 per centiles.  Application of this 
process results in the winsorisation of six continuous variables.  These are equity next 
year (upper level only), leverage (upper level only), ownership concentration (upper 
level only), Tobin’s Q (upper level only), ROA and size.  The consequent descriptive 
data for 2007 and 2009 continuous variables after winsoration are presented in bold in 
Panels A, Table  4-9.  The winsorised variables are discussed here, beginning with the 
2007 sample. 
The 2007 sample comprises 218 companies that make GHG disclosures and 
1,558 that do not, summing to a total of 1,776 companies.  Equity issued next year, after 
winsorisation has a mean of 9.60 (minimum 0.00, maximum 20.56) for the whole 
sample.  For disclosing (non-disclosing) companies these statistics are mean 10.11 
(9.52), minimum 0.00 (0.00) and maximum 20.56 (20.56).  Leverage is restricted to a 
maximum of 1.23.  This is achieved for both disclosers and non-disclosers.  The mean 
leverage value for the whole sample is 0.34.  This value is 0.50 (0.32) for the disclosing 
(non-disclosing) companies.  The upper limit for ownership concentration is set at 
90.40, a value that is reached by both disclosing and non-disclosing companies.  The 
mean value for the whole sample is 22.33, for disclosing sample it is 27.13 and for the 
non-disclosing sample it is 21.66.  ROA’s boundaries are set to range from -0.91 to 
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0.70.  Both disclosing and non-disclosing samples meet this range.  The mean ROA for 
the whole sample is -0.13.  In the disclosing companies, the mean is 0.02.  The non-
disclosing companies have a mean ROA of -0.15.  The Tobin’s Q variable is limited to a 
maximum of 6.31, a value reached by both disclosers and non-disclosers.  The mean 
value for Tobin’s Q is 2.33 for the whole sample, 2.12 for the disclosing companies and 
2.36 for the non-disclosing companies.  The last continuous variable to undergo extreme 
value limits is size.  The minimum is set at 11.32; the maximum is set at 23.49.  The 
whole sample’s mean size after winsorisation is 17.57.  The disclosing companies’ 
mean size is 20.28 (minimum 12.93, maximum 23.49), while the non-disclosing 
companies have a mean size of 17.19 (minimum 11.32, maximum 23.49). 
The application of winsorisation techniques in 2009 results in setting equity 
issued next year to a maximum of 20.36.  This value is reached by disclosers and non-
disclosers.  The mean equity issued next year for the whole sample is 9.55.  For the 
disclosing sample the mean is 10.55, while the non-disclosing sample has a mean of 
9.28.  Leverage is allowed to peak at 1.30.  The whole sample mean for leverage is 0.36.  
The disclosing sample’s mean leverage is 0.39 (minimum 0.00, maximum 1.24).  The 
non-disclosers’ mean leverage is 0.35 (minimum 0.00, maximum 1.30).  The upper limit 
for ownership concentration is put at 98.70, a value achieved by both disclosers and 
non-disclosing companies.  The whole sample mean for ownership concentration is 
24.71.  This statistic is 27.22 for the disclosing companies and 24.04 for the non-
disclosing companies.  ROA is set to range from -0.88 to 0.59.  This spread is achieved 
by both disclosing and non-disclosing companies.  The mean ROA for the whole 
sample is -0.17.  This value is -0.08 for disclosing companies and -0.19 for non-
disclosing companies.  Tobin’s Q is constrained to a maximum of 3.64.  The mean value 
of Tobin’s Q for the whole sample is 1.50.  The disclosing companies’ mean Tobin’s Q 
is 1.39 (minimum 0.00, maximum 3.64).  Non-disclosers have a mean Tobin’s Q of 
1.52 (minimum 0.02, maximum 3.64). Size is limited to extend from 10.83 to 23.71.  
The mean size for the whole sample is 17.36.  Disclosers’ mean size is 19.08 (minimum 
12.44, maximum 23.71).  Non-disclosers’ mean size is 16.90 (minimum 10.83, 
maximum 23.71). 
Winsorised variables are used for linear, Tobit and logistic regression analyses. 
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Table ‎4-9 Descriptive statistics for continuous independent & control variables after winsorisation  
 Panel A - Continuous Variables after Winsorisation 
 (The variables in bold have been subjected to the winsorisation process.) 
 2007 All Companies, n = 1776 2007 Disclosing Companies, n = 218 2007 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1558 
Variable n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max 
Borrowings next year 1776 6.83 8.30 0.00 24.24 218 13.62 8.72 0.00 24.24 1558 5.88 7.78 0.00 23.16 
Equity issued next year 1776 9.60 7.43 0.00 20.56 218 10.11 8.09 0.00 20.56 1558 9.52 7.33 0.00 20.56 
Leverage 1776 0.34 0.30 0.00 1.23 218 0.50 0.24 0.02 1.23 1558 0.32 0.30 0.00 1.23 
Ownership concentration 1776 22.33 23.44 0.00 90.40 218 27.13 24.22 0.00 90.40 1558 21.66 23.26 0.00 90.40 
Competition 1776 0.71 0.22 0.00 1.00 218 0.67 0.24 0.00 1.00 1558 0.72 0.21 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1776 -0.13 0.38 -0.91 0.70 218 0.02 0.26 -0.91 0.70 1558 -0.15 0.39 -0.91 0.70 
Tobin’s‎Q 1776 2.33 1.73 0.00 6.31 218 2.12 1.49 0.12 6.31 1558 2.36 1.76 0.00 6.31 
Age of fixed assets 1776 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.00 218 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.92 1558 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Size 1776 17.57 2.28 11.32 23.49 218 20.28 2.46 12.93 23.49 1558 17.19 1.98 11.32 23.49 
 2009 All Companies, n = 1853 2009 Disclosing Companies, n = 390 2009 Non-Disclosing Companies, n = 1463 
Variable n Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min. Max. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max 
Borrowings next year 1853 5.36 7.64 0.00 24.03 390 8.29 9.03 0.00 24.03 1463 4.58 7.03 0.00 21.85 
Equity issued next year 1183 9.55 7.53 0.00 20.36 390 10.55 7.80 0.00 20.36 1463 9.28 7.44 0.00 20.36 
Leverage 1853 0.36 0.33 0.00 1.30 390 0.39 0.28 0.00 1.24 1463 0.35 0.34 0.00 1.30 
Ownership concentration 1853 24.71 24.35 0.00 98.70 390 27.22 23.78 0.00 98.70 1463 24.04 24.47 0.00 98.70 
Competition 1853 0.71 0.22 0.00 1.00 390 0.71 0.20 0.00 1.00 1463 0.71 0.22 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1853 -0.17 0.31 -0.88 0.59 390 -0.08 0.29 -0.88 0.59 1463 -0.19 0.31 -0.88 0.59 
Tobin’s‎Q 1853 1.50 1.03 0.02 3.64 390 1.39 0.91 0.05 3.64 1463 1.52 1.06 0.02 3.64 
Size 1853 17.36 2.40 10.83 23.71 390 19.08 2.77 12.44 23.71 1463 16.90 2.06 10.83 23.71 
Age of fixed assets 1853 0.30 0.29 0.00 1.00 389 0.28 0.23 0.00 1.00 1463 0.30 0.30 0.00 1.00 
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4.8.6 Correlations 
 In recognition of the non-normal distribution of the data, the bivariate 
correlation matrices reported in Table  4-10 and Table  4-11 for 2007 and 2009, 
respectively, present Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Spearman’s rho Correlation 
Coefficients for the base model independent variables.  Pearson statistics are discussed 
first.   
 Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients reveal that in 2007 there are 
strong positive relationships between size and borrowings next year (r = 0.82, p < 0.01), 
Audit quality and borrowings next year (r = 0.54, p < 0.01), and audit quality and size (r 
= 0.50, p < 0.01).  Medium positive relationships are found between equity issued next 
year and borrowings next year (r = 0.46, p < 0.01), size and equity issued next year (r = 
0.39, p < 0.01), size and leverage (r = 0.35, p < 0.01) and age of fixed assets and GICS 
sector (r = 0.31, p < 0.01).  
 Similar relationships are in evidence in the 2009 data.  The Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient determines strong positive relationships between size 
and borrowings next year (r = 0.79, p < 0.01), audit quality and borrowings next year (r 
= 0.51, p < 0.01), and audit quality and size (r = 0.50, p < 0.01).  Medium positive 
correlations are found between equity issued next year and borrowings next year (r = 
0.46, p < 0.01), size and equity issued next year (r = 0.42, p <0.01), ROA and size (r = 
0.31, p < 0.01), and age of fixed assets and GICS sector (r = 0.30, p < 0.01).  A medium 
negative correlation is found between Tobin’s Q and ROA (r =- 0.37, p < 0.01). 
In comparing 2007 and 2009 Pearson correlation statistics, most coefficients 
maintain the strength and direction of their relationships over this duration.  An 
exception is the association between leverage and equity issued next year, which loses 
its significant relationship in 2009.  In 2009 other relationships develop significance.  A 
positive and significant relationship between ROA and ownership concentration (r = 
0.10, p < 0.01) and between Tobin’s Q and leverage (r = 0.20, p < 0.01) result in 2009.  
Negative and significant associations between ROA and leverage (r = -0.10, p < 0.01), 
Tobin’s Q and ROA (r = -0.37, p < 0.01) and foreign listing and ROA (r = -0.07, p < 
0.01) are observed. 
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 Spearman’s rho correlations, a nonparametric technique, does not make 
assumptions about the underlying population distribution and is useful for analysing 
categorical data (Pallant, 2011).  For 2007 data, strong positive correlations are found 
between borrowings next year and size (r = 0.84, p < 0.01), borrowings next year and 
audit quality (r =0 .56, p < 0.01), size and ROA (r = 0.60, p < 0.01) and between size 
and audit quality (r = 0.51, p < 0.01).  Medium positive correlations are determined for 
borrowings next year and equity issued next year (r = .49, p < 0.01), borrowings next 
year and ROA (r = 0.43, p < 0.01), equity issued next year and size (r =0 .37, p < 0.01), 
leverage and GICS sector (r = 0.36, p < 0.01), leverage and size (r = 0.44, p < 0.01), 
leverage and age of fixed assets (r =0 .34, p < 0.01), and GICS sector and age of fixed 
assets (r = 0.32, p < 0.01).   A medium negative correlation is found between size and 
Tobin’s Q (r = -0.31, p < 0.01).  
 In 2009, the Spearman’s rho correlations determine strong positive relationships 
between borrowings next year and size (r = 0.79, p < 0.01), borrowings next year and 
audit quality (r = 0.52, p < 0.01), size and ROA (r = 0.66, p < 0.01), and size and audit 
quality (r = .50, p < 0.01).   Medium positive correlations are found for borrowings next 
year and equity issued next year (r = .48, p < 0.01), borrowings next year and ROA (r = 
0.43, p < 0.01), equity issued next year and size (r = 0.43, p < 0.01), leverage and GICS 
sector (r = 0.37, p < 0.01), leverage and age of fixed assets (r = 0.33, p < 0.01), GICS 
sector and age of fixed assets (r = 0.30, p < 0.01), and ROA and audit quality (r = 0.33, 
p < 0.01).   
 Comparisons between Spearman’s statistics for the two years of this study show 
four relationships between pairs of variables drop from significance in 2009.  These are 
ownership concentration and competition, ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q, 
GICS sector and Tobin’s Q and Tobin’s Q and audit quality.  All other significant 
relationships retain that status. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the disclosure index findings and intercoder 
reliability tests of the indexation results.  It provided descriptive statistics of the sample 
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being studied.  In the next chapter, results of statistical testing are presented and 
discussed. 
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Table ‎4-10 Bivariate correlation matrices 2007 (n = 1776) 
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients are displayed in bold in the upper diagonal, Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients are displayed in the lower diagonal) 
 
Borrowings 
Next Year 
Equity 
Issued 
Next 
Year 
Leverage 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Competition 
GICS 
Sector 
Size ROA Tobin’s Q 
Audit 
Quality 
Age of 
Fixed 
Assets 
Foreign 
Listing 
Borrowings Next Year  0.46** 0.25** 0.07* -0.03 0.05 0.82** 0.16** -0.18** 0.54** -0.06 0.14** 
Equity Issued Next Year 0.49**  0.15** 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.39** 0.06 0.04 0.21** -0.06* 0.09** 
Leverage 0.32** 0.15**  0.03 -.08** 0.29** 0.35** 0.02 -0.01 0.17** 0.26** -0.04 
Ownership Concentration 0.07* 0.03 0.03  -0.04 0.05* 0.13** 0.04 0.01 0.10** 0.08** 0.03 
Competition -0.03 0.03 -0.09** -0.05*  -0.24** -0.08** -0.03 0.02 -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 
GICS Sector 0.04 -0.04 0.36** 0.03 -0.21**  0.13** 0.02 -0.03 0.10** 0.31** -0.10** 
Size 0.84** 0.37** 0.44** 0.09** -0.04 0.17**  0.13** -0.24** 0.50** 0.01 0.11** 
ROA 0.43** 0.08** 0.28** 0.12** 0.05 0.21** 0.60**  -0.02 0.06** 0.05* 0.02 
Tobin’s Q -0.09* 0.05 -0.14** 0.14** -0.01 -0.10** -0.31** -0.24**  -0.06* 0.03 0.09** 
Audit Quality 0.56** 0.23** 0.23** 0.08** -0.04 0.10** 0.51** 0.29** -0.06**  0.10** 0.04 
Age of Fixed Assets -0.04 -0.07* 0.34** 0.07** -0.08** 0.32** 0.05* 0.12** 0.07** 0.11**  0.02 
Foreign Listing 0.13** 0.10** -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.11** 0.08** -0.05 0.05* 0.04 0.03  
"Note: **, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *, Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table ‎4-11 Bivariate correlation matrices 2009 (n = 1853) 
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients are displayed in bold in the upper diagonal, Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients are displayed in the lower diagonal) 
 
Borrowings 
Next Year 
Equity 
Issued 
Next 
Year 
Leverage 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Competition 
GICS 
Sector 
Size ROA Tobin’s Q 
Audit 
Quality 
Age of 
Fixed 
Assets 
Foreign 
Listing 
Borrowings Next Year  0.46** 0.09* 0.12** -0.07 0.08 0.79** 0.23** -0.12** 0.51** -0.03 0.18** 
Equity Issued Next Year 0.48**  0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.42** 0.05 -0.05 0.21** -0.09** 0.14** 
Leverage 0.15** 0.06*  -0.03 -0.11** 0.28** 0.17** -0.10** 0.20** 0.13** 0.25** -0.01 
Ownership Concentration 0.15** 0.02 -0.02  -0.04 0.05* 0.15** 0.10** -0.05* 0.11** 0.11** 0.03 
Competition -0.05 -0.02 -0.11** -0.04  -0.18** -0.09** -0.04 0.01 -0.07** -0.10** -0.04 
GICS Sector 0.07 -0.03 0.37** 0.04 -0.17**  0.17** 0.04 0.04 0.13** 0.30** -0.10** 
Size 0.79** 0.43** 0.29** 0.14** -0.04 0.20**  0.31** -0.22** 0.50** 0.01 0.15** 
ROA 0.43** 0.13** 0.17** 0.16** 0.01 0.26** 0.66**  -0.37** 0.14** 0.01 -0.07** 
Tobin’s Q -0.11** 0.02 0.21** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.25** -0.22**  -0.05* 0.03 -0.01 
Audit Quality 0.52** 0.21** 0.21** 0.10** -0.04 0.14** 0.50** 0.33** -0.03  0.11** 0.06* 
Age of Fixed Assets -0.01 -0.06* 0.33** 0.11** -.11** 0.30** 0.05* 0.18** 0.17** 0.12**  0.01 
Foreign Listing 0.15** 0.12** 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.11** 0.11** -0.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.02  
"Note: **, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *, Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Chapter 5 Results and Analysis  
5.1 Empirical Tests 
Recall that the NGER Act 2007 (Cth) became operational in 2008.  This 
research studies the voluntary GHG disclosures made in 2007 and 2009 in ASX-listed 
companies’ annual and stand-alone sustainability reports and therefore it is possible to 
identify how they have progressed during that period.   Independent-samples T-tests are 
performed on the disclosure scores for the whole sample.  Similar tests are carried out 
on the disclosure scores of the disclosing companies and on the ratio of hard to total 
disclosures of those same companies.  Results are presented in Table  5-1 and are 
discussed in the two sections following. 
5.1.1 Whole sample 
An independent-samples t-test is carried out to compare the disclosure scores of 
the full sample for 2007 and 2009.  There is a significant difference in disclosure scores 
for 2007 (M = 0.80, SD = 2.88) and 2009 (M = 1.07, SD = 3.25); t (3605.51) = -2.66, p 
< 0.01 (two-tailed).  However, the effect size of the differences in the means (mean 
difference = -0.27, 95.00 per cent CI: -0.47 to -0.07) is very small (η2 = 0.00).  A Mann-
Whitney U Test reveals a significant difference in the GHG disclosure levels of 
companies in 2007 (Md = 0.00, n = 1776) and 2009 (Md = 0.00, n = 1853).   
5.1.2 Disclosing companies 
Applying the same testing procedure to the disclosing companies’ scores for 
2007 and 2009 reveals a significant difference in disclosure scores for 2007 (M = 6.54, 
SD = 5.49) and 2009 (M = 5.10, SD = 5.44); t (606) = 3.12, p = 0.00 (two-tailed).  
There is a small effect size (η2= 0.02) of the differences in the means (mean difference 
= 1.44, 95.00 per cent CI: 0.53 to 2.35).  A Mann-Whitney U Test reveals a significant 
difference in the GHG disclosure levels of companies in 2007 (Md = 5.00, n = 218) and 
2009 (Md = 3.00, n = 390). 
The performance of an independent-samples t-test on the disclosing companies’ 
hard to total disclosure ratios for 2007 and 2009 reveals the following.  There is a 
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significant difference in the hard to total disclosure ratios for 2007 (M = .41, SD = .26) 
and 2009 (M = .28, SD = .29); t (490.70) = 5.86, p = 0.00 (two-tailed).  The magnitude 
of the differences in the means (mean difference = .13, 95.00 per cent CI: 0.09 to 0.18) 
approaches a moderate effect (η2= 0.05).  A Mann-Whitney U Test also reveals a 
significant difference in the hard to total ratio of GHG disclosures of companies in 2007 
(Md = .48, n = 218) and 2009 (Md = .25, n = 390). 
It is possible to conclude that while some companies’ actions in providing 
superior GHG information to interested users undergo a change after the NGER 
legislation becomes effective, and more companies make voluntary GHG disclosures in 
their annual reports and/or stand-alone sustainability reports, the quality of disclosures 
does not improve overall. 
 
Table ‎5-1 Results of Statistical Tests Comparing 2007 and 2009 Disclosure Index 
Scores 
Variable Sample Category N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
t p 
Mann-
Whitney 
P 
Total number of 
disclosures 
Whole 
sample 
2007 1776 .80 2.88 
-2.66 <0.01 0.00 
2009 1853 1.07 3.25 
Total number of 
disclosures 
Disclosing 
companies 
2007 218 6.54 5.49 
3.12 0.00 0.00 
2009 390 5.10 5.44 
Ratio of hard to 
total disclosures 
Disclosing 
companies 
2007 218 .41 .26 
5.86 0.00 0.00 
2009 390 .28 .29 
 
A Mann-Whitney U Test reveals a significant difference in the age of fixed assets 
in 2007 disclosing companies (Md = .29, n = 218) and in 2007 non-disclosing 
companies (Md = .21, n = 1558), U = 149426, z = -2.88, p = .004, r = .07.  The r value 
of .07 is considered a small effect size (Pallant, 2011).    In 2009, this test reveals no 
significant differences between disclosing companies (Md = .27, n = 390) and non-
disclosing companies (Md = .24, n = 1463), z = 283489, p = .85, r = .00). 
 123 
 
5.2 Specification of models 
 This study initially tests four models.  While multiple dependent variables are 
tested, independent and control variables remain the same throughout.  The base models 
are provided in Chapter 3, Section  3.15 
The predicted signs of association for the independent and control variables are 
included in all tables.  Positive signs are expected for the forward looking financing 
proxies associated with information asymmetry theory (borrowings next year, and 
equity issued next year).  Agency theory variables, leverage and ownership 
concentration, are predicted to be positive and negative, respectively, reflecting the 
varying accessibility to additional information by these groups.  A negative sign is 
predicted for the proprietary cost variable, competition.  Signs for the GICS sectors 
energy, utilities, materials and industrials are expected to be positive.  Signs for GICS 
sectors consumer discretionary, consumer staples, financial, health care, information 
technology and telecommunication services are not forecast.  Positive signs are 
predicted for the control variables, ROA, Tobin’s Q, audit quality, age of fixed assets, 
foreign listing status, and size.   
5.3 Statistical Tests of the Hypotheses (whole sample)  
Archival financial data is combined for hypotheses testing in linear, Tobit and 
logistic regression analyses.  Two models testing the whole sample are first presented 
for analysis, and are as follow: 
VD1,2 = 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage 
+ 4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q 
+ 9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
Note that VD1 is a continuous variable, while VD2 is dichotomous and based on 
disclosure behaviour.   
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5.3.1 Model 1 
The dependent variable for Model 1 is the index of the quality of GHG 
disclosures made by all ASX-listed companies in their 2007 (2009) annual reports and 
stand-alone sustainability reports.  Linear and Tobit regression techniques are applied to 
this model. 
Table  5-2 shows the multiple linear regression results for both years.  The 2007 
model is significant at p < 0.00 and the R
2
 is 25.46 per cent.   
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are concerned with information asymmetry theory and the 
information problem.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that companies provide better quality GHG 
disclosures when they seek additional debt finance.  The analysis supports this 
hypothesis.  Borrowings next year is positive and significant (t = 4.95, p = 0.00).  This 
suggests that companies make voluntary greenhouse gas emission disclosures in their 
annual reports and stand-alone reports when they seek additional debt finance.  Support, 
however, is missing for hypothesis 2, which predicts that companies provide better 
quality GHG disclosures when they seek additional equity finance (t = -1.00, p = 0.32).   
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are represented by agency proxies, leverage and ownership 
concentration.  Leverage is statistically significant and positive (t = 1.86, p = 0.03), 
providing support for hypothesis 3 that companies with higher debt levels provide 
higher quality voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  Hypothesis 4’s proposal that firms 
with high concentrated ownership disclose less voluntary information about their GHG 
emission disclosures is not supported by the 2007 analysis (t = 0.61, p = 0.54). 
Proprietary costs are thought to influence a company’s decision not to disclose 
GHG emission information.  Hypothesis 5 proposes that companies in highly 
competitive product markets disclose less and divulge lower quality information relating 
to GHG emissions than those in less competitive product markets.  Results do not 
support this hypothesis.  The sign of the coefficient is negative, but significance is not 
achieved (t = -0.93, p = 0.35).   
Hypothesis 6 relates to political cost theory and conjectures that companies 
disclose more to avoid scrutiny from which additional costs may be imposed.  This 
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hypothesis is concerned with the climate change-sensitivity associated with GICS sector 
membership.   GICS sector – materials is the reference group for industry fixed effects.  
The partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable, controlling for the other 
variables in the model, is statistically significant (F Change = 7.24, p = 0.00), thus 
implying significance as predicted.  When referred to the reference group (GICS sector 
– materials) some seven GICS sectors have significant, but negative associations.  
Negative, but significant, coefficients for GICS sector – consumer discretionary (p = 
0.00), GICS sector – financials (p = 0.00), GICS sector – health care (p = 0.00), GICS 
sector – industrials (p = 0. 00), GICS sector – information technology (p = 0.00), GICS 
sector – telecommunication services (p = 0.00), and GICS sector – utilities (p = 0.08) 
suggest that these sectors are inclined to make fewer GHG disclosures than GICS sector 
– materials.  The climate change-sensitivity nature of energy, utilities, industrials and 
materials GICS sectors lead to the assumption that they make more GHG disclosures 
than those in other sectors.  Partial support for this hypothesis is therefore found.   
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Table ‎5-2 Results Model 1 (Linear Regression) 
  2007, n = 1776 2009, n = 1853 
  B t Sig* VIF B t Sig* VIF 
Constant  -9.56 -12.99 0.00  -11.95 -14.96 0.00  
Borrowings next year + 0.04 4.95 0.00 1.54 0.03 2.69 0.00 1.40 
Equity issued next year + -0.01 -1.00 0.32 1.18 0.00 0.20 0.84 1.18 
Leverage + 0.46 1.86 0.03 1.56 0.19 0.78 0.43 1.48 
Ownership concentration - 0.00 0.61 0.54 1.08 0.00 0.53 0.60 1.07 
Competition - -0.28 -0.93 0.35 1.24 -0.23 -0.72 0.47 1.14 
GICS Sector – Consumer 
Discretionary 
 
-1.51 -6.05 0.00 1.51 -1.40 -5.01 0.00 1.46 
GICS Sector – Consumer 
Staples 
 
-0.12 -0.30 0.77 1.14 0.37 0.84 0.40 1.11 
GICS Sector – Energy + -0.01 -0.05 0.96 1.29 -0.08 -0.38 0.70 1.21 
GICS Sector – Financials  -1.23 -5.79 0.00 1.69 -1.29 -5.65 0.00 1.60 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -1.09 -4.24 0.00 1.44 -1.20 -4.30 0.00 1.37 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -0.76 -3.17 0.00 1.51 -0.44 -1.70 0.09 1.50 
GICS Sector – Information 
Technology 
 
-1.01 -3.54 0.00 1.36 -0.73 -2.23 0.03 1.30 
GICS Sector – 
Telecommunication 
Services 
 
-1.41 -2.88 0.00 1.13 -1.43 -2.55 0.01 1.08 
GICS Sector – Utilities + -0.85 -1.73 0.08 1.11 -0.52 -0.99 0.32 1.09 
ROA + -0.44 -2.26 0.02 1.55 -0.70 -2.37 0.02 1.86 
Tobin’s Q + 0.10 2.57 0.00 1.30 0.30 4.04 0.00 1.38 
Audit Quality + -0.10 -0.74 0.46 1.40 -0.14 -0.89 0.38 1.38 
Age of Fixed Assets + 0.94 3.82 0.00 1.35 0.64 2.45 0.01 1.37 
Foreign Listing Status + 0.56 2.92 0.00 1.07 0.44 2.11 0.02 1.08 
Size + 0.58 14.41 0.00 2.39 0.73 16.77 0.00 2.61 
2007: R2 = 0.25; adjusted R2 = 0.25; F = 29.96; p = 0.00 
2009: R2 = 0.27; adjusted R2 = 0.26; F = 33.60; p = 0.00 
Dependent variable = the score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and sustainability reports for 
2007 (2009); Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following year; Leverage = 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership Concentration = the per centage of shares held by those who 
own more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer staples, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member 
of the GICS sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a 
member of the GICS sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
telecommunication services consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the 
year (either 2007 or 2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008); 
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of total debt, all 
divided by book value of total assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 
4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment divided by 
gross property plant and equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an 
overseas stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; Size = the natural log of total assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
 
The control variables, ROA, Tobin’s Q, audit quality, age of fixed assets, foreign 
listing status and size have mixed results.   
ROA is statistically significant, but has the opposite sign to that predicted (t = -
2.26, p = .02).  This suggests, contrary to expectations that voluntary GHG disclosures 
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are made when firms are underperforming financially.  Tobin’s Q is positive as 
predicted and statistically significant (t = 2.57, p = 0.00).  This allows the conclusion to 
be drawn that voluntary greenhouse gas disclosures in annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports are of relevance to stock market participants.   
Audit quality is both negative contrary to expectations, and non-significant (t = -
0.74, p = 0.46).  Thus it cannot be concluded that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is a 
motivating factor for the making of voluntary GHG disclosures.  
Age of fixed assets is found to be statistically significant and positive (t = 3.82, p 
= 0.00).  It is possible to conclude that firms with older fixed assets, and thus emitters of 
more pollution, disclose more about their GHG emissions. 
Foreign listing status is positive as predicted, and statistically significant (t = 2.92, 
p = 0.00).  This suggests that firms are likely to disclose more voluntary greenhouse gas 
emission information because of overseas listing requirements. 
Voluntary GHG emission disclosures are positively associated with the size of the 
disclosing corporation (t = 14.41, p = 0.00).  This positive statistical significance 
suggests that large firms disclose more voluntary greenhouse gas emission information.   
The 2009 multiple regression results, shown also at Table  5-2 are similar.  The 
total variance explained by this model is 26.83 per cent (R
2
 = 0.27).  The statistical 
significance of the result is 0.00.     
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are concerned with information asymmetry theory and the 
information problem.  As in 2007, hypothesis 1 finds support to the exclusion of 
hypothesis 2.  Borrowings next year (hypothesis 1) is positive and significant (t = 2.69, 
p = 0.00).  It is concluded that companies provide better quality GHG disclosures when 
they seek additional debt finance.  Equity issued next year is positive but not significant 
(t = 0.20, p = 0.84).   Therefore, no support is found for hypothesis 2 that companies 
provide higher quality GHG disclosures when they seek additional equity finance. 
Hypothesis 3 purports that companies with higher debt levels provide higher 
quality voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  It is not supported by 2009 analysis.  
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While leverage, an agency proxy, is of the predicted sign, it fails to achieve significance 
(t = 0.78, p = 0.43).  The second agency proxy variable is ownership concentration.  It is 
central to hypothesis 4 that firms with high concentrated ownership disclose less 
voluntary information about their GHG emission disclosures.  As in 2007, concentrated 
ownership is not significant (t = 0.53, p = 0.60) and so does not support hypothesis 4.   
Hypothesis 5, that companies in highly competitive product markets disclose less 
and disclose lower quality GHG information is not supported.  Competition, while 
negative, is not significant (t = -0.72, p = 0.47).    
Support is partly found for the political cost hypothesis, hypothesis 6.  This 
hypothesis proposes that companies in climate change-sensitive GICS sectors, and 
therefore energy, utilities, materials and industrials, are likely to disclose more GHG 
information because of the political sensitivity of their operations in regard to climate 
change.  Results for companies in the GICS sector - materials and GICS sector - 
industrials are significant.   The partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable, 
controlling for the other variables in the model, is statistically significant (F Change = 
6.65, p = 0.00), thus implying significance as predictor.  Negative, but significant 
coefficients for each of the following GICS sectors, GICS sector – consumer 
discretionary (p = 0.00), GICS sector – financials (p = 0.00), GICS sector – health care 
(p = 0.00), GICS sector – industrials (p = 0.09), GICS sector – information technology 
(p = 0.03), and GICS sector – telecommunication services (p = 0.01), indicate that these 
sectors make fewer GHG disclosures than GICS sector – materials. 
Similar results are again found among the control variables’ associations with 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures in this latest year of study.  ROA, Tobin’s Q, audit 
quality, age of fixed assets, foreign listing status and size again have mixed results.  
ROA is statistically significant, but the opposite sign to that predicted recurs in 2009 (t 
= -2.37, p = .02).  Tobin’s Q is positive as predicted and statistically significant (t = 
4.04, p = 0.00).  Audit quality is both negative and non-significant (t = -0.89, p = 0.38), 
against expectations.  Age of fixed assets is again statistically significant and positive (t 
= 2.45, p = 0.01).  Foreign listing status is again positive and statistically significant (t = 
2.11, p = 0.02).  Size is once more positive and significant (t = 16.77, p = 0.00).  
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In summary, results indicate that the stock market’s interest in GHG emission 
information, companies holding older fixed assets and therefore conjectured to have less 
pollution controls, being listed on a stock exchange outside of Australia, and the size of 
the company influence the making of voluntary GHG disclosures. 
Model 1 is further subjected to Tobit regression analysis, using a Newton-
Raphson algorithm (see Table  5-3).  Tobit models are suitable when the dependent 
variable is continuous but its range is constrained (Verbeek, 2004). This is often in 
evidence when a substantial part of the population has a zero dependent variable and the 
balance of the population has positive dependent variables with many different 
outcomes.  In this study, zero voluntary GHG disclosures are observed for the majority 
of the population (2007 n = 1,558, 2009 n = 1,463) with the remainder (2007 n = 218, 
2009 n = 390) making disclosures.   
Tobit models are usually estimated using maximum likelihood and coefficients 
have dual interpretations (Verbeek, 2004).  Firstly, the coefficient indicates the impact 
of a change in the variable on the probability of a non-zero disclosure.  Secondly, it 
estimates the impact of a change in the variable on the level of the disclosure.  
Interpreting Tobit coefficients is not obvious (Roncek, 1992) so this study follows 
Cormier & Magnan’s  (1999) environmental disclosures study and discusses only the 
predicted direction and significance of coefficient estimates.   
Table  5-3 describes the Tobit regression results for 2007 and 2009 whole sample.  
The 2007 results are the first discussed.  Under this analysis technique, the model for 
2007 data is significant at p = 0.00 and a pseudo R
2 
of 33.59 per cent (Veall & 
Zimmermann, 1994).   The 2007 results are mostly similar to the OLS regression results 
in terms of direction and significance
51
.  In 2007, borrowings next year is statistically 
significant and positive as predicted (z = 3.55, p = 0.00).  This result supports 
hypothesis 1 that companies provide higher quality GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.    
                                                 
51
 The exception is competition, which enters into significance under Tobit regression in this 
year.  
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Equity issued next year is negative and insignificant (z = -1.29, p = 0.20).   
Therefore, hypothesis 2, that companies provide higher quality GHG disclosures when 
they seek additional equity finance, remains unsubstantiated. 
Leverage is significant and in the predicted sign (z = 1.49, p = 0.07).  This 
supports hypothesis 3 that companies with higher debt are more forthcoming with their 
GHG information.  Ownership concentration again fails to achieve significance (z = 
0.31, p = 0.76), thus rejecting hypothesis 4’s proposal of a negative relationship existing 
between ownership concentration and GHG emission disclosures. 
Companies in more competitive product markets are found to disclose less GHG 
emission information (z = -2.03, p = 0.04), thus providing support for hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 6 asserts that companies in climate change-sensitive GICS sectors of 
materials, energy, utilities and industrials, are likely to disclose more voluntary GHG 
information in order to minimise the imposition of political costs.  Indirect support is 
forthcoming from this statistical test.  Significant results are achieved for GICS Sector – 
consumer discretionary (z = -3.37, p = 0.00), GICS sector – financials (z = -4.05, p = 
0.00), GICS sector – health care (z = -3.91, p = 0.00), GICS sector – information 
technology (z = -2.30, p = 0.02) and GICS sector – telecommunication services (z = -
2.74, p = 0.01).  These results indicate that these sectors disclose less than the reference 
group, GICS sector – materials.  The non-significance of the other GICS sectors 
indicates that these disclose much the same as the reference group.   
The control variables conform to their OLS results in 2007.  ROA is again 
significant, but has the unpredicted sign (z = -1.72, p = 0.09), and audit quality has the 
correct sign but is not significant (z = 1.24, p = 0.22).  Tobin’s Q (z = 4.43, p = 0.00), 
age of fixed assets (z = 2.63, p = 0.00), foreign listing status (z = 1.45, p = 0.07) and 
size (z = 10.76, p = 0.00) are found to influence voluntary GHG disclosures. 
The 2009 results, also shown in Table  5-3, are significant at p = 0.00, with pseudo 
R
2
 of 29.21 per cent (Veall & Zimmermann, 1994), but no hypotheses find support 
under this technique. The 2009 Tobit results differ from their OLS results in that 
borrowings next year (z = 1.17, p = 0.24) is not significant in the Tobit analysis, audit 
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quality makes a contribution to the model, although not in the direction predicted, (z = -
2.39, p = 0.02), and neither age of fixed assets (z = 0.62, p = 0.27) nor foreign listing 
status (z = 0.37, p = 0.71) are significant.  The control variables that influence the 
making of voluntary GHG disclosures are ROA (z = -1.98, p = 0.05), Tobin’s Q (z = 
2.70, p = 0.01), audit quality (z = -2.39, p = 0.02), and size (z = 14.18, p = 0.00).  Of 
these, only Tobin’s Q and size matches expectations, and it appears that larger 
companies make GHG disclosures because they are of relevance to stock market 
participants. 
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Table ‎5-3 Results Model 1 (Tobit Regression) 
  2007 2009 
  n = 1776 n = 1853 
  
B 
z-
Statistic 
Sig* B 
z-
Statistic 
Sig* 
Constant  -66.75 -12.21 0.00 -49.67 -14.82 0.00 
Borrowings next year + 0.18 3.55 0.00 0.04 1.17 0.24 
Equity issued next year + -0.06 -1.29 0.20 0.03 0.84 0.40 
Leverage + 2.51 1.49 0.07 -1.03 -1.04 0.30 
Ownership concentration - 0.00 0.31 0.76 0.01 0.64 0.52 
Competition - -3.55 -2.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.98 
GICS Sector – Consumer 
Discretionary 
 
-4.96 -3.37 0.00 -4.11 -3.78 0.00 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples  -1.80 -0.86 0.39 0.52 0.36 0.72 
GICS Sector – Energy + 1.50 -1.17 0.24 0.81 1.08 0.28 
GICS Sector – Financials  -5.12 -4.05 0.00 -4.80 -5.39 0.00 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -8.88 -3.91 0.00 -7.09 -4.81 0.00 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -1.05 -0.83 0.41 -0.29 -0.33 0.74 
GICS Sector – Information 
Technology 
 
-4.95 -2.30 0.02 -2.20 -1.64 0.10 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication 
Services 
 
-12.07 -2.74 0.01 -5.88 -2.35 0.02 
GICS Sector – Utilities + -1.94 -0.84 0.40 0.71 0.46 0.64 
ROA + -2.41 -1.72 0.09 -2.20 -1.98 0.05 
Tobin’s Q + 1.19 4.43 0.00 0.75 2.70 0.01 
Audit Quality + 1.20 1.24 0.22 -1.44 -2.39 0.02 
Age of Fixed Assets + 4.25 2.63 0.00 0.66 0.62 0.27 
Foreign Listing Status + 1.50 1.45 0.07 0.26 0.37 0.71 
Size + 2.95 10.76 0.00 2.48 14.18 0.00 
2007: Pseudo R2 = 0.34 
2009: Pseudo R2 = 0.29 
Dependent variable = the score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and sustainability reports for 
2007 (2009); Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following year; Leverage = 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership Concentration = the per centage of shares held by those who 
own more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer staples, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member 
of the GICS sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a 
member of the GICS sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
telecommunication services consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the 
year (either 2007 or 2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008); 
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of total debt, 
all divided by book value of total assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a 
Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment divided 
by gross property plant and equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on 
an overseas stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; Size = the natural log of total assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
 
5.3.2 Model 2 
The dependent variable for Model 2 is a categorical variable of disclosers and 
non-disclosers, and is determined according to whether or not an ASX-listed company 
makes voluntary GHG disclosures in their 2007 (2009) annual reports and stand-alone 
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sustainability reports.  Independent variables remain the same.  Logistic regression is 
performed on this model to assess the likelihood that companies disclose their GHG 
information.  The results for 2007, shown in Table  5-4, are discussed first.   
The model is statistically significant, Chi-square (20, N = 1776) = 425.61, p < 
0.00, indicating that the model is able to distinguish between companies that make 
voluntary GHG disclosures and those that do not.  The model as a whole explains 
between 21.34 per cent (Cox and Snell R square) and 40.58 per cent (Nagelkerke R 
squared) of the variance in disclosures, and correctly classifies 90.09 per cent of cases.  
The Hosmer and Lemeshow Test reveals a Chi-square value of 9.92 and a significance 
level of 0.27
52
, indicative of support for this model.   
Model 2 provides support for only three hypotheses.  This model marginally 
supports hypothesis 3 that companies with higher debt levels provide higher quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures (wald = 1.64, p = 0.10).  Evidence is provided for 
hypothesis 5 that companies in highly competitive product markets disclose less and 
divulge lower quality information relating to GHG emissions than those in less 
competitive product markets (wald = 5.64, p = 0.02).  The influence of membership of 
climate-change sensitive GICS sectors on GHG emission disclosures (hypothesis 6) is 
partially supported.  GICS sector – materials is significant (wald = 35.59, p = 0.00), and 
GICS sector – energy is likely to make more disclosures than GICS sector - materials 
(wald = 2.78, p = 0.10).  GICS sectors – industrials and utilities are not significant (wald 
= 0.26, p = 0.61, wald = 0.46, p = 0.50, respectively).  GICS sectors – consumer 
discretionary (wald = 6.46, p = 0.01), financials (wald = 10.42, p = 0.00), health care 
(wald = 10.24, p = 0.09), information technology (wald = 2.82, p = 0.09) and 
telecommunication services (wald = 5.54, p = 0.02) are significant and less probable to 
make GHG disclosures in comparison to the GICS sector – materials.  
Four control variables are supported in the model.  These are Tobin’s Q (wald = 
17.32, p = 0.00), audit quality (wald 1.75, p = 0.09), age of fixed assets (wald 5.45, p = 
0.01), and size (wald = 102.70, p = 0.00).  This permits the conclusion that voluntary 
GHG emission disclosures are more likely to be made by larger firms because market 
                                                 
52
 The Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test requires a value of > 0.05 for significance. 
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participants find this information useful; a Big 4 audit firm influences the disclosures; 
and because fixed assets are older and thus have less pollution controls, leaving the 
company more susceptible to the imposition of political costs.   
The 2009 model is also statistically significant and results are also presented in 
Table  5-4.  This model results in a Chi-square (20, N = 1853) = 364.96, p < 0.00, 
indicating that the model is able to distinguish between companies that make voluntary 
GHG disclosures and those that do not.  The model as a whole explains between 17.88 
per cent (Cox and Snell R square) and 27.82 per cent (Nagelkerke R squared) of the 
variance in disclosures, and correctly classifies 82.62 per cent of cases. 
Table  5-4 shows results that are less satisfactory than those in 2007.  Only GICS 
sector – materials (wald = 63.59, p = 0.00), GICS sector – energy (wald = 3.98, p = 
0.05) and GICS sector – utilities (wald = 4.88, p = 0.03) are significant.  Therefore, 
partial support is found for hypothesis 6, that membership in a climate-change sensitive 
GICS sector influences voluntary GHG disclosures.  Of the control variables, only 
Tobin’s Q (wald = 5.04, p = 0.02) and size (wald = 139.90, p = 0.00) are in keeping 
with predictions. 
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Table ‎5-4 Results Model 2 (Logistic Regression) 
  2007 2009 
  n = 1776 n = 1853 
  B Wald Sig.* B Wald Sig.* 
Constant  -14.49 145.87 0.00 -11.17 169.18 0.00 
Borrowings next year + -0.04 3.32 0.07 0.00 0.32 0.57 
Equity issued next year + 0.00 0.22 0.64 0.01 0.73 0.39 
Leverage + 0.50 1.64 0.10 -0.33 1.55 0.21 
Ownership concentration - 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.13 0.72 
Competition - -0.96 5.64 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.81 
GICS Sector – Materials +  35.59 0.00  63.59 0.00 
GICS Sector – Consumer Discretionary  -0.89 6.46 0.01 -0.64 4.99  0.03 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples  -0.39 0.60 0.44 0.43 1.16 0.28 
GICS Sector – Energy + 0.51 2.78 0.10 0.39 3.98 0.05 
GICS Sector – Financials  -0.97 10.42 0.00 -1.02 18.27 0.00 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -1.71 10.24 0.09 -1.54 14.02 0.00 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -0.16 0.26 0.61 0.20 0.74 0.39 
GICS Sector – Information Technology  -0.90 2.82 0.09 -0.22 0.36 0.55 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication 
Services 
 
-2.21 5.54 0.02 -0.87 1.83 0.18 
GICS Sector – Utilities + -0.38 0.46 0.50 0.99 4.88 0.03 
ROA + -0.43 1.71 0.19 -0.61 4.14 0.04 
Tobin’s Q + 0.26 17.32 0.00 0.17 5.04 0.02 
Audit Quality + 0.31 1.75 0.09 -0.41 6.83 0.01 
Age of Fixed Assets + 0.91 5.45 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.40 
Foreign Listing Status + 0.16 0.39 0.53 -0.11 0.29 0.59 
Size + 0.64 102.70 0.00 0.55 139.90 0.00 
2007: Chi-square = 425.61 (20, N = 1776), p = 0.00; Cox and Snell R Square = 0.21; Nagelkerke R Square = 0.41; 
correctly classifying 90.09% of cases; Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test = > 0.05 
2009: Chi-square = 364.94 (20 N = 1853), p = 0.00; Cox and Snell R Square = 0.18; Nagelkerke R Square = 0.28; 
correctly classifying 82.63% of cases; Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test = < 0.05 
Dependent variable = a dichotomous variable, 1 = voluntary GHG disclosures are made, 0 otherwise for 2007 
(2009); Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following year; Leverage = the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership Concentration = the per centage of shares held by those who own 
more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one minus the 
Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer 
discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if 
the company is a member of the GICS sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 0 otherwise; 1 = if 
the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) 
divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008); Tobin’s Q = the sum of market 
value of common equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total 
assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age 
of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment divided by gross property plant and 
equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas stock exchange 
in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; Size = the natural log of total assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
 
5.4 Statistical Tests of the Hypotheses (subsample of disclosing companies) 
A better understanding of the factors that influence the voluntary disclosure of 
GHG information is possible by isolating the disclosing companies and applying 
statistical tests.  Models 3 and 4 concern only the disclosing companies. 
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5.4.1 Model 3 
 Some 218 (390) companies make voluntary greenhouse gas emission disclosures 
in 2007 (2009).  Ordinary least square linear regression is applied to the subsample of 
disclosing companies, and tested as Model 3: 
VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Equity issued next year + 3 Leverage + 
4 Ownership Concentration + 5 Competition + 6 Industry + 7 ROA + 8 Tobin’s Q + 
9 Audit Quality + 10 Age of Fixed Assets + 11 Foreign Listing Status + 12 Size + e 
 Results of linear regression are presented in Table  5-5.  The 2007 results are 
discussed first.  It is seen that this model explains a total variance of 29.54 per cent and 
has a statistical significance of 0.00.  Only one hypothesis is fully supported by this 
model, another receives partial support.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that companies provide 
higher quality GHG disclosures than companies when they seek additional debt finance.  
Evidence is found in support of this hypothesis.  The sign of borrowings next year is 
positive, as predicted (t = 1.65, p = 0.05).   
 Partial support is found for hypothesis 6, that climate-change sensitivity 
influences disclosures.  The partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable, 
controlling for the other variables in the model, is statistically significant (F Change = 
2.14, p = 0.03), thus implying significance as predictor.  When referred to the reference 
group, GICS sector – materials, some four GICS sectors have significant, but negative 
effects.  GICS sector – consumer discretionary (p = 0.00), GICS sector – financials (p = 
0.00), GICS sector – health care (p = 0.05), and GICS sector – telecommunication 
services (p = 0.06) all show negative but significant coefficients.  This indicates that 
companies in these GICS sectors make GHG disclosures, but provide fewer voluntary 
GHG disclosures than companies in the reference group, GICS sector – materials.  It 
was forecast that membership of GICS sector – energy, GICS sector – industrials, and 
GICS sector – utilities would influence GHG disclosures, but this relationship is 
unsubstantiated in this model. 
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 Age of fixed assets is positive and significant (t = 1.72, p = 0.05), allowing the 
conclusion that as fixed assets age, companies are inclined to make more voluntary 
GHG disclosures.  It is conjectured that this relationship is to explain pollution 
performance as older assets are likely to produce more emissions. Size, predicted to be 
positively associated with disclosures, is positive and significant (t = 3.98, p = 0.00).   
 The 2009 results explain a total variance of 38.15 per cent and is significant (p = 
0.00), but is dissimilar to the 2007 results in that borrowings next year is not significant.   
Hypothesis 6 predicts that companies in climate change-sensitive GICS sectors, 
specifically materials, energy, industrials and utilities, disclose more than others.  The 
partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable, controlling for the other variables 
in the model, is statistically significant (F Change = 3.12, p = 0.00), thus implying 
significance as predictor.  When referring these results to the reference group, GICS 
sector – materials, eight GICS sectors have significant, but negative effects.  These are 
GICS sector – consumer discretionary (p = 0.00), GICS sector – energy (p = 0.09), 
GICS sector – financials (p = 0.00), GICS sector – health care (p = 0.01), GICS sector – 
industrials (p = 0.03), GICS sector – information technology (p = 0.03), GICS sector – 
telecommunication services (p = 0.01), GICS sector – utilities (p = 0.01).  As energy, 
industrials, and utilities are included in here, this hypothesis is supported. 
Of the control variables, only foreign listing status (t = 1.58, p = 0.06), age of 
fixed assets (t = 1.37, p = 0.09) and size (t = 7.11, p = 0.00) are also found to influence 
GHG disclosures in 2009. 
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Table ‎5-5 Results Model 3 (Linear Regression) Disclosing Companies 2007 & 2009 
  2007 2009 
  n = 218 n = 390 
  B t Sig* VIF B t Sig* VIF 
Constant  -14.99 -3.14 0.00  -15.83 -5.26 0.00  
Borrowings next year + 0.08 1.65 0.05 1.50 0.04 1.16 0.25 1.66 
Equity issued next year + 0.02 0.44 0.66 1.22 0.00 0.15 0.88 1.14 
Leverage + 0.04 0.02 0.98 1.77 0.02 0.02 0.98 1.74 
Ownership concentration - 0.00 -0.23 0.82 1.14 0.01 0.94 0.35 1.12 
Competition - 0.70 0.46 0.65 1.25 -0.70 -0.59 0.55 1.18 
GICS Sector – Consumer 
Discretionary 
 
-4.27 -3.24 0.00 1.40 -3.88 -3.69 0.00 1.44 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples  -1.40 -0.83 0.41 1.25 -1.81 -1..49 0.14 1.23 
GICS Sector – Energy + -1.03 -0.88 0.38 1.51 -1.15 -1.68 0.09 1.30 
GICS Sector – Financials  -3.22 -3.02 0.00 1.68 -2.68 -3.18 0.00 1.63 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -4.69 -2.00 0.05 1.15 -4.22 -2.56 0.01 1.10 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -1.47 -1.35 0.18 1.57 -1.79 -2.26 0.03 1.74 
GICS Sector – Information 
Technology 
 
-3.01 -1.27 0.21 1.17 -2.95 -2.18 0.03 1.19 
GICS Sector – 
Telecommunication Services 
 
-6.82 -1.88 0.06 1.11 -6.46 -2.77 0.01 1.11 
GICS Sector – Utilities + -2.47 -1.32 0.19 1.30 -3.39 -2.82 0.01 1.29 
ROA + -0.58 -0.34 0.74 1.82 -0.36 -0.33 0.74 1.93 
Tobin’s Q + 0.24 0.87 0.39 1.58 0.25 0.93 0.35 1.20 
Audit Quality + 0.44 -0.42 0.68 1.48 0.30 0.44 0.66 2.19 
Age of Fixed Assets + 2.81 1.72 0.05 1.36 1.52 1.37 0.09 1.34 
Foreign Listing Status + 1.03 1.17 0.24 1.18 1.03 1.58 0.06 1.19 
Size + 1.01 3.98 0.00 3.60 1.11 7.11 0.00 3.76 
2007: R2 = 0.30; adjusted R2 = 0.22; F = 4.13; p = 0.00 
2009: R2 = 0.38; adjusted R2 = 0.35; F = 11.38; p = 0.00 
Dependent variable = the score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and sustainability reports for 
2007 (2009) for disclosing companies; Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the 
following year; Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership Concentration = the per centage of 
shares held by those who own more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-
sector calculated as one minus the Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  1= if the company is a member 
of the GICS sector - consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the 
company is a member of the GICS sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS 
sector - health care, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if 
the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the company is a member of the 
GICS sector - telecommunication services consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income before abnormal items at 
the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 
or 2008); Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of 
total debt, all divided by book value of total assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the 
engagement of a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and 
equipment divided by gross property plant and equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 
equals a listing on an overseas stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; Size = the natural log of total 
assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
  
5.4.2 Model 4 
Recall Model 4 takes as its dependent variable the ratio of hard to total 
disclosures, an indication of the quality of voluntary GHG disclosures made.  Linear 
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regression is applied to the 218 (390) companies making voluntary disclosures in 2007 
(2009).  Results are presented in the following table. 
Table ‎5-6 Results Model 4 (Linear Regression) Ratio of Hard to Total Disclosures, 
Disclosing Companies 2007 & 2009 
  2007 2009 
  n = 218 n = 390 
  B t Sig* VIF B t Sig* VIF 
Constant  -0.42 -1.73 0.09  -0.58 -3.48 0.00  
Borrowings next year + 0.00 0.12 0.91 1.50 0.00 -0.75 0.46 1.66 
Equity issued next year + 0.00 -0.66 0.51 1.22 0.00 0.72 0.47 1.14 
Leverage + -0.15 -1.62 0.11 1.77 -0.04 -0.67 0.51 1.74 
Ownership concentration - 0.00 1.51 0.13 1.14 0.00 1.36 0.18 1.12 
Competition - 0.12 1.58 0.12 1.25 -0.05 -0.70 0.48 1.18 
GICS Sector – Consumer Discretionary  -0.13 -1.91 0.06 1.40 -0.04 -0.68 0.50 1.44 
GICS Sector – Consumer Staples  -0.11 -1.34 0.18 1.25 0.01 0.16 0.87 1.23 
GICS Sector – Energy + -0.10 -1.68 0.10 1.51 -0.05 -1.20 0.23 1.30 
GICS Sector – Financials  -0.04 -0.71 0.48 1.68 0.10 2.14 0.03 1.63 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -0.15 -1.28 0.20 1.15 0.13 1.42 0.16 1.10 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -0.07 -1.18 0.24 1.57 0.06 1.44 0.15 1.74 
GICS Sector – Information Technology  -0.20 -1.62 0.11 1.17 -0.14 -1.93 0.06 1.19 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication 
Services 
 
-0.35 -1.86 0.06 1.12 -0.30 -2.31 0.02 1.11 
GICS Sector – Utilities + 0.07 0.71 0.48 1.30 0.11 1.70 0.09 1.29 
ROA + -0.13 -1.48 0.14 1.82 0.09 1.55 0.06 1.93 
Tobin’s Q + 0.00 -0.15 0.88 1.58 0.03 2.10 0.02 1.20 
Audit Quality + -0.03 -0.63 0.53 1.49 0.03 0.72 0.47 2.19 
Age of Fixed Assets + 0.24 2.86 0.00 1.36 0.09 1.42 0.08 1.34 
Foreign Listing Status + -0.05 -1.10 0.27 1.18 0.03 0.93 0.35 1.19 
Size + 0.04 3.18 0.00 3.60 0.04 4.79 0.00 3.78 
2007: R2 = 0.18; adjusted R2 = 0.09; F = 2.11; p = 0.00 
2009: R2 = 0.34; adjusted R2 = 0.30; F = 9.38; p = 0.00 
Dependent variable = the ratio of hard to total voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and 
sustainability reports for 2007 (2009 for disclosing companies); Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds 
from borrowings in the following year; Leverage = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership 
Concentration = the percentage of shares held by those who own more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of 
competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one minus the Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  
1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a 
member of the GICS sector - consumer staples, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company 
is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the 
company is a member of the GICS sector - telecommunication services consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income 
before abnormal items at the end of the year (either 2007 or 2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous 
financial year (either 2006 or 2008); Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred 
stock and book value of total debt, all divided by book value of total assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable 
where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of 
property plant and equipment divided by gross property plant and equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a 
dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an overseas stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; 
Size = the natural log of total assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
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The 2007 (2009) analysis shows that this model explains a total variance of 17.66 
(33.70) per cent and has a statistical significance of 0.00 (0.00).  Contrary to 
expectations, this model provides limited support for the proffered hypotheses.   
An unexpected result in 2007 is that the partial effects of the GICS sector 
categorical variable, controlling for the other variables in the model, falls from 
statistical significance (F Change = 1.39, p = 0.20), thus eliminating GICS sector 
membership as a predictor for this model.  In 2009, however, results for the GICS sector 
categorical variable are mostly as expected.  When controlling for the other variables in 
the model, the partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable is statistically 
significant (F Change = 3.03, p = 0.00).  However, of the climate change-sensitive 
GICS sectors, energy, industrials and utilities, only GICS sector – utilities (t = 1.70, p = 
0.09) makes an impact, and therefore, hypothesis 6 is only partially supported in 2009.  
It is noted that when referred to the reference group, GICS sector – financials (t = 2.14, 
p =0.03) makes a positive impact, while GICS sector – information technology (t = -
1.93, p = 0.06) and GICS sector - telecommunication (t = -2.31, p = 0.02) provide a 
negative impact.   
In 2007 age of fixed assets (t = 2.86, p = 0.00) provides evidence that older fixed 
assets are an influencing factor for companies’ GHG disclosure behaviour.  This 
relationship is also found in 2009 (t = 1.42, p = 0.08).  Both financial performance 
control variables present as significant in 2009 but not in 2007.  In 2009, ROA is 
positive and significant (t = 1.55, p = 0.06) and Tobin’s Q also has these attributes (t = 
2.10, p = 0.02).    From this, it is possible to conclude that in 2009, companies 
performing better financially in terms of accounting and market metrics are inclined to 
disclose better quality GHG emission information voluntarily.  Companies in the GICS 
sector - utilities and GICS sector – financials make better quality disclosures after the 
NGER Act is enacted.  Size is positive and significant in both years (2007: t = 3.18, p = 
0.00; 2009: t = 4.79, p = 0.00), permitting the conjecture that the larger the company, 
the better is its quality of voluntary GHG information.   
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5.5 Summary of Results  
In summary, the 2007 and 2009 voluntary GHG disclosures of ASX-listed 
companies are tested using four models and five statistical techniques.  Models 1 and 2 
test the entire population for 2007 and 2009; Models 3 and 4 are restricted to disclosing 
companies.  The independent and control variables are the same in all models.   
Table  5-2, Table  5-3, Table  5-4, Table  5-5 and Table  5-6 indicate the predicted 
signs of association for the independent and control variables.  Positive signs are 
expected for the forward looking financing proxies associated with information 
asymmetry theory (borrowings next year, and equity issued next year).  Agency theory 
variables, leverage and ownership concentration, are predicted to be positive and 
negative, respectively, reflecting the varying accessibility to additional information by 
these groups.  A negative sign is predicted for the proprietary cost variable, competition.  
The political cost variables associated with GICS membership is expected to be an 
influencing factor, and signs for GICS sector – materials, GICS sector – energy, GICS 
sector – industrials, and GICS sector utilities are forecast as being positive.  Positive 
signs are predicted for the control variables, ROA, Tobin’s Q, audit quality, age of fixed 
assets, foreign listing status, and size.  Models 1 and 2 are discussed first.  Models 3 and 
4 follow. 
Models 1 and 2 are based on the entire population of ASX-listed companies in 
2007 and 2009 and are tested by linear, Tobit and logistic regression.  Support for 
hypothesis 1 is evidenced in Model 1 under multiple regression and under Tobit 
regression for 2007.   Model 2 does not provide any support for this hypothesis.  While 
results are mixed, it is possible that companies make voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
disclosures in their annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports when they seek 
additional debt finance.   
Neither Model 1 nor Model 2 provides support for hypothesis 2, the second 
information asymmetry conjecture.  Equity issued next year is insignificant in all tests. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are represented by agency proxies, leverage and ownership 
concentration.  Leverage is statistically significant and positive only in Model 1 for 
2007 under multiple regression and Tobit regression, and in Model 2 in 2007.  Thus, 
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only limited support is perceptible for the agency theory that debtholders compel 
disclosures of greenhouse gas emission information to enable them to assess potential 
future liabilities.  This result suggests that debtholders avail themselves of information 
from other sources with which to make their lending decisions.  Ownership 
concentration is not statistically significant in this study.  It is concluded, therefore, that 
a company’s shareholding characteristics do not influence voluntary GHG disclosures. 
The proprietary cost hypothesis, Hypothesis 5, is supported Model 1 in 2007 
under the Tobit method of analysis, and in Model 2 in 2007.  Therefore, in 2007 
evidence exists that companies in highly competitive product markets disclose less 
GHG information.   
Political cost theory is represented by Hypotheses 6, which is concerned with the 
climate change-sensitivity of GICS sector membership and its influence on voluntary 
GHG disclosure behaviour.  A positive direction is predicted for GICS sector – 
materials, GICS sector – energy, GICS sector – industrials and GICS sector – utilities.  
Partial support is found for this hypothesis in Model 1 and Model 2.   
The control variables, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Big 4 auditor, age of fixed assets, foreign 
listing status and size have mixed results.  ROA, while statistically significant in Model 
1 (multiple regression and Tobit regression) and in Model 2 in 2009, is consistently of 
the wrong direction. This suggests that voluntary GHG disclosures are made when firms 
are underperforming financially.   
Tobin’s Q, a market-based financial performance variable is uniformly 
statistically significant and positive as predicted.  This evidence permits the conclusion 
to be drawn that voluntary greenhouse gas disclosures in annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports are of relevance to stock market participants.   
Audit quality is only significant and positive as expected in Model 2 for 2007.  
Thus it cannot be concluded that Big 4 auditors are a motivating factor for voluntary 
GHG disclosures. 
Age of fixed assets is found to be statistically significant and positive in Model 1 
for both years when tested with multiple regression, and for 2007 under Tobit 
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regression. Model 2 supports the conjecture in 2007.  This tends to suggest that firms 
with older fixed assets, and thus emitters of more pollution, disclose more.   
Model 1 provides support for the influence on foreign listing status and voluntary 
GHG disclosure for both years under multiple regression, and for 2007 under Tobit 
regression.  Model 2 finds no such support.  Therefore, limited support is in evidence 
for the premise that firms are likely to disclose more voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
information because of overseas listing requirements. 
The size variable is statistically significant in Model 1 (multiple regression and 
Tobin regression) and Model 2 for both years.  The positive statistical significance 
provides support for conjectures that large firms disclose more voluntary greenhouse 
gas emission information.  This is attributed to the costs of providing information being 
lower for larger firms (Clarkson et al., 2008) and also has linkages with political cost 
theory. 
Models 3 and 4 focus on the disclosing companies.  Some 218 companies make 
GHG disclosures in 2007 and 380 companies do so in 2009.  The dependent variable for 
Model 3 is the total GHG disclosure scores of the disclosing companies.  In Model 4 
this variable takes the form of the ratio of hard to total disclosures.  Multiple regression 
is applied to both models.  Independent t-tests reveal significant differences between the 
disclosure metrics for both models.  Limited success is claimed for the specification of 
these models. 
With regard to hypothesis 6, indications are found that membership in climate 
change-sensitive GICS sectors somewhat contributes to each model in both years with 
the exception of 2007 when it has no significance when analysing the hard to total 
disclosures ratio of disclosing companies.  
Age of fixed assets is statistically significant and positive in 2007 and 2009 for 
both models.  This suggests that companies with fixed assets that are older and 
therefore, more likely to have less pollution controls, make disclosures in anticipation of 
the NGER  Act 2007 (Cth) to establish a baseline from which to measure future 
performance.  Indeed, the mean age of fixed assets is .32 in 2007 and falls to .28 in 
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2009, indicating that older fixed assets are replaced around the time the NGER Act 
2007 (Cth) comes into force.  
Foreign listing status is found to influence the disclosing companies’ behaviour 
only in 2009 for Model 3.  The expected influence of size is borne out in both Model 3 
and Model 4.  For each year, size is statistically significant and positive, thus again 
testament to the established fact that large firms have the resources available to permit 
them to disclose additional information. 
5.6  Tests of OLS regression residuals 
 Results of evaluation of normality assumptions led to the winsorisation of 
continuous variables using Tukey’s Hinges methodology53.  Accordingly, equity issued 
next year (upper level only), leverage (upper level only), ownership concentration 
(upper level only), Tobin’s Q (upper level only), size and ROA are truncated as a means 
of reducing the impact of outliers without losing cases.   
Further tests for normality of the regression residuals include the Jaque-Bera test 
and the White test for heteroskedasticity.  Tests of the regression residuals reveal large 
divergences from normality.  As this study is concerned with the population of ASX-
listed companies in 2007 and 2009, non-normality is expected.  
No problematic variables are found in either 2007 or 2009 when testing Models 1, 
3 and 4 for multicollinearity.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) collinearity statistics 
accompanying the regression results reported in Table  5-2, Table  5-5 and Table  5-6 do 
not exceed the accepted ceiling of above 10 (Hair Jnr, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 
1998; Pallant, 2011).     
5.7 Robustness Tests 
Equity issued next year and ownership concentration have no statistical 
significance in any of the four models.  Accordingly, prudence suggests that the 
                                                 
53
 Tukey’s method is a simple way of calculating quartiles.  The formula for calculating Tukey’s 
Hinges is 1.5 times the spread between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 per centiles, deducted from the 25
th
 per centile 
value (added to the 75
th
 per centile value) to set the lower (upper) bounds for data.   
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removal of these two variables is likely to produce better results while bringing more 
parsimony to the models.  Thus Model 5 becomes:   
VD= 0 + 1 Borrowings next year + 2 Leverage + 3 Competition + 4 Industry 
+ 5 ROA + 6 Tobin’s Q + 7 Audit Quality + 8 Age of Fixed Assets + 9 Foreign 
Listing Status + 10 Size + e 
and similar modifications are made to Models 2, 3, and 4. 
Consequently the four models are re-run under linear, Tobit and logistic 
regression techniques.  No improvements are evidenced under any of the tests and so 
results for only linear regression analysis follow in Table  5-7. 
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Table ‎5-7 Model 5 (Linear Regression) 
  2007 2009 
  n = 1776 n = 1853 
  B t Sig* VIF B t Sig* VIF 
Constant  -9.57 -13.01 0.00  -11.95 -14.96 0.00  
Borrowings next year + 0.04 4.93 0.00 1.51 0.03 2.76 0.00 1.39 
Leverage + 0.47 1.88 0.03 1.55 0.17 0.72 0.47 1.46 
Competition - -0.28 -0.92 0.36 1.23 -0.25 -0.74 0.46 1.16 
GICS Sector – Energy + -0.02 -0.07 0.79 1.13 -0.08 -0.39 0.70 1.20 
GICS Sector – Financials  -1.21 -5.73 0.94 1.29 -1.30 -5.76 0.00 1.56 
GICS Sector – Health Care  -1.06 -4.16 0.00 1.43 -1.20 -4.30 0.00 1.37 
GICS Sector – Industrials + -0.74 -3.10 0.00 1.50 -0.44 -1.71 0.09 1.49 
GICS Sector – Information Technology  -0.97 -3.44 0.00 1.34 -0.74 -2.26 0.02 1.29 
GICS Sector – Telecommunication 
Services 
 
-1.37 -2.81 0.01 1.12 -1.43 -2.55 0.01 1.08 
GICS Sector – Utilities + -0.84 -1.71 0.09 1.11 -0.52 -1.01 0.31 1.09 
ROA + -0.41 -2.14 0.03 1.53 -0.68 -2.40 0.02 1.81 
Tobin’s Q + 0.09 2.49 0.00 1.20 0.30 4.13 0.00 1.36 
Audit Quality + -0.10 -0.68 0.50 1.40 -0.14 -0.88 0.38 1.38 
Age of Fixed Assets + 0.96 3.90 0.00 1.35 0.65 2.49 0.00 1.35 
Foreign Listing Status + 0.55 2.87 0.00 1.07 0.44 2.13 0.02 1.08 
Size + 0.58 14.44 0.00 2.36 0.74 16.98 0.00 2.57 
2007: R2 = 0.25; adjusted R2 = 0.25; F = 33.26; p = 0.00 
2009: R2 = 0.27; adjusted R2 = 0.26; F = 37.34 p = 0.00 
Dependent variable = the score of voluntary GHG disclosures based on annual reports and sustainability reports for 
2007 (2009); Borrowings next year = the natural log of proceeds from borrowings in the following year; Leverage = 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Ownership Concentration = the per centage of shares held by those who 
own more than 5 per cent; Competition = the degree of competition in the industry sub-sector calculated as one 
minus the Herfindahl Index; Industry = fixed industry effects  1= if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
consumer discretionary, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - consumer staples, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - energy, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member 
of the GICS sector - financials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - health care, 0 
otherwise; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - industrials, 0 otherwise; 1 = if the company is a 
member of the GICS sector - information technology, 0; 1 = if the company is a member of the GICS sector - 
telecommunication services consumer staples, 0 otherwise; ROA = income before abnormal items at the end of the 
year (either 2007 or 2009) divided by total assets at the end of the previous financial year (either 2006 or 2008); 
Tobin’s Q = the sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock and book value of total debt, all 
divided by book value of total assets; Audit Quality = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals the engagement of a Big 
4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age of Fixed Assets = accumulated depreciation of property plant and equipment divided by 
gross property plant and equipment; Foreign Listing Status = a dichotomous variable where 1 equals a listing on an 
overseas stock exchange in addition to the ASX, 0 otherwise; Size = the natural log of total assets. 
Note:  Two-tailed tests unless a direction is predicted. 
 
 No new support is found for other hypotheses that were not supported by Model 
1.  Model 5 shows the same variables are significant as in non-restricted Model 1.  
Unexpectedly, a very slight weakening of results occurs.  In 2007, Model 5 has an R
2
 of 
25.25 per cent and is significant (p = 0.00).  Results in 2009 are R
2
 26.82 per cent (p = 
0.00).   Table  5-7 shows support for hypothesis 1.  In both years the coefficient for 
borrowings next year is positive as predicted and significant (2007: t = 4.93, p = 0.00; 
2009: t = 2.76, p = 0.00).  It is concluded that companies provide higher quality GHG 
disclosures when they seek additional debt finance.  Support is found in 2007 for 
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hypothesis 3, that companies with higher debt levels provide higher quality voluntary 
GHG emission disclosures.  The leverage variable is positive as predicted, and 
significant (t = 1.88, p = 0.03).   
Partial support is given to hypothesis 6 by the results for both years.  In 2007, the 
partial effects of the GICS sector categorical variable, controlling for the other variables 
in the model, is statistically significant (F Change = 7.11, p = 0.00), thus still implying 
its significance as a predictor.  When referred to the reference group, GICS sector – 
materials, some six GICS sectors have significant, but negative effects.  These are GICS 
sector – consumer discretionary (p = 0.00), GICS sector – health care (p = 0.00), GICS 
sector – industrials (p = 0.00), GICS sector – information technology (p = 0.00), GICS 
sector – telecommunication services (p = 0.01), and GICS sector – utilities (p = 0.09).  
These results suggest that these sectors are inclined to make fewer GHG disclosures 
than GICS sector – materials in 2007.  In 2009, the partial effects of the GICS sector 
categorical variable, controlling for the other variables in the model, is also statistically 
significant (F Change = 6.84, p = 0.00), and implies significance as predictor.  Negative, 
but significant coefficients occurring for GICS sector – consumer discretionary (p = 
0.00), GICS sector – financials (p = 0.00), GICS sector – health care (p = 0.00), GICS 
sector – industrials (p = 0.09), GICS sector – information technology (p = 0.02), and 
GICS sector – telecommunication services (p = 0.01), indicate that these sectors make 
fewer GHG disclosures than GICS sector – materials.  Therefore partial support is 
claimed for hypothesis 6 in 2009. 
In 2007 (2009), the control variable Tobin’s Q is positive and significant (2007: t 
= 2.49, p = 0.00; 2009: t = 4.13, p = 0.00).  These results indicate that voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures are made because stock market participants consider them 
important.   
The age of fixed assets is a determinant for making voluntary GHG disclosures.  
Companies with older fixed assets make voluntary GHG disclosures.  The age of fixed 
assets variable is positive and significant for both years (2007: t = 3.90 p = 0.00; 2009: t 
= 2.49, p = 0.00).  Foreign listing status is found to influence voluntary GHG 
disclosures in both years (2007: t = 2.87, p = 0.00; 2009: t = 2.13, p = 0.02).  Voluntary 
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GHG emission disclosures are positively associated with the size of the disclosing 
corporation as results for this variable are positive and significant (2007: t = 14.44, p = 
0.00; 2009: t = 16.98, p = 0.00).     
5.8 Conclusion  
This study is founded on information asymmetry, agency, political costs and 
proprietary cost theories to identify factors influencing the disclosure of voluntary 
greenhouse gas information by ASX-listed companies in their 2007 and 2009 annual 
and stand-alone sustainability reports.  The population of ASX-listed companies in 2007 
and 2009 is targeted, resulting in 1,776 companies being studied in 2007 and 1,853 in 
2009.   
Results suggest that voluntary greenhouse emission disclosures in ASX-listed 
companies’ annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports are motivated by 
companies that are seeking new debt finance, are more highly leveraged, participate in 
less competitive product-markets, are large, are currently underperforming financially 
but are held in good esteem in the stock market, have older assets and hold additional 
listing status on securities exchanges outside of Australia.  Companies in the GICS 
sector - materials are likely to disclose more than those in GICS sector - consumer 
discretionary, GICS sector - consumer staples, GICS sector - energy, GICS sector - 
financials, GICS sector - health care, GICS sector – industrials, GICS sector - 
information technology or GICS sector - telecommunication services, but the quality of 
GHG emission disclosures improves in GICS sector – utilities and GICS sector – 
financials in 2009. 
This chapter concludes with summary tables.  Table  5-8 summarises the hypotheses 
tested and findings.  Table  5-9 summarises the significance of the control variables 
within each model. 
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Table ‎5-8 Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
Model Hypothesis Test Findings 2007 Findings 2009 
1: Whole Sample 
(VD = Continuous 
variable) 
H1: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.  
Linear Regression Supported Supported 
Tobit Regression Supported Not Supported 
H2: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional equity finance. 
Linear Regression  Not Supported Not Supported 
Tobit Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H3: Companies with higher debt levels 
provide higher quality voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Supported Not Supported 
Tobit Regression Supported Not Supported 
H4: Firms with higher concentrated 
ownership disclose lower quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
Tobit Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive 
product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions 
than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
Tobit Regression Supported Not Supported 
H6:  Companies in climate change-
sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission 
information than those in other GICS 
sectors. 
Linear Regression Supported Supported 
Tobit Regression Supported Not Supported 
2. Whole Sample 
(VD – Categorical 
variable) 
H1: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.  
Logistic 
Regression 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H2: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional equity finance. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H3: Companies with higher debt levels 
provide higher quality voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Supported Not Supported 
H4: Firms with higher concentrated 
ownership disclose lower quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive 
product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions 
than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Supported Not Supported 
H6:  Companies in climate change-
sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission 
information than those in other GICS 
sectors. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Supported Supported 
3. Disclosing Sub-
sample (VD – 
Continuous variable) 
H1: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.  
Linear Regression Supported Not Supported 
H2: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional equity finance. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H3: Companies with higher debt levels 
provide higher quality voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H4: Firms with higher concentrated 
ownership disclose lower quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive 
product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions 
than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H6:  Companies in climate change-
sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission 
information than those in other GICS 
Linear Regression Supported Supported 
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sectors. 
4.  Disclosing Sub-
sample (VD = Ratio 
of hard to total 
disclosures) 
H1: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.  
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H2: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional equity finance. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H3: Companies with higher debt levels 
provide higher quality voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H4: Firms with higher concentrated 
ownership disclose lower quality 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive 
product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions 
than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H6:  Companies in climate change-
sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission 
information than those in other GICS 
sectors. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Supported 
5. Full Sample (DV = 
Continuous variable; 
restricted IVs )  
H1: Companies provide higher quality 
GHG disclosures when they seek 
additional debt finance.  
Linear Regression Supported Supported 
H3: Companies with higher debt levels 
provide higher quality voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures. 
Linear Regression Supported Not Supported 
H5:  Companies in highly competitive 
product markets disclose less 
information relating to GHG emissions 
than those in less competitive product 
markets. 
Linear Regression Not Supported Not Supported 
H6:  Companies in climate change-
sensitive GICS sectors voluntarily 
disclose more GHG emission 
information than those in other GICS 
sectors. 
Linear Regression Supported Supported 
 
Table ‎5-9 Significance of Control Variables 
Model Year ROA Tobin’s‎Q Audit Quality 
Age of Fixed 
Assets 
Foreign Listing 
Status 
Size 
1 (Linear 
Regression) 
2007 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
2009 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
1 (Tobit 
Regression) 
2007 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
2009 Significant Significant Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant 
2  
2007 Not Significant Significant Significant Significant Not Significant Significant 
2009 Significant Significant Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant 
3 
2007 Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant Not Significant Significant 
2009 Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
4 
2007 Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant Not Significant Significant 
2009 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Not Significant Significant 
5 
2007 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
2009 Significant Significant Not Significant Significant Significant Significant 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis concludes with this chapter.  Section  6.2 presents a summary of the 
motivation for this study, research questions and the contribution of the thesis.  Results 
of the tests of hypotheses are summed up in Section  6.3.  Furthermore, Section  6.4 
acknowledges the limitations of the study and the implications for future research are 
presented in Section  6.5.  Conclusions are presented in Section  6.6.  
6.2 Summary of Research Motivation, Research Questions and Contribution 
  Society, concerned by climate change risk, is demanding that companies account 
for their business activities’ adverse impacts on the natural environment (Solomon, 
Solomon, Norton & Joseph, 2011).  In Australia, a governmental response to the climate 
change issue is the enactment of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (Cth).  This legislation and consequential carbon tax proposal have propelled the 
issue of climate change to a prominent position in corporate considerations and 
decision-making.  From 2008, companies exceeding certain GHG and energy threshold 
levels are required to report their greenhouse and energy performance data to the 
relevant Australian government body
54
 responsible for administering carbon emission 
reduction legislation and clean energy usage.  Reported information is made publicly 
available the following year.  Companies are not required to reveal their GHG emission 
management and performance in their annual reports or sustainability reports (Cotter, 
Najah & Wang, 2011).   
This research is motivated by the occurrence of corporate reporting of GHG 
performance and management information in non-mandated settings.  It examines 
statements made about greenhouse gas emission performance and management in 
companies’ annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports for 2007 and 2009.  
                                                 
54
 The Clean Energy Regulator took over this role from the Greenhouse and Energy Data Officer 
on 1
st
 April 2012. 
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Questions arising from this research concern the nature of the disclosures, the reasons 
for the disclosures, and the changes in the disclosures from 2007 to 2009.  
This research applies statements about GHG emissions management and 
performance to an index to determine the nature of disclosures being made in these 
reports.  The index measures the quality of those disclosures by reference to their being 
soft, unverifiable statements, or hard disclosures, where supporting evidence is possible.  
Influential factors considered for the incidence of these disclosures come from 
information asymmetry, agency, political cost and proprietary cost theories.  Examining 
the disclosures from points of time on either side of the enforcement of the NGER Act 
2007 (Cth) establishes how these voluntary disclosures have progressed over this time. 
Ascertaining the content, motivations and progression of voluntary disclosures of 
GHG emission information reveals corporate commitment to the climate change 
agenda.  It also reveals corporate attitude to society’s climate change concerns.  
Establishing the entire population of ASX-listed companies’ 2007 and 2009 voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure practices permits a firm benchmark from which future cross-
sectional and temporal comparisons may be made.  This knowledge is useful for 
stakeholders at all levels of society in their decision-making. 
Given the global context in which companies list their securities, standard-setters 
and policy-makers are able to determine the adequacy of the information currently 
provided and mandate improvements or extensions in the form and content of reports to 
serve their general objectives.  Deeper knowledge of the ecological credentials of 
companies is likely to influence how investors, suppliers, creditors, and lobby groups 
deal in future with those companies.   
This study serves to reduce gaps in the academic and professional communities' 
knowledge about corporate greenhouse gas emission disclosures in voluntary settings.  
This knowledge permits conjectures about corporations’ behaviour towards future 
legislative mandates.  Knowing how voluntary disclosures change pre- and post-NGER 
legislation is beneficial to the understanding of corporate anticipatory and reactive 
behaviour towards reducing the information problem inherent in the company form of 
business structure.   
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6.3 Summary of the Results 
Some 1,776 companies are studied for 2007 and 1,853 for 2009.  These companies 
represent the entire population of ASX-listed companies in those years.  Tests are run 
for 2007 and 2009 separately.  Four models are drawn with which to test this 
population.  Models 1 and 2 test the population in 2007 and 2009.  Linear and Tobit 
regression analysis is applied to Model 1.  The dependent variable in this model is 
continuous and represents each company’s indexed score of disclosures.  Logistic 
regression is used for Model 2.  The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, 
reflecting whether or not companies make GHG disclosures. Models 3 and 4 are subsets 
of the population and represent companies making GHG emission disclosures in their 
annual and stand-alone sustainability reports in either or both 2007 and 2009.  
Dependent variables are index of quality, and the ratio of hard to total disclosures made 
for Model 3 and Model 4 respectively.  Linear regression is the statistical technique 
performed on these latter models.   
Hypotheses 1 and 2, representing information asymmetry theory, test whether 
voluntary GHG disclosures are made when companies seek additional finance in the 
year following the disclosures.  Hypothesis 1 deals with debt finance and hypothesis 2 
makes assertions about the issue of additional equity in the next year.  Support is found 
for hypothesis 1only.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are based on agency theory.  Hypothesis 3 tests the 
relationship between voluntary GHG disclosures and the amount of leverage in 
company capital structure.  Support is observed from linear regression results for 2007 
only.     Hypothesis 4 is concerned with concentration of ownership and tests whether 
disclosures are negatively associated with the level of ownership held by those owning 
more than 5 per cent of ordinary shares.  No support is found. 
Competition influences proprietary costs and is central to hypothesis 5.  This 
hypothesis proposes that voluntary GHG disclosures are negatively related to the level 
of competition in the industry in which the company operates.  Support is found for this 
hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 6 involves political cost theory, and relates to industry membership.  
Results show that GICS sector membership in a climate change-sensitive sector 
contributes to each model in both years.   
ROA, Tobin’s Q, age of fixed assets, foreign listing status, and size are all found 
to be associated with voluntary GHG disclosures.  An opposite result is determined for 
the presence of a Big 4 auditor. 
6.4 Limitations of the Research 
This research seeks to explain the nature and motivations of voluntary reporting 
of greenhouse gas emissions and relies on information asymmetry, agency, political cost 
and proprietary cost theories.  By limiting the scope of this research to these theories, 
the ultimate explanations for corporate motivations and behaviour in reporting their 
greenhouse gas emissions at this point in time and in these particular media may not 
have been fully determined.   
External validity refers to the generalisability of the findings, that is, whether the 
results can be extrapolated to other settings and times (Neuendorf, 2002).  This calls for 
the representativeness of the sample to be examined.  In this case, the sample is the 
entire population of ASX-listed companies in 2007 and 2009 and thus the results are 
applicable to Australia at these times.  However, by limiting this study to Australian-
listed public companies, differences in business, regulatory and capital markets 
environments detracts from the generalisability of the results to corporations in other 
parts of the world.   
This study investigates GHG disclosures in annual reports and sustainability 
reports only.  A large and increasing variety of alternative reporting media is used by 
companies (Adams et al., 1998).  Disclosures in other media may contain different 
information. 
The index used for this study is a modification of one used by Clarkson et al. 
(2008) that mapped back to the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines and that had been 
validated by collaboration with an expert in environmental reporting.  Its validity, 
therefore, is reasonably assured.  Reliability testing of the indexation of the disclosures 
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results in a Krippendorff’s agreement coefficient α, of 84 per cent.  While this is an 
acceptable reliability distribution, there remains 16 per cent to which agreement is not 
reached.  These differences may affect the index scores of the disclosing companies 
ultimately analysed.  Additional coders’ input may have improved reliability but time 
and cost constraints prevented this.  
Estimation techniques used are not prone to small sample size problems as the 
entire population of ASX-listed companies are studied here.  However, a characteristic 
of social and economic data is that “normal distribution is likely to be the exception 
rather than the rule” (Friedman, 1937, p. 675) and therefore the sample’s distributional 
properties violate normality distribution assumptions.  Winsorisation processes 
improved but did not overcome normality violations.  Hence, using the equations 
produced by ordinary least square regression to make inferences outside of the 
population tested is problematic.  
6.5 Implications for Future Research 
Multiple theoretical constructs are used in this research.  These relate to 
information asymmetry, agency, political cost and proprietary cost theories.  This 
selection considers the motivation for voluntary GHG emission disclosures using 
economic, wealth maximisation theories. They consider incentives to disclose based on 
the costs and benefits of doing so.  This narrow approach leaves open the consideration 
of firm corporate image and good corporate citizenship as motivating factors.   Thus, 
opportunities exist to apply socio-political theories to explore the motivations for this 
behaviour.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This final chapter presented a summary of the motivations for the research, the 
questions it sought to answer, and its various contributions.  It summarised the results of 
tests of the hypotheses, the limitations inherent in the study, and suggestions for future 
research.  This thesis is now concluded.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Selected Voluntary Disclosure Studies:  Reporting Media 
Study 
Annual 
Report 
Stand-
alone 
Report 
Corporate 
Web Pages 
Conference 
Call 
Press 
Release 
Corporate 
Brochure 
or 
Newsletter 
Other Sample Studied Findings 
Adams, Hill & 
Roberts (1998) 
       150 firms in France, 
Germany, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the 
U.K for 1992.  
The amount and nature of 
information disclosed varies 
significantly across Europe. 
Corporate social reporting 
patterns are influenced by 
company size, industrial 
grouping and country of 
domicile all influence 
corporate social reporting 
patterns. 
Aerts & Cormier 
(2009) 
       158 U.S. and 
Canadian firms in 
consumer goods and 
services, energy, 
chemicals and drugs, 
industrials, 
information 
technology, Telecom 
and media, mining 
and resources, and 
utilities for 2002. 
Reactive environmental press 
releases and the quality of the 
economic-based segments of 
annual report environmental 
disclosures positively affect 
environment legitimacy.  
Environmental press releases 
are driven by negative media 
legitimacy. 
Banghøj & 
Plenborg (2008) 
       36 Danish industrial 
firms from 1996 to 
2000. 
Association between current 
returns and future earnings 
are not improved by more 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Study 
Annual 
Report 
Stand-
alone 
Report 
Corporate 
Web Pages 
Conference 
Call 
Press 
Release 
Corporate 
Brochure 
or 
Newsletter 
Other Sample Studied Findings 
Bansal & 
Clelland (2004) 
       
News 
articles 
100 U.S. firms in the 
paper, chemicals, 
petroleum, primary 
metals, and 
transportation 
equipment for 1990 
to 1994. 
Environmental legitimacy is 
earned when firms meet 
stakeholders’ expectations of 
environmental performance.  
Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2008) 
       85 Italian-listed 
nonfinancial 
companies for 1999 
to 2001. 
High quality disclosure, 
measured 
multidimensionally, is 
positively associated with 
accuracy of financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Bhojraj, 
Blacconiere & 
D’Souza (2004) 
       
10-K 
filings 
81 U.S. investor-
owned electric utility 
companies for 1996 
and 1997. 
Conflicting disclosure 
incentives exist in multiple-
audience environments. 
Birt, Bilson, 
Smith & Whaley 
(2006) 
       286 Australian Top 
500 companies for 
2001 to 2003. 
Ownership concentration and 
competition interact to 
influence voluntary segment 
disclosures. 
Botosan & 
Plumlee (2002) 
       
Investor 
relations 
668 U.S. firms in 43 
industries for 1986 to 
1996. 
Cost of equity capital 
decreases with the level of 
annual report disclosure, but 
increases with the level of 
timely disclosures. 
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Study 
Annual 
Report 
Stand-
alone 
Report 
Corporate 
Web Pages 
Conference 
Call 
Press 
Release 
Corporate 
Brochure 
or 
Newsletter 
Other Sample Studied Findings 
Bowman & Haire 
(1975) 
       82 U.S. food 
processing firms for 
1973. 
There is a U-shaped 
association between 
corporate responsibility 
activity and profits (medium 
CSR is associated with high 
profits, low and high CSR is 
associated with low profits).  
CSR is evidence of a broad 
management style that 
extends beyond the business 
function to a posture that is 
sensitive to, and deals with, a 
dynamic, multi-dimensional 
environment. 
Brammer & 
Pavelin (2006, 
2008) 
       
PIRC 
Environm
ental 
Reporting 
2000 
survey 
 
News 
media 
reports 
447 large U.K. 
companies for 2000. 
High quality disclosure is 
associated with larger firms 
and those in sectors most 
closely related to 
environmental concerns.  
Media exposure does not 
influence voluntary 
disclosures. 
Brennan, 
Guillamon-Saorin 
& Pierce  (2009) 
     
 
  21 U.K. companies 
for 2000. 
Positive information is 
exaggerated and negative 
information is either ignored 
or underplayed. 
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Broberg, 
Tagesson & 
Collin (2009) 
       199 and 194 Swedish 
companies for 2002 
and 2005 
respectively. 
Agency theory predicts 
voluntary disclosure.  The 
main influences of voluntary 
disclosure are the locus of 
ownership, capital structure 
and industry.  Corporations 
with ownership separated 
from management, with more 
debt and those in the 
manufacturing industry 
disclose more voluntary 
information.  Less voluntary 
information is disclosed 
when there is a large share of 
management ownership.   
Brown (2007)  
 
      All listed entities on 
Port Morseby Stock 
Exchange for 2002. 
No link between 
conventional accounting 
predictors and aggregated 
natural environment 
disclosures, but some 
individual predictors 
explained some individual 
components of natural 
environment disclosures.  
Cahan, Rahman 
& Perera (2005) 
 
 
      216 Fortune’s Global 
500 list for 1998 or 
1999. 
The existence of global 
operations influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure, but 
the extent of global financing 
has no influence. 
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Campbell (2003)  
 
      10 U.K. FTSE 100 
companies for 1974 
to 2000. 
Legitimacy theory is a 
meaningful explicator for 
variability in environmental 
disclosures in U.K. 
companies 
Campbell, 
Shrives & 
Bohnbach-Saager 
(2001) 
 
 
       FTSE 100 companies 
for 1998. 
Mission statements are used 
to signal companies’ attitudes 
to various constituencies, 
many of which are external. 
Cerin (2002)    
 
    337 companies on the 
OM Stockholm 
Exchange in 2000. 
Fewer than 10 of OM 
Stockholm-listed companies 
provide documented 
environmental reports on the 
Internet annually. 
Clarke & Gibson-
Sweet (1999) 
 
 
 
 
     95 Times Top 100 
U.K. companies in 
1997. 
Stand-alone reports are used 
to communicate with a 
variety of stakeholders, while 
annual report disclosures’ 
primary audience is existing 
shareholders. 
Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson & 
Vasvari (2008) 
  
 
 
 
    191 U.S. firms from 
five polluting 
industries in 2003. 
Confirms voluntary 
disclosure theory predictions:  
superior environmental 
performers are more 
informative in truly 
discretional disclosure 
channels. 
Collett & Hrasky 
(2005) 
       299 Australian 
companies for 1994. 
Voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance 
information is positively 
associated with the intention 
to raise equity capital. 
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Cormier & 
Magnan (2003) 
       50  French non-
financial firms for 
1992 to 1997. 
There is a link between 
voluntary corporate 
environmental reporting and 
firm media visibility. 
Cormier & 
Magnan (2007) 
       50  French non-
financial firms for 
1992 to 1997; 
55 German non-
financial firms for 
1992 to 1998; 
118 Canadian non-
financial firms for 
1992 to 1997. 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosure does not 
significantly influence the 
stock market valuation of 
Canadian and French firms’ 
earnings, but does have a 
moderating influence on 
German firms’ earnings.  
Cormier, Aerts, 
Ledoux & 
Magnan (2009) 
   
 
    155 (189) non-
financial Canadian 
companies in 2005 
(2002).  
Efficient governance leads to 
more disclosure about its 
social and human capital. 
Cormier, Magnan 
& Van Velthoven 
(2005) 
       55 large German non-
financial firms for 
1992 to 1998. 
Environmental disclosure is a 
multifaceted phenomenon, 
underpinned by no single 
theoretical framework. 
Quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosure is 
determined by imitation and 
by routine.  
Cowan & 
Gadenne (2005) 
       25 Australian 
companies reporting 
on the National 
Pollutant Inventory 
for 1998 to 2000. 
The voluntary sections of the 
annual reports contain higher 
levels of positive 
environmental disclosures 
than in the statutory sections. 
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Daley, McKinlay 
& Percy (2000) 
       Australian listed 20 
companies that were 
prosecuted by 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
from 1 January 1994 
to 30 June 1998. 
The quantity of 
environmental disclosures is 
influenced by proprietary 
costs and firm size. 
Deegan & 
Gordon  (1996) 
       197 Australian-listed 
companies for 1991, 
25 of which were 
studied for 1980, 
1985, 1988 and 1991. 
Companies report favourable 
environment performance but 
are silent on negative 
performance. Environmental 
disclosures are self-
laudatory. Environmental 
disclosures increase over 
time. 
Deegan & Rankin 
(1996) 
       20 EPA-prosecuted 
Australian companies 
for 1990 to 1993, 
matched with non-
EPA-prosecuted 
Australian 
companies. 
Negative environmental 
performance is not likely to 
be voluntarily disclosed in 
annual reports.  Prosecution 
produces greater positive 
environmental disclosures.  
Australian annual reports are 
similar to those elsewhere, in 
that they are biased in their 
portrayal of corporate 
environmental performance. 
Depoers (2000)        102 non-financial 
listed French 
companies for 1995. 
Managers make strategic 
decisions to disclose 
discretionary information. 
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Deumes & 
Knechel (2008) 
       All non-financial 
listed Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange 
companies for 1997 
to 1999. 
Managers make a conscious 
trade-off between the costs 
and benefits of making 
voluntary disclosures of their 
internal controls. 
Eng & Mak 
(2003) 
       158 firms listed on 
Singapore Stock 
Exchange for 1995.  
Voluntary disclosure is 
affected by ownership 
structure and board 
composition. 
Fekrat, Inclan & 
Petroni (1996) 
       168 major 
international 
companies covering 
18 countries for 1991. 
There is a significant 
variation among disclosures 
across industries and 
countries.  There is no link 
between disclosure and 
environmental performance. 
Firth  (1980)        278 U.K. 
manufacturing firms 
for 1971 to 1973. 
Small companies increase 
voluntary disclosure levels 
significantly when raising 
new stock market finance.  
Larger companies disclose 
more than small companies. 
Firth  (1984)        100 U.K. 
manufacturing firms 
for 1977. 
The amount of disclosure has 
no impact on the level of 
unsystematic risk and 
variance of return. 
Francis, Nanda & 
Olsson  (2008) 
       
Managem
ent 
forecasts 
677 U.S. companies 
for 2001. 
Firms with better earnings 
quality make more voluntary 
disclosures. More voluntary 
disclosure is associated with 
a lower cost of capital. 
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Frost (2007)        71 Australian firms in 
environmentally 
sensitive industries 
for 1998 to 2001. 
More companies are making 
environmental disclosures 
and the level of information 
provided is increasing, 
although the reporting 
approaches vary.  Annual 
reports contain less 
disclosure than stand-alone 
reports. 
Gazoli, How & 
Verhoeven (2002) 
       Australian-listed 
companies for 1998 
to 2000. 
Disclosure of environmental 
information is increasing.  
Companies that disclose 
positive environmental 
information are better stock-
market performers. 
Gibson & Guthrie  
(1995) 
       60 large public and 
private companies, 
and 20 NSW 
government 
departments and 
agencies for 1994. 
Australian environmental 
disclosures are similar in mix 
and type to international 
organisations’ disclosures.   
K. Gibson & 
O’Donovan 
(2007) 
       41 Australian 
companies for 1983 
to 2003. 
Environmental disclosures 
are increasing over time in 
terms of volume of 
information and number of 
disclosing companies. 
R. Gray, Javad, 
Power & Sinclair 
(2001) 
       95 U.K. firms for 
1988 to 1995. 
In the U.K., corporate social 
and environmental disclosure 
is related to corporate 
characteristics of size, profit 
and industry affiliation, but 
those relationships are not 
stable over time. 
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S.J. Gray, Meek 
& Roberts (1995) 
       180 large 
multinational U.S. 
and U.K. industrial 
companies for 1989. 
Participation in international 
capital markets is 
significantly associated with 
additional voluntary 
disclosures.  However, there 
are significant differences in 
disclosure practices between 
internationally listed and 
domestic listed multinational 
companies. 
Hackston & 
Milne (1996) 
       47 large listed New 
Zealand companies. 
Companies make most social 
disclosures on human 
resources, with environment 
and community themes also 
receiving significant 
attention.  Narrative 
information is mostly 
presented, and information 
tends to be positive rather 
than negative.  Size and 
industry are associated with 
the amount of disclosure. 
Ho & Taylor 
(2007) 
       100 large U.S. and 
Japanese companies 
for 2003 to 2004. 
Size determines total TBL 
disclosure.  Japanese firms 
disclose more, with 
environmental disclosures 
being the key driver. 
Holland & Foo 
(2003) 
       37 publicly-listed 
U.K. and U.S. firm in 
chemicals, mining, oil 
and gas, construction 
and power industries 
for 2000. 
More U.K. companies 
produce stand-alone reports 
in comparison to U.S. 
companies. Motivations for 
environmental disclosures 
differ between U.S. and U.K. 
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Hossain,  Perera 
& Rahman (1995) 
       55 listed New 
Zealand companies 
for 1991. 
Firm size, leverage and 
foreign listing are statistically 
related to the level of 
financial information 
voluntarily disclosed.  Firm 
size determines levels of 
disclosure. 
Hutton, Miller & 
Skinner (2003) 
       
Managem
ent 
earnings 
forecasts 
147 publicly-listed 
firms for 1993 to 
1997. 
Positive forecasts are 
supplemented with verifiable 
forward-looking statements, 
but negative forecasts are 
accompanied by “soft talk” 
disclosures.  Bad news 
forecasts are always 
informative but good news 
forecasts require supplements 
of verifiable forward-looking 
statements information to be 
informative. 
Jantadej & Kent 
(1999) 
 
 
      1 Australian company 
(BHP) for 1992 to 
1996. 
BHP increased its 
environmental disclosures to 
reduce its exposure to the 
social, legal and political 
environments following the 
Ok Tedi copper mine 
disaster. 
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Jones (2007)  
 
   
 
   
Not 
disclosed 
119 R&D-intensive 
firms in chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, 
machinery and 
computer hardware, 
electrical and 
electronics, and 
scientific instruments 
industries in United 
States for 1997. 
Firms disclose a variety of 
information about all stages 
of R&D activity.  Firms 
disclose less when the 
proprietary costs of 
disclosure are higher. Firms 
with a lower book-to-market 
ratio provide more detailed 
information about R&D-
related activities. 
Kolk & Perego 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    212 Fortune Global 
250 companies for 
1999, 2002 and 2005 
European and Japanese 
companies are most likely to 
provide verified 
sustainability reports, the 
provision of which is more 
likely in companies in more 
stakeholder-oriented 
countries and with weaker 
governance enforcement 
regime. 
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Lee (2007)  
 
      829 East Asian 
companies for 2002 
and 2003. 
Corporate voluntary 
disclosure is negatively 
associated with the 
separation of cash flow rights 
from control rights. Large 
non-management 
shareholding mitigates 
agency problems associated 
with the separation of 
ownership and control.  
Firms with high agency costs 
and greater external 
financing needs have more 
incentives to undertake 
higher firm-level voluntary 
disclosures. 
Lightstone & 
Driscoll (2008) 
 
 
    
 
  13 Canadian public 
companies that 
received cease-
trading orders in 2004 
or 2005 
High-risk companies attempt 
to manage legitimacy by 
selectively releasing 
information and by using 
ambiguous language.  
Managers will use symbolic 
language to distort or conceal 
negative organisational 
outcomes. 
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Lim, Matolcsy & 
Chow (2007) 
 
 
      181 Australian 
companies in 2001. 
There is a positive 
association between board 
composition and voluntary 
disclosure.  Independent 
boards provide more 
voluntary disclosure of 
forward looking and strategic 
information but board 
structure does not influence 
voluntary disclosure of non-
financial and historical 
financial information. 
Magness (2006)  
 
    
 
  44 Canadian public 
gold-mining 
companies with 
mining accidents in 
1995. 
Environmental disclosure 
increases with company size, 
intention to access external 
financial markets, and an 
active strategy of stakeholder 
management through press 
releases. 
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Meek, Roberts & 
Gray (1995) 
 
 
      226 internationally- 
and domestically-
listed multinational 
companies for 1989. 
Continental European 
multinational companies 
voluntarily disclose more 
strategic information than 
U.S. or U.K. companies.  The 
largest multinational 
companies set the trend in 
providing voluntary 
disclosures of nonfinancial 
and financial information.  
Industry patterns exist for 
voluntary nonfinancial and 
financial information.  All 
multinational companies 
provide more information in 
their annual reports than is 
regulated. 
Niskanen & 
Nieminen (2001) 
 
 
      27 Finnish listed 
companies for which 
environmental news 
items were published 
for 1985 to 1996. 
Negative events are unlikely 
to be reported in annual 
reports. 
Patten (1991)        128 listed Fortune 
500 firms for 1985. 
Profitability variables do not 
explain the level of voluntary 
social disclosures, but size 
and industry classification 
do. 
Peck & Sinding 
(2003) 
   
 
    30 companies from 
Australia, Canada, 
South Africa and U.S. 
in the mining industry 
for 1998 to mid-2000. 
Resource dependency or 
institutional pressures 
influence leading mining 
groups’ reporting decision. 
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Pollach, Scharl & 
Weichselbraun 
(2009) 
   
 
    989 corporate 
websites of 
companies included 
in the 2004 edition of  
Fortune 1000. 
Companies avoid negative 
information about waste 
management in 
environmental 
communication. 
Raar (2006)  
 
      187 Australian firms 
for 1998 to 2002. 
Based on the categories of 
the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), the annual 
report does not provide 
reliable information on 
sustainability issues and does 
not necessarily link financial 
measurement with 
environmental or social 
performance. 
Skinner (1994)      
 
  93 NASDAQ 
National Market 
System firms for 
1981 to 1990. 
Managers face an 
asymmetric loss function in 
choosing their voluntary 
disclosure policies due to 
U.S. securities laws (and so 
pre-empt large negative 
earnings surprises by 
voluntarily disclosing that 
information early) and 
because of the effect on 
relations with the investment 
community. 
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Toms (2002)        89 (126) U.K.  firms 
rated as “Britain’s 
Most Admired 
Companies” for 1996 
(1997). 
Environmental reputation is 
enhanced with 
implementation, monitoring 
and disclosure of 
environmental policies in 
annual reports.  Diverse 
institutional share ownership 
and low systematic risk are 
associated with positive 
environmental reputation. 
Trotman & 
Bradley (1981) 
       207 Australian-listed 
companies for 1978. 
Managerial decision-horizon, 
size and extent of company-
perceived social pressure 
influence the amount of 
voluntary social disclosure. 
Vormedal & 
Ruud (2009) 
       98 largest Norwegian 
companies for 2004. 
While the number of firms 
issuing separate reports is 
low, the quality of reporting 
is higher in separate reports. 
90 of companies do not 
comply with environmental 
reporting laws, and voluntary 
reporting is less than 
satisfactory. 
Wahyuni, Rankin 
& Windsor 
(2009) 
       271 ASX300 
Australian listed 
companies for 2007. 
34.3 of firms make GHG 
emission disclosures, 
preferring the annual report 
above any other media. 
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Zéghal & Ahmed 
(1990) 
       
Advertise
ments 
15 large Canadian 
firms in banking and 
petroleum industries 
for 1981 and 1982. 
A company’s operations 
determine the information 
content and form of social 
information disclosure, and 
different media are used to 
communicate to different 
audiences.  
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Appendix B. Disclosing Companies and Disclosure Media 
  
2007 Annual 
Report 
2007 
Sustainability 
Report 
2009 Annual 
Report 
2009 
Sustainability 
Report 
AAC Australian Agricultural Company Limited   X  
AAD Ardent Leisure Group   X  
AAE Agri Energy Limited X    
AAI Alcoa Inc X X X X 
AAX Ausenco Limited   X  
ABC Adelaide Brighton Limited X  X  
ABU ABM Resources NL   X  
ABY Aditya Birla Minerals Limited   X  
ACE Advanced Engine Components Limited X  X  
ACS Accent Resources NL   X  
ACZ Atticus Resources Limited   X  
AEF Australian Ethical Investment Limited X X X X 
AEJ Redbank Energy Limited X  X  
AEO Austereo Group Limited X    
AFG Allco Finance Group Limited  X    
AFI Australian Foundation Investment Company X    
AFR African Energy Resources   X  
AFT Aft Corporation Limited X    
AGG Anglogold Ashanti Limited X    
AGK AGL Energy Limited X X X  
AHE Automotive Holdings Group Limited X  X  
AIA Auckland Airport   X  
AIO Asciano Limited   X  
AIW Australian-American Mining Corporation Limited X    
AIX Australian Infrastructure Fund X  X  
AIZ Air New Zealand X    
AJL AJ Lucas Group Limited X  X  
AKF Ask Funding Limited   X  
AKI African Iron Limited   X  
ALL Aristocrat Leisure Limited   X  
ALZ Australand Holdings Limited X    
AMC Amcor Limited X X X X 
AMP AMP X  X  
AMU Amadeus Energy Limited   X  
AND Andean Resources   X  
ANN Ansell X    
ANZ ANZ X X X X 
AOE Arrow Energy X  X  
AOH Altona Mining Limited   X  
APA APA Group X  X  
API Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Limited   X  
APK Australian Power & Gas Limited   X  
AQP Aquarius Platinum Limited   X  
ARQ Arc Energy Limited X    
ARU Arafura Resources Limited   X  
ARW Australian Renewable Fuels Limited   X  
ASB Austal   X  
ASL Ausdrill Limited X    
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ASX ASX Limited X  X  
ATM Antam X    
AUQ Alara Resources Limited   X  
AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Limited   X  
AVA Aviva  Corporation Limited X  X  
AVG Australian Vintage Limited   X  
AVM Anvil Mining Limited X X   
AWC Alumina Limited   X  
AWE AWE Limited X X X  
AXA AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Limited X  X  
AXI Axiom Properties Limited X    
AXM Apex Minerals NL   X  
AZM Azumah Resources Limited   X  
AZS Azure Minerals Limited   X  
BAU Bauxite Resources Limited   X  
BBG Billabong International Limited X  X  
BEC Becton Property Group Limited X    
BEI Babcock & Brown Environmental Investments X    
BEL Bentley Capital Limited   X  
BEN Bendigo And Adelaide Bank Limited X  X  
BGD Boulder Steel Limited   X  
BHP BHP Billiton Limited X X X X 
BIS Bisalloy Steel Group   X  
BKL Blackmores Limited X  X  
BKN Bradken Limited   X  
BKW Brickworks Limited X  X  
BLD Boral Limited   X X 
BLE Blue Ensign Technologies Limited X    
BLK Blackham Resources Limited   X  
BNB Babcock & Brown X    
BNV Brand New Vintage Limited   X  
BOE Boss Energy Limited   X  
BPT Beach Petroleum Limited   X  
BSE Base Iron Limited   X  
BSL Bluescope Steel Limited X  X  
BTT BT Investment Management Limited   X  
BVA Bravura Solutions Limited   X  
BWD Blackwood Corporation Limited  X    
BWP BWP Trust   X  
BXB Brambles Limited X  X X 
BYR Burey Gold Limited   X  
CAA Capral Limited   X  
CAB Cabcharge X  X  
CBA Commonwealth Bank Of Australia X   X 
CBD CBD Energy Limited X    
CBH CBH Resources Limited   X  
CBQ Coalbank Limited   X  
CBR Constellation Brands, Inc X  X  
CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Limited X  X X 
CDP Carindale Property Trust X  X  
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CDT Castle Minerals Limited   X  
CEL Challenger Energy Limited   X  
CES Coal Fe Resources Limited   X  
CEU ConnectEast Group X  X  
CEY Centennial Coal Company Limited X  X  
CFU Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited   X  
CFX CFS Retail Property Trust X  X  
CGV Clean Global Energy Limited   X  
CHR Chalmers Limited   X  
CII CI Resources Limited   X  
CLH Collection House Limited   X  
CLK Cypress Lakes Group Limited   X  
CLQ Clean Teq Holdings Limited   X  
CNA Coal & Allied Industries Limited X  X  
CNB CIC Australia Limited X  X  
CNN Cardia Bioplastics Limited   X  
CNP Centro Properties Group X    
CNX Carbon Energy Limited   X  
COH Cochlear Limited X    
COZ Co2 Group Limited X  X  
CPA Commonwealth Property Office Fund X X X  
CPB Campbell Brothers Limited X  X  
CPI CPI Group   X  
CPU Computershare Limited   X  
CPZ Car Parking Technologies Limited   X  
CQO Charter Hall Office REIQ X  X  
CQR Macquarie Countrywide Management Limited   X  
CRG Crane Group X  X  
CSL CSL Limited   X  
CSR CSR Limited X  X X 
CTO Citigold Corporation Limited   X  
CTX Caltex Australia Limited X  X  
CUS Customers Limited   X  
CVC CVC Limited X    
CVY Coventry Resources Limited   X  
CWE Carnegie Wave Energy Limited X  X  
CWN Crown Limited   X X 
CWP Cedar Woods Properties Limited X   X 
CXC Couer D'alene Mines Corporation   X  
CXH Compass Hotel Goup   X  
CXM Centrex Metals Limited X    
CXP Corporate Express X  X X 
CXU Cauldron Energy Limited   X  
CYG Coventry Group Limited   X  
DDD 3D Resources Limited   X  
DEX Dexion Limited   X  
DIO Dioro Exploration NL   X  
DJS David Jones Limited X  X  
DMA Dynasty Metals Australia Limited X    
DMP Domino’s Pizza Enterprises Limited   X  
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DMX Dolomatrix International Limited   X  
DOW Downer EDI   X X 
DTL Data#3 Limited   X  
DTM Dart Mining NL   X  
DUE Duet Investment Holding Limited   X  
DXL Dyno Nobel Limited X    
DXS Dexus Property Group  X    
DYE Dyesol Limited X  X X 
EAR Echo Resources Limited   X  
EDS Every Day Mine Services Limited   X  
EER East Energy Resources Limited   X  
EGL The Environmental Group Limited X    
EGN Coote Industrial   X    
ELD Elders Limited  X    
EME Energy Metals Limited   X  
ENB Eneabba Gas Limited X  X  
ENE Energy Developments Limited X  X  
ENL Eagle Nickel Limited   X  
ENV Envestra Limited X  X  
EPX Ethane Pipeline Income Fund   X  
ERA Energy Resources of Australia Limited X X X  
ERJ Enerji Limited   X  
ESG Eastern Star Gas Limited X    
EVE Energy Ventures Limited   X  
EXG Excelsior Gold Limited   X  
EZL Euroz Limited   X  
FBU Fletcher Building X  X  
FEA Forest Enterprises Australia Limited X  X X 
FGL Foster’s Group Limited X X X X 
FKP FKP X  X  
FLX Felix Resources X  X  
FMG Fortescue Metals Group Limited   X X 
FNT Frontier Resources Limited   X  
FPH Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Corporation Limited   X  
FPS Fiducian Portfolio Services Limited   X  
FRR Frigrite Limited X    
FXJ Fairfax Media Limited X  X  
FXL Flexigroup Limited X    
GAU Great Australian Resources Limited   X  
GCL Gloucester Coal Limited   X  
GCS Global Construction Services Limited   X  
GDN Golden State Resources Limited   X  
GDY Geodynamics Limited   X  
GFF Goodman Fielder X  X  
GGE Grand Gulf Energy Limited   X  
GGG Greenland Minerals And Energy Limited   X  
GLE GLG Corporation   X  
GMD Genesis Minerals Limited   X  
GMG Goodman Group   X  
GNB Greenbox Group Limited  X  X  
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GNC Graincorp Limited   X  
GNI Global Nickel Investments Limited   X  
GNS Gunns Limited X  X  
GOG Great Artesian Oil And Gas Limited X    
GPT GPT Management Holdings Limited   X  
GRB Gage Roads Brewing Co Limited   X  
GRK Green Rock Energy Limited X    
GRR Grange Resources Limited   X  
GRV Greenvale Mining NL   X  
GRY Gryphon Minerals Limited   X  
GTE Great Western Exploration Limited   X  
GTP Great Southern Limited X    
GUD GUD Holdings X    
GUN Gunson Resources Limited   X  
GWA GWA Group Limited  X  X  
GXY Galaxy Resources Limited   X  
HAZ Hazelwood Resources Limited   X  
HDF Hastings Diversified Utilities Fund   X  
HGG Henderson Group Plc X  X  
HGO Hillgrove Resources Limited X    
HHM Hampton Hill Mining NL   X  
HIL Hills Industries Limited   X  
HRR Heron Resources Limited   X  
HST Hastie Group Limited   X  
HTA Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Limited   X  
HUM Humanis Group Limited   X  
HZL Healthzone Limited   X  
HZN Horizon Oil Limited   X  
IAG Insurance Australia Group Limited X X X  
ICL Straits Resources Limited  X    
ICN Icon Energy Limited   X  
IDG Indago Resources Limited   X  
IDL Industrea Limited   X  
IDO Indo Mines Limited X    
IFE Ironclad Mining Limited   X  
IFN Infigen Energy Re Limited  X  X  
IGO Independence Group NL   X  
IOF Investa Office Fund X  X  
IPL Incitec Pivot X X X  
IPT Impact Minerals Limited   X  
IRD Iron Road Limited   X  
IRM Iron Mountain Mining Limited   X  
ISL Intelligent Solar Limited  X  X  
ITO Intoll Group   X  
IVC Invocare Limited X  X  
IVR Investigator Resources Limited   X  
JAT Jatenergy Limited   X  
JBH JB Hi-Fi Limited   X  
JHX James Hardie X  X X 
JRL Jindalee Resources Limited   X  
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KAR Karoon Gas Australia Limited   X  
KAS Kasbah Resources Limited   X  
KCN Kingsgate Consolidated Limited X  X  
KEN Kuth Energy Limited   X  
KEY Key Petroleum Limited   X  
KOG Kilgore Oil & Gas Limited   X  
KRS Kresta Holdings Limited    X  
KSC K&S Corporation Limited X    
KZL Kagara Zinc Limited X    
LBY Liberty Resources Limited   X  
LEI Leighton Holdings Limited X X X X 
LGL Lihir Gold Limited X  X X 
LLA Living And Leisure Australia Group   X  
LLC Lend Lease Corporation X  X  
LNC Linc Energy Limited X  X  
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas Limited X    
LNN Lion Merchant Limited X    
LYC Lynas Corporation Limited X  X  
LYL Lycopodium Limited X    
MAH Macmahon Holdings Limited X    
MAP MAp Group X  X  
MAS Mesa Minerals Limited X  X  
MBT Mission Newenergy Limited X  X  
MCC Macarthur Coal Limited X  X  
MCG Macquarie Communications Infrastructure Group X    
MCP Mcpherson’s Limited   X  
MCQ Macquarie Capital Alliance Group X    
MDA Modena Resources Limited   X  
MDL Mineral Deposits Limited   X  
MDX Mindax Limited   X  
MEL Metgasco Limited X  X  
MEY Marenica Energy Limited   X  
MGR Mirvac Group Limited X X X X 
MIX Mirvac Industrial Trust X  X  
MLB Melbourne IT Limited X    
MLM Metallica Minerals   X  
MND Monadelphous Group Limited   X  
MNM Mantle Mining Corporation Limted   X  
MQG Macquarie Group Limited X  X  
MRC Mineral Commodities Limited   X  
MRI MRI Holdings Limited   X  
MRZ Mirvac Real Estate Investment Trust X  X  
MSF The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited   X  
MTN Marathon Resources Limited   X  
MTS Metcash Limited X  X  
NAB National Australia Bank X X X X 
NCM Newcrest Mining Limited X  X X 
NEN Neon Energy Limited   X  
NFE Northern Iron Limited   X  
NFK Norfolk Group Limited   X  
 197 
  
2007 Annual 
Report 
2007 
Sustainability 
Report 
2009 Annual 
Report 
2009 
Sustainability 
Report 
NFL Natural Fuel Limited X    
NGF Norton Gold Fields Limited   X  
NHC New Hope Corporation Limited X  X  
NHF Nib Holdings Limited   X  
NHR National Hire Group Limited   X  
NOD Nomad Building Solutions Limited   X  
NPX Nuplex Industries Limited X  X  
NRU Newera Uranium Limited   X  
NWS News Corporation X  X  
NXS Nexus Energy Limited   X  
ODN Odin Energy Limited   X  
OEL Otto Energy Limited   X  
OEQ Orion Equities Limited   X  
OGC Oceanagold Corporation X  X X 
OGL Overseas & General Limited X    
ORG Origin Energy Limited X X X X 
ORI Orica Limited X X X X 
OSH Oil Search Limited   X  
OST Onesteel Limited X  X  
OZL Oz Minerals Limited X  X X 
PAN Panoramic Resources Limited   X  
PAX Panax Geothermal Limited   X  
PBB Pacifica Group Limited X    
PBD Port Bouvard Limited   X  
PBG Pacific Brands Limited X  X  
PDN Paladin Energy Limited X  X  
PEH Pacific Environment Limited   X  
PEM Perilya Limited X  X  
PEX Peel Exploration Limited   X  
PFL Patties Foods Limited   X  
PGA Photon Group X    
PHG Pulse Health Limited   X  
PHI Phileo Australia Limited   X  
PIR Papillon Resources Limited   X  
PMP PMP Limited X  X X 
PNA PanAust Limited  X X X 
PNN Pepinnini Minerals Limited   X  
PNR Pacific Niugini Limited   X  
PPC Peel Limited X  X  
PPT Perpetual Limited X  X  
PPX Paperlinx Limited X X X X 
PRW Proto Resources & Investments Limited    X  
PSH Penrice Soda Holdings Limited X  X  
PTM Platinum Asset Management Limited X    
PUN Pegasus Metals Limited   X  
QAN Qantas Airways Limited X X X X 
QBE QBE Insurance Group Limited X  X  
QMG Quay Magnesium Limited X    
QTM Quantum Energy Limited X    
QUE Queste Communications Limited   X  
 198 
  
2007 Annual 
Report 
2007 
Sustainability 
Report 
2009 Annual 
Report 
2009 
Sustainability 
Report 
QXQ Q Limited X    
RCR RCR Tomlinson Limited   X  
REX Regional Express Holdings Limited   X  
RFL Rubik Financial Limited   X  
RHC Ramsay Health Care Limited X    
RHD Ross Human Directions Limited X    
RHI Red Hill Iron Limited   X  
RHL Ruralco Holdings Limited   X  
RIC Ridley Corporation Limited X  X  
RIN Rinker Group Limited X    
RIO Rio Tinto X X X X 
RIV Riversdale Mining Limited X    
RMP Red Emperor Resources NL   X  
RND Rand Mining NL   X  
RNI Resource & Investment NL   X  
ROC Roc Oil Company Limited   X X 
ROG Red Sky Energy Limited   X  
RRS Range Resources Limited   X  
RSG Resolute Mining Limited   X  
RSP Resource Pacific Holdings Limited X    
RUL Runge Limited   X  
RVR Red River Resources Limited   X  
SAF Safe Effect Technologies Limited  X    
SAQ Sydney Attractions Group Limited X    
SBM St Barbara Limited X  X  
SCD Scantech Limited X  X  
SDM Sedgman Limited X    
SEK Seek Limited   X  
SFC Schaffer Corporation Limited   X  
SFH Specialty Fashion Group Limited   X  
SFR Sandfire Resources NL   X  
SFZ South American Ferro Metals Limited   X  
SGL Sydney Gas Limited X    
SGM Sims Metal Management Limited X  X  
SGP Stockland X  X X 
SHL Sonic Healthcare Limited   X  
SHX Shield Mining Limited   X  
SIP Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited X    
SKE Skilled Group   X  
SLA Solagran Limited   X  
SLM Salmat Limited X    
SLX Silex Systems Limited X  X  
SMC Strategic Minerals Corporation NL   X  
SMX SMS Management & Technology Limited   X  
SOL Washington H. Soul Pattinson & Company Limited   X  
SPH Sphere Minerals Limited   X  
SPN SP Ausnet   X X 
SPT Spotless Group Limited X  X  
SRA Strathfield Group Limited X    
SRK Strike Resources Limited   X  
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SRV Servcorp Limited   X  
SST Steamships Trading Company Limited X    
STG Staging Connections Group Limited   X  
STO Santos Limited X X X X 
STU Stuart Petroleum Limited X  X  
STX Strike Energy Limited X    
SUN Suncorp-Metway Limited X  X  
SUR Sun Resources NL   X  
SWM Seven West Media Limited   X  
SWN Silver Swan Group Limited   X  
SXL Southern Cross Media Group Limited   X  
SYP Style Limited   X  
SYS Syngas Limited   X  
TAH Tabcorp Holdings Limited X    
TAL Tower Australia Group Limited X  X  
TAM Tanami Gold NL   X  
TAP Tap Oil Limited   X  
TAW Tawana Resources N. L. X  X  
TBG Tutt Bryant Group Limited   X  
TBR Tribune Resources NL   X  
TCL Transurban Group X X X X 
TCN Techniche Limited   X  
TCQ Trinity Group   X  
TEL Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited X  X  
TEN Ten Network Holdings Limited   X  
TGR Tassal Group Limited   X  
TIM Timbercorp Limited X    
TKL Traka Resources Limited   X  
TLS Telstra Corporation Limited X  X  
TMR Tamaya Resources X    
TMX Terrain Minerals Limited   X  
TNE Technology One Limited   X  
TOE Toro Energy Limited   X  
TOL Toll Holdings Limited X  X  
TOX Tox Free Solutions Limited   X  
TPI Transpacific Industries Group Limited   X  
TRF Trafford Resources Limited   X  
TSE Transfield Services Limited X X X X 
TSI TSI International Limited   X  
TTS Tatts Group Limited   X  
UGL UGL Limited   X  
UOG United Orogen Limited   X  
UXA UXA Resources Limited  X  X  
UXC UXC Limited X  X  
VBA Virgin Blue Holdings Limited X  X  
VOR Voyager Resources Limited X    
VPG Valad Property Group   X  
VRL Village Roadshow Limited   X  
WAS Wasabi Energy Limited   X  
WBC Westpac Banking Corporation X X X X 
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WCB Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory Co Holdings  X  X  
WCL Westside Corporation Limited   X  
WDC Westfield Group X  X X 
WDS WDS Limited X  X  
WEC White Energy Company Limited X  X  
WES Wesfarmers Limited X X X X 
WFL Willmott Forests Limited   X  
WGP Westralian Gas & Power Limited X    
WHC Whitehaven Coal Limited   X  
WHE Wildhorse Energy Limited X    
WHS The Warehouse Group Limited X  X  
WOR Worleyparsons Limited X  X  
WOW Woolworths Limited X  X X 
WPG WPG Resources Limited   X  
WPL Woodside Petroleum Limited X  X  
WTP Watpac Limited   X  
WWG World Wide Entertainment Group Limited   X  
WWW Whinnen Resources Limited   X  
WYL Wattyl Limited X    
XRF XRF Scientific Limited   X  
YBR Yellow Brick Road Holdings Limited   X  
ZFX Zinifex Limited X    
ZIM Zimplats Holdings Limited X    
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Appendix C. Coding Instructions 
 
Coding Instructions for Content Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Disclosures 
The objective of this research is to investigate voluntary disclosures made by 
Australian listed companies concerning their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) for the years 
2007 and 2009.   Companies making GHG disclosures have already been identified by 
electronically-searching their corporate PDF reports using key terms.  Segments of text 
containing information relevant to the study have been saved in Excel worksheets.  There are 
separate worksheets for each company, saved in files according to year and the type of report.   
The text is to be coded according to whether it matches items of information listed in the 
attached index. 
You have been provided with four Excel files containing a sample of the companies’ 
disclosures and an Excel file containing four worksheets for recording the index matches for 
each company’s disclosure.  There is a file for the type of report and year of report. The 
sample companies’ disclosures, numbered from 1 to 266, are listed at the end of these 
instructions.  The PDFs for each company report are also supplied. 
Coding Instructions for Content Analysis of GHG Disclosures: 
 The following guidelines apply. 
 Familiarise yourself with the information on the attached sheets. 
 For the purposes of this content analysis “disclosure” refers to any sentence, 
phrase, paragraph, table or graph. 
 All disclosures must be explicitly stated, they cannot be implied. 
 Identify entries in the company’s worksheet that match with an index item.  
Only one match is to be recorded per item regardless of the number of times 
examples of the items appear. 
 Tables, graphs or narrative statements of performance data which match 
multiple items in section A3 should be classed accordingly to each item. 
 Note the index item code beside the corresponding text in the Excel file. 
 Record a number 1 in the Excel file (GHG Indexes Reliability Sampling) 
against the relevant index item. 
 Save all files regularly. 
 
Note that the companies’ disclosure worksheets represent GHG information from a 
random sample drawn from all GHG disclosing companies for each year.  Disclosures of 
interest are not necessarily made by each company in each type of report used in this study.  
Hence, the annual report or sustainability report might not contain information that matches 
to any index items. 
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Appendix D. Sample Companies for Reliability Assessment 
No. Report 
ASX 
Code 
Company 
1 2007 AR ACE Advanced Engine Components Limited 
2 2007 AR AEO Austereo Group Limited 
3 2007 AR AFG Allco Finance Group Limited  
4 2007 AR AFT AFT Corporation Ltd 
5 2007 AR AIX Australian Infrastructure Fund 
6 2007 AR ANN Ansell 
7 2007 AR AOE Arrow Energy 
8 2007 AR ARW Australian Renewable Fuels Limited  
9 2007 AR ASL Ausdrill Limited 
10 2007 AR AVA Aviva Corporation LTD 
11 2007 AR AWE AWE Ltd 
12 2007 AR AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Limited 
13 2007 AR BEC Becton Property Group Ltd 
14 2007 AR BHP BHP Billiton Limited 
15 2007 AR BKW Brickworks Limited And Controlled Entities 
16 2007 AR BSL Bluescope Steel Limited 
17 2007 AR BUL Blue Energy Limited 
18 2007 AR BWD Matilda Minerals Ltd  
19 2007 AR CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
20 2007 AR CBR Constellation Brands, Inc 
21 2007 AR CEY Centennial Coal Company Ltd 
22 2007 AR CNB Canberra Investment Corporation Limited 
23 2007 AR CQO Macquarie Office Trust  
24 2007 AR CSR CSR Ltd 
25 2007 AR CTX Caltex Australia Limited 
26 2007 AR CVC CVC Limited 
27 2007 AR DJS David Jones 
28 2007 AR DMA Dynasty Metals Australia Limited 
29 2007 AR DXL Dyno Nobel Limited 
30 2007 AR DXS DbRreef Trust  
31 2007 AR DYE Dyesol Limited 
32 2007 AR EGL The Environmental Group Limited 
33 2007 AR EGN Coote Industrial   
34 2007 AR ENB Eneabba Gas Limited 
35 2007 AR ENE Energy Developments Limited 
36 2007 AR ERA ERA 
37 2007 AR FEA FEA Group Companies 
38 2007 AR FGL Fosters Group 
39 2007 AR FXL FlexiGroup Limited 
40 2007 AR GNB Jackgreen Limited  
41 2007 AR GOG Great Artesian Oil and Gas Limited 
42 2007 AR GTP Great Southern Limited 
43 2007 AR GWT GWA International Limited  
44 2007 AR HGO Hillgrove Resources Limited 
45 2007 AR IAG Insurance Australia Group Limited 
46 2007 AR IPL Incitec Pivot 
47 2007 AR JHX James Hardie 
48 2007 AR KSC K & S Corporation Limited 
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49 2007 AR KZL Kagara Zinc Ltd 
50 2007 AR LGL Lihir Gold Limited 
51 2007 AR LNC Linc Energy Limited 
52 2007 AR LNN Lion Merchant Limited 
53 2007 AR MAH Macmahon 
54 2007 AR MBT Mission Biofuels Limited 
55 2007 AR MCQ Macquarie Capital Alliance Group 
56 2007 AR MQG Macquarie Bank 
57 2007 AR MRZ Mirvac Real Estate Investment Trust 
58 2007 AR MTS Metcash Limited 
59 2007 AR NAB National Australia Bank 
60 2007 AR NWS News Corporation 
61 2007 AR PMP PMP Ltd 
62 2007 AR PNA PanAustralia 
63 2007 AR PPC Peel Ltd 
64 2007 AR PPT Perpetual Ltd 
65 2007 AR PSH Penrice Soda Holdings Ltd 
66 2007 AR QBE QBE Insurance Group Ltd 
67 2007 AR QXQ Q Ltd 
68 2007 AR RIC Ridley Corporation Ltd 
69 2007 AR RIO Rio Tinto 
70 2007 AR RIV Riversdale Mining Ltd 
71 2007 AR SBM St Barbara Ltd 
72 2007 AR SGL Sydney Gas 
73 2007 AR SIP Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited 
74 2007 AR SLX Silex Systems Ltd 
75 2007 AR SRA Strathfield Group Ltd 
76 2007 AR STU Stuart Petroleum Ltd 
77 2007 AR TAH Tabcorp 
78 2007 AR TLS Telstra Corporation Ltd 
79 2007 AR TMR Tamaya Resources 
80 2007 AR TOL Toll 
81 2007 AR UXC UXC Ltd 
82 2007 AR VBA Virgin Blue Group 
83 2007 AR WDC The Westfield Group 
84 2007 AR WDS Walter Diversified Services Limited 
85 2007 AR WEC White Energy Company Limited 
86 2007 AR WGP Westralian Gas & Power Ltd 
87 2007 AR WHE Wildhorse Energy Limited 
88 2007 AR WOT Westpac Office Trust 
89 2007 AR WOW Woolworths Ltd 
90 2007 SR AEF Australian Ethical Investment Ltd 
91 2007 SR AMC Amcor Limited 
92 2007 SR ANZ ANZ Banking 
93 2007 SR ERA ERA 
94 2007 SR FGL Foster’s Group Limited 
95 2007 SR IAG Insurance Australia Group Limited 
96 2007 SR ORI Orica 
97 2007 SR PNA PanAustralia Ltd 
98 2007 SR TSE Transfield Services Limited 
 204 
No. Report 
ASX 
Code 
Company 
99 2007 SR WBC Westpac Banking Corp 
100 2009 AR AAC Australian Agricultural Company Limited 
101 2009 AR AAD Ardent Leisure Group 
102 2009 AR AAX Ausenco Limited 
103 2009 AR ABC Adelaide Brighton Limited 
104 2009 AR ABU ABM Resources NL 
105 2009 AR ABY Aditya Birla Minerals Limited 
106 2009 AR ACS Accent Resources NL 
107 2009 AR AGK AGL Energy Limited 
108 2009 AR AMP AMP 
109 2009 AR API Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Limited 
110 2009 AR ASX  Australian Securities Exchange 
111 2009 AR AUQ Alara Resources Limited 
112 2009 AR AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Limited 
113 2009 AR AVG Australian Vintage Ltd 
114 2009 AR AWE Australian Worldwide Exploration Limited 
115 2009 AR AXM Apex Minerals NL 
116 2009 AR AXY Atom Energy Limited 
117 2009 AR AZS Azure Minerals Limited 
118 2009 AR BIS Bisalloy Steel Group 
119 2009 AR BKL Blackmores Limited 
120 2009 AR BLD Boral Limited 
121 2009 AR BOE Boss Energy Limited 
122 2009 AR BPT Beach Petroleum Limited 
123 2009 AR BSE Base Iron Ltd 
124 2009 AR BSL BlueScope Steel Limited 
125 2009 AR BVA Bravura Solutions Limited 
126 2009 AR BWP Bunnings Property Management Limited 
127 2009 AR BXB Brambles Limited 
128 2009 AR BYR Burey Gold Limited 
129 2009 AR CCL Coca-Cola Amatil Limited 
130 2009 AR CDP Carindale Property Trust 
131 2009 AR CES Coal FE Resources Ltd 
132 2009 AR CFX CFS Retail Property Trust 
133 2009 AR CHR Chalmers Limited 
134 2009 AR CII CI Resources Limited 
135 2009 AR CLH Collection House Limited 
136 2009 AR CNB CIC Australia Limited 
137 2009 AR CPU Computershare Limited 
138 2009 AR CRG Crane Group Limited 
139 2009 AR CSR CSR Limited 
140 2009 AR CVY Coventry Resources Limited 
141 2009 AR CWE Carnegie Wave Energy Limited 
142 2009 AR CWP Cedar Woods Property 
143 2009 AR CXP Corporate Express 
144 2009 AR CXU Cauldron Energy Limited 
145 2009 AR CYG Coventry Group Ltd 
146 2009 AR DRK Drake Resources Limited 
147 2009 AR DSF DSF International Holdings Limited 
148 2009 AR DTL Data#3 Limited 
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149 2009 AR EAR Echo Resources Limited 
150 2009 AR EEE Empire Beer Group Limited 
151 2009 AR EME Energy Metals Limited 
152 2009 AR ENE Energy Developments Limited 
153 2009 AR ENL Eagle Nickel Limited 
154 2009 AR ERA Energy Resources of Australia Ltd 
155 2009 AR ERJ Enerji Ltd 
156 2009 AR EXT Extract Resources Ltd 
157 2009 AR FKP FKP Property Group 
158 2009 AR FMG Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 
159 2009 AR FPH Fisher &Paykel Healthcare Corporation Limited 
160 2009 AR FPS Fiducian Portfolio Services Limited 
161 2009 AR GDY Geodynamics Limited 
162 2009 AR GGE Grand Gulf Energy Limited 
163 2009 AR GLE GLG Corporation 
164 2009 AR GMD Genesis Minerals Limited 
165 2009 AR GMG Goodman Group 
166 2009 AR GNC GrainCorp Limited 
167 2009 AR GNI Global Nickel Investments Limited 
168 2009 AR GNV Green Invest 
169 2009 AR GPT GPT Management Holdings Limited 
170 2009 AR GRY Gryphon Minerals Limited 
171 2009 AR GXY Galaxy resources limited 
172 2009 AR HGG Henderson Group plc 
173 2009 AR HRR Heron Resources Limited 
174 2009 AR HTA Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Limited 
175 2009 AR HUM Total Staffing Solutions Limited 
176 2009 AR HZN Horizon Oil Limited 
177 2009 AR IDG Indago Resources Limited 
178 2009 AR IPL Incitec Pivot Limited 
179 2009 AR ITO Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Limited 
180 2009 AR ITS InterStaff Recruitment Limited 
181 2009 AR JGL Jackgreen Limited 
182 2009 AR KAS Kasbah Resources Limited 
183 2009 AR KEY Key Petroleum Ltd 
184 2009 AR LBY Liberty Resources Ltd 
185 2009 AR LNG Liquefied Natural Gas Limited 
186 2009 AR LYC Lynas Corporation Limited 
187 2009 AR MAP MAp Airports Limited 
188 2009 AR MAS HITEC ENERGY LIMITED 
189 2009 AR MBT Mission NewEnergy 
190 2009 AR MCP McPherson’s Limited 
191 2009 AR MDA Modena Resources Limited 
192 2009 AR MEL Metgasco Ltd 
193 2009 AR MIX Mirvac Industrial Trust 
194 2009 AR MND Monadelphous Group 
195 2009 AR MOF Macquarie Office Trust 
196 2009 AR MQG Macquarie Group Limited 
197 2009 AR MYR NB Flinders Pty Ltd 
198 2009 AR NAB National Australia Bank Limited Group 
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199 2009 AR NEN Salinas Energy Limited 
200 2009 AR NFE Northern Iron Limited 
201 2009 AR NFK Norfolk Group Limited 
202 2009 AR NHC New Hope Corporation Limited 
203 2009 AR NHR National Hire Group Limited 
204 2009 AR NOD Nomad Building Solutions Limited 
205 2009 AR NSL NSL Consolidated Limited 
206 2009 AR NSX NSX Limited 
207 2009 AR OGC Oceana Gold 
208 2009 AR OSH Oil Search Limited 
209 2009 AR OZL Oz Minerals Ltd 
210 2009 AR PBD Port Bouvard Limited 
211 2009 AR PDN Paladin Energy Ltd 
212 2009 AR PEH Pacific Environment Limited 
213 2009 AR PEM Perilya Limited 
214 2009 AR PFL Patties Foods Ltd 
215 2009 AR PHG Pulse Health Limited 
216 2009 AR PPX PaperlinX Limited 
217 2009 AR QUE Queste Communications Ltd 
218 2009 AR RCI Rocklands Richfield Limited 
219 2009 AR RCR RCR Tomlinson Limited 
220 2009 AR RFL Rubik Financial Limited 
221 2009 AR RGD RER Group Limited 
222 2009 AR RNI Resource & Investment NL 
223 2009 AR RRS Range resources ltd 
224 2009 AR SFR Sandfire Resources NL 
225 2009 AR SGP Stocklands Group 
226 2009 AR SGZ Scotgold Resources Limited 
227 2009 AR SLX Silex Systems Limited 
228 2009 AR SMC Strategic Minerals Corporation NL 
229 2009 AR STG Staging Connections Group Limited 
230 2009 AR TAM Tanami Gold NL 
231 2009 AR TAP Tap Oil Limited 
232 2009 AR TAW Tawana Resources NL 
233 2009 AR TBG Tutt Bryant Group Limited 
234 2009 AR TBR Tribune Resources NL 
235 2009 AR TCL Transurban Group 
236 2009 AR TEN Ten Network Holdings Limited 
237 2009 AR TLS Telstra Corporation Limited 
238 2009 AR TNE Technology One Limited 
239 2009 AR TRF Trafford Resources Limited 
240 2009 AR TSE Transfield Services Limited 
241 2009 AR TSF Total Staffing Solutions Limited 
242 2009 AR TTS Tatts Group Limited 
243 2009 AR UOG United Orogen Limited 
244 2009 AR UXA United Uranium Limited 
245 2009 AR VRL Village Roadshow Limited 
246 2009 AR WAN West Australian Newspapers Holdings Limited 
247 2009 AR WBC Westpac Banking Corporation 
248 2009 AR WDC Westfield Group 
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249 2009 AR WDS WDS Limited 
250 2009 AR WHC Whitehaven Coal Limited 
251 2009 AR WPG Western Plains Resources Ltd 
252 2009 AR WPL Woodside Petroleum Ltd 
253 2009 AR WTP Watpac Limited 
254 2009 AR WWG World Wide Entertainment Group Limited 
255 2009 SR BLD Boral Limited 
256 2009 SR CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
257 2009 SR CSR CSR Limited 
258 2009 SR CWN Crown Limited 
259 2009 SR DYE Dyesol Limited 
260 2009 SR FMG Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 
261 2009 SR LEI Leighton Holdings Limited 
262 2009 SR LGL Lihir Gold Limited 
263 2009 SR OZL Oz Minerals Ltd 
264 2009 SR ROC Roc Oil Company Limited 
265 2009 SR SGP Stockland 
266 2009 SR SPN SP Australia Networks (Distribution) Ltd  
 
 
 
